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The twentieth century has created so many symbols, so many new
concepts. It has also created a new human species: the refugee. Now
what is the characteristic of a refugee? It is that she or he has no
citizenship. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of human beings have
felt - overnight - unwanted.
What has been done to the word refuge? In the beginning the word
sounded beautiful. A refuge meant "home." It welcomed you, protected
you, gave you warmth and hospitality. Then we added one single
phoneme, one letter, e, and the positive term refuge became refugee,
connoting something negative.
ELIE WIESEL

1

The transformation of interpretation into legal meaning begins when
someone accepts the demands of interpretation and, through the personal
act of commitment, affirms the position taken.
ROBERT COVER

2

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Brief Overview of the Sanctuary Movement
In 1985, the United States sought and obtained the indictment of two
nuns, a Protestant minister, two Quakers, several lay Catholic and Protestant
employees of church-sponsored social services, and members of religious

I.

Elie Wiesel,

The Refugee, in SANCTUARY: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR UNDER-

STANDING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES' STRUGGLE 10 (Gary
MacEoin ed., 1985).

2. Robert Cover, Nomos. and Narrative,
95, 144 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992).

in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
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congregations, for their work in assisting Central American refugees 3 to
enter and find safe haven in this country, despite the efforts of Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) efforts to capture and return them. The
"sanctuary movement" was a church community awakened by refugees'
eyewitness accounts of death squads, torture, and the disappearance of
citizens4 and of church aid and other humanitarian aid workers. 5 For North
Americans, these accounts provoked a double trauma: the knowledge of
extensive human rights abuses in Central America by United Statessupported forces, coupled with the refusal of the United States government
to harbor refugees until the hostilities in El Salvador abated. 6
By the time of the Tucson indictment, the Sanctuary Movemene

3. As a matter of United States and international law, "refugee" is a term of art
meaning a person who has a "well-founded fear" that he or she will face persecution on
account of their "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion" if returned to the country of origin. See Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952 § IOI(a)(42), 8 C.§ IIOI(a)(42) (1988); Protocol Relating to the Status ofRefugees,
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. This is narrower than the colloquial sense of
the term, which refers more generally to persons displaced from the security of their homes
and communities, particularly due to military hostilities, political instability, human rights
abuses, and perhaps natural disaster.
The Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) refers to people who have entered
the United States without proper visas and whom it has not yet determined to be "refugees,"
as "illegal aliens." Compare 8 C. ~ Il01(a)(42) with 8 C. § 1101 (frequently using the
undefined term "illegal aliens").
This Article refers to people fleeing war and human rights abuses and claiming to be
refugees, as refugees, without regard to whether they are aware of the law's technical
requirements. Where "refugee" is used as a term of art, it will be indicated or evident by
context.
4. See discussion infra part IJ.A.2.
5. See discussion infra part IJ.B.
6. Instead, the INS imprisoned the new refugees and deported them promptly,
systematically violating refugees' legal rights to legal counsel and an opportunity to apply
for asylum. See discussion infra part IV.B.3.
7. "Sanctuary Movement" is used in this Article primarily as an historian might use
it to refer to the network of people and congregations who aided Central American refugees
coming to or through the United States during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. The
policies of those administrations regarding the governments of Central American nations,
asylum applications of fleeing citizens of those countries, and adherence to international
agreements concerning human rights, figure prominently in any effort to describe and
understand the actions of the individuals prosecuted for their Sanctuary work. Readers
should bear in mind, however, that Central Americans continue to flee northward from civil
wars and persecution, and the Sanctuary Movement continues to offer assistance for safety.
By "Sanctuary workers," I mean people who consciously and actively participated in the
Sanctuary Movement, whether by actually providing assistance to particular refugees or by
organizing the work of other participants.
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sprawled across the nation, from California, Arizona, and Texas on the
border of Mexico; north to Seattle; east to Cleveland, Chicago, New York,
and Boston, and even into Canada. 8 The growing network of Sanctuary
providers and their supporters continually reiterated the religious principles
of the people providing aid and sanctuary. The Movement developed
practices of"testimony" presented to churches, a practice which disseminated refugees' stories of persecution and escape. In this way, Sanctuary
workers invoked familiar church-based rhetoric of ministry and aid, as they
called on other faith communities to provide similar sanctuary assistance.
The relief network spread across the country, chiefly through religious
congregations, despite federal criminal sanctions for harboring or transporting "illegal aliens."
As the Sanctuary network spread, its inconsistency with official
interpretation of United States immigration laws against harboring illegal
aliens became more evident. After first dismissing the Movement as
irrelevant piety, federal officials changed tack; in 1984 and 1985, several
participants in the Sanctuary Movement were arrested and prosecuted in
Texas and Arizona on charges of alien smuggling, harboring and concealing,
and conspiracy. 9 Officials in Washington, D.C., authorized the extended
undercover investigation nicknamed "Operation Sojourner," which relied on
bugged informants' participation in church services and Bible studies as well
as attendance at meetings of the Tucson Ecumenical Council's task force on

Two excellent books written by journalists recount the rise and spread of the North
American Sanctuary Movement during the 1980s: ANN CRITIENDEN, SANCTUARY (1988);
ROBERT TOMSHO, THE AMERICAN SANCTUARY MOVEMENT (1987). Some Sanctuary
Movement participants have written invaluable accounts ofthe Movement's development, the
most comprehensive of which are: IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES ( 1985); RENNY GOLDEN & MICHAEL MCCONNELL,
SANCTUARY: THE NEW UNDERGROUND RAILROAD ( 1986); CHICAGO RELIGIOUS TASK FORCE
ON CENTRAL AMERICA, SANCTUARY: A JUSTICE MINISTRY (1986); Wiesel, supra note I.
8. In the San Francisco area, some 26 Christian and Jewish congregations comprised
the East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, and others formed the San Francisco Sanctuary Covenant.
In Texas, church-related shelters offered housing, and Central American families subsequently resettled with churches throughout Texas. In Arizona, the Tucson Ecumenical Cou~cil
(TEC) formed a task force to organize the shelter of as many refugees as it could in church
buildings and parishioners' homes. TEC volunteers solicited community legal resources to
aid refugees to secure asylum under immigration laws and raised money to bond refugees out
of INS detention centers while asylum claims were pending. The Chicago Religious Task
Force on Central America later agreed to coordinate the resettlement of refugees coming
through Arizona, to church communities far from the border.
9. See United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989), amended after denial
of rehearing, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 1046 (1991); United States v.
Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), reh 'g
and reh'g en bane denied, 772 F.2d 904 (1985); United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574
(S.D. Tex. 1985).
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Central America. 10 The investigation eventually led to the criminal
indictment of various members of the Tucson area's Movement in January
1985. 11
What ensued was the highly publicized Tucson trial whose every media
report underscored the contesting rhetorical claims of the parties.
Prosecutors described the defendants as alien-smugglers, conspirators, and
felons. 12 But Sanctuary defendants and supporters countered. At press
conferences on the courthouse steps, weekend speaking appearances, and
through media reports, the defendants explained that:
Sanctuary is not a building. It is not one man or one woman or 16 of
them. It is a response rooted in faith and nurtured by prayer and
conscience that has captured the hearts of tens of thousands of persons
across the country. It is a sign of hope and compassion that is springing
forth from an ever-growing number of faithful every day. 13

The defendants in these actions understood their Sanctuary efforts as an
integral part of a religiously directed way of life, in which they had been
able to respond to refugees with shelter and protection from the persecution
and strife that the refugees fled. Federal officials, however, responded as
if the Sanctuary defendants were practicing coyotismo, the cruel servitude
into which entrepreneurial alien smugglers sell any whom they can slip into
the United States. 14 Subsequent court decisions excluded evidence and
arguments that the Sanctuary defendants sought to address the issue of
whether their actions of humane assistance violated United States laws. 15

10. See Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989) (challenging the electronic surveillance of church activities); infra part III.B.
11. See discussion infra part liLA.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 190-92 (discussing the prosecution's more
colorful and Communist-phobic characterization).
13. BAU, supra note 7, at 181 (quoting a joint statement issued by religious leaders
after the Arizona indictments in support of Sanctuary ministry).
14. Coyotismo is transit in exchange for often extortionate payments, with no
guarantee of successful passage into the United States. Coyotes can and do exploit their
"passengers," by robbing, raping, or prostituting them, and even abandoning them to die in
the desert. See, e.g., MIRIAM DAVIDSON, CONVICTIONS OF THE HEART: JIM CORBETT AND
THE SANCTUARY MOVEMENT 6-12 ( 1988) (discussing the 13 middle-class Salvadorans, illequipped for desert travel, who died after being abandoned by their coyotes in Organ Pipe
National Monument); Alien Deaths Followed Long March in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
1984, § 1, at 16 (four illegal aliens killed in train wreck during 20-hour forced march without
food and water); AI Senia, Thirteen Smuggled Salvadorans Found Dead in United States
Desert, WASH. POST, July 6, 1980, at A I; see also TED CONOVER, COYOTES: A JOURNEY
THROUGH THE SECRET WORLD OF AMERICA'S ILLEGAL ALIENS (1987) (discussing a slightly
less gruesome account of coyotismo in the underground economy of Mexican laborers in the
United Sfates agricultural industry).
15. See supra note 9; infra part III.B. Only in the first legal test was a Sanctuary
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These clashes on the field of legal process have been variously assessed by
commentators as "persecution" of the Sanctuary workers, as the reluctant
response of an administration 16 pressured to act by the media's baiting, 17
and as an overtly political trial in which government officials intended to
criminalize the Movement's relief activities 18 or to constrain nongovernmental humanitarian charity. 19
Between the birth of the North American Sanctuary Movement, in 1980,
and the Tucson trial, in 1985, participants forged the praxis and philosophy
of the Sanctuary movement, at the center of which a discourse honored and
encouraged the faith-basis for that work. A burgeoning number of faith
communities around the United States agreed to shelter and support Central
Americans who had fled war in their home countries, and who then were
aided by Sanctuary workers to cross into the United States and evade
detention and deportation. In the linked practices of border-crossing,
sheltering, and aiding the Central Americans to give testimony of the
conditions that the refugees had fled, Sanctuary participants enacted their
own interpretations of the United States and international laws of refugee
recognition and assistance. These interpretations were contrary to the ones
enforced by United States officials. As I will explain in Part IV, Tucson
Sanctuary participants developed a collective interpretive authority in their
practice of "civil initiative"-a conscientious community practice to uphold
human rights law even when the government persists in violating such law.
In welcoming Central Americans into public, church-based Sanctuary, the
Movement's leaders consciously invoked ancient religious traditions of safe
refuge, and prepared to confront the Government over its claim to interpret
authoritatively the meaning of law.
Despite the unmistakable centrality of mainstream churches to the spread
of the Sanctuary Movement, the Government fundamentally failed to
perceive the practices of Sanctuary as religious expression. Indeed, the
Government's investigation, prosecution strategies, and judicial pronounce-

defendant permitted to present a legal defense based on the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574.
16. See Katherine L. Vaughns, Of Morality. Politics and the Legal Order, 14 Mo.
J. INT'L. L. & TRADE 127, 137 (1990) (reviewing CRITTENDEN, supra note 7).
17. See. e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 101, 105, 115, 190-92 (1988).
18. See Sophie H. Pirie, The Origins of a Political Trial: The Sanctuary Movement
and Political Justice, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 381, 383 (1990). Generally, "political trials"
refers to trials in which political motivation rather than legalism drives the decision to
prosecute, political considerations affect the outcome, or participants intend their conduct to
make the most of the political consequences of appearing before courts. !d. at 384 (citing
N. Dorsen & L. Friedman, DISORDER IN THE COURT, REPORT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CiTY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COURTROOM CONDUCT 79
(1973)).
19. See Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Bambino, Harboring, Sanctuary and the Crime
of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119 (1993).
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ments denigrated the religious impulses of Sanctuary, and left a written
record that elevates state power at the expense of conscience. Still, the
power of Sanctuary workers' practices-in which thousands of United States
citizens participated, and still do-suggests that such practices have not been
fully subordinated to statist legal discourse.
This Article considers what this phenomenon of "religious outlaws" may
teach us about the capacity of law to retain its customary authoritative rule,
in the face of contrary experience among citizens which makes them willing
to interpret the law differently. What is the social meaning of thousands of
ordinarily conventional and quietist "people in the pew" engaging in a
subculture of opposition? Virtually all contemporary analysis of this
recurring phenomenon examines such conflicts of religious and civil duty
from the perspective of the law, posing the question: How does (or should)
the law treat religiously motivated activity in the socio-political sphere?20
My project begins at the opposite end of the frame, asking: How do people,
whose religious convictions lead them to take actions proscribed by law,
view the law? What empowers them to resist and reframe the law as
interpreted by government officials and courts? What cognitive, discursive,
or other means render the citizens' legal interpretation possible-indeed, a
social force to be reckoned with?
In Part V of this Article, I consider what we ought to make of this
phenomenon of citizen interpretive authority, and particularly, of the claim
that Sanctuary civil initiative strengthens rather than demeans the law. How
dangerous, or how valuable, are such processes of citizen interpretation?
This Article is a project in which I read the social meanings of law, by
referring to the understandings ascribed by members of society to matters
about which the law speaks, and not only to positive laws and the institutions which make and apply them. While this Article primarily considers
Sanctuary Movement participants, whose culture of religiously prompted
practice contested the Government's .interpretation of federal laws concern-

20. Scholars debate whether generally applicable law should provide an exemption,
and if an exemption exists, whether an implicit interpretation of legal rules, explicit mandate,
or a constitutional right. See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 555 (1991);
William P. Marshall, In Defense ofSmith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv.
308 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. II 09 ( 1990) (developing arguments for exemption); Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992); Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv.
1409 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195
( 1992); Symposium, Georgetown Symposium on Church and State and Society and Law
Colloquium, 71. L. & RELIGION 261 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1989) (discussing the constitutional
status of claims of exemption); Ellis West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based
Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 624 (1990).
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ing legal entry/ 1 similar situations might be expected to arise in our evermore religiously diverse nation. 22
I began with interviews of Sanctuary defendants, enabling me to learn
from the "religious outlaws" how they framed the questions of societal
obligations and of religious liberty, before their faith-motivated efforts made
them lawyers' clients and defendants in federal criminal trials. 23 I wished

21. See United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1989). Eight Sanctuary
workers were convicted on 18 felony counts for violating 8 C.§§ 1324(a), 1325 (1952). All
defendants received sentences of probation; none served in prison. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 667.
Three others were found not guilty. Originally 16 were indicted, and 60 unindicted coconspirators were named. !d.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 was amended after the Tucson indictment,
by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 112(a), 100 Stat.
3381. The successor version of§ 1324(a) changes the scienter standard from "willfully or
knowingly" to "knowing or in reckless disregard." !d.
22. See Loken & Bambino, supra note 19. The Gulf War began the day after the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Aguilar, and congregations made a new round of
Sanctuary declarations, offering counseling and shelter to military personnel refusing
deployment. !d. A number of churches offered Sanctuary throughout the United States
during the Vietnam War, even though its role in that protest was collateral and not central.
See discussion infra part I.B.2.; MITCHELL K. HALL, BECAUSE OF THEIR FAITH: CALCAV
AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION TO THE VIETNAM WAR (1990).
23. The Designated Research Institutional Fund of the University of Maryland at
Baltimore funded my interviews with Sanctuary participants. Some participants' contemporaneous views were recorded in secret tapes and transcripts made as part of the federal
undercover investigation of the Sanctuary movement, "Operation Sojourner." I reviewed the
tape transcripts identified for trial, courtesy of Jim Brosnahan of Morrison & Foerster in San
Francisco.
I employed a narrative interview procedure for my primary research, drawn from
traditional ethnographic work, see, e.g., IRVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LiFE ( 1959), with sensitivity to the cognitive framework associated with Jerome
Bruner. See JEROME S. BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (1986). Each
interview began with an open-ended discussion of the subject's life, in response to the
request to: "Tell me about yourself, and particularly how you came to be involved with the
Sanctuary Movement." The interviews continued through open-ended questions posed in
multiple sessions, ranging from 90 minutes to several hours. Questions were designed to
elicit personal background; views of self as religious; senses of faith, law, and obligations
prior to and following arrest; expectations and assessment of risks, before and after arrest;
and finally, views of faith, law, and the subject's conduct, in light of the outcomes of trial
and appeal.
All interviews took place some five years after the verdicts, just as probation was ending
for those convicted. I met with some Sanctuary workers and defendants because of
introductions made by the first defendant with whom I met. By that time, several Sanctuary
defendants had moved away from Tucson, some having trained for other work (by going to
seminary, learning a language, preparing to teach school). A few dropped out of sight
altogether, and neither conventional leads nor the continuing Sanctuary network located them.
Some defendants whom I met were cautious about my research; one interrogated me first
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to learn the stories of the defendants, independent of the analytic frame and
premises used by the few courts who judged their actions. Because these
Sanctuary accounts are missing from the courts' recitals or serious analysis,
we are invited to compare and contrast the accounts with the courts' analytic
method to address both the religious and criminal conceptions of defendants'
acts.

B. Conceptual Approach and the Use of Narrative
This Article relates two narratives: that of Sanctuary participants,
including many of those who were prosecuted in Arizona in United States
v. Aguilar, and that of federal prosecutors and judges. To speak of narrative
ordinarily implies three essential elements: a story about an event, a narrator
who tells it, and the audience to whom it is told. 24 My effort is complicated by the fact that the Sanctuary givers' actions were the subject of
narration and interpretation by officials of the federal legal system. In
presenting both the Sanctuary and the official narratives, I necessarily give
each narrative a story form: the beginnings, continuities, and conclusions to
organize the flow of events through time. Because every project relating
events in the past requires some starting point and some perspective, all
historical accounts are contingent on interpretive narrative. 25 Narrative
about what I would do if my notes were subpoenaed. Others sought no conditions or
limitations on our meeting or my use of the materials produced.
The perspectives of the two Mexican defendants, Father Ramon Quinones and Maria
Socorro de Aguilar, are largely missing from this and all other published accounts of the
government's prosecution of Sanctuary providers. According to several interviewees, these
defendants were stung by the prosecution-Senora Aguilar by the personal betrayal of herself
and her priest by the government's informant, Jesus Cruz, and Father Quinones by what he
saw as the North American obsession with the superiority of the United States, whose
materialistic culture he viewed as foreign and dangerous for Central Americans' traditional
and spiritual values. Just as focusing on the defendant Sanctuary workers tends to obscure
the breadth and nature of the rescue movement, so does focusing on United· States
participants obscure the extensive efforts at protection made throughout Mexico on the behalf
of fleeing Central Americans. Nevertheless, I only attempt to discuss the churchstate/religion-politics tangle on the United States side of a binational network.
24. See GERALD A. PRINCE, A DICTIONARY OF NARRATOLOGY 58 (1987) (providing
a detailed definition of "narrative": "Narrative: The recounting ... of one or more real or
fictitious EVENTS communicated by one, two or several narrators to one, two or several . . .
NARRA TEES").
25. This perspectival character of witnessing in history distinguishes history from
mere chronology, and from "detachable" conclusions of science. See SHOSHANA FELMAN
& DORI LAUB, TESTIMONY: CRISES OF WITNESSING IN LITERATURE, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND
HISTORY 94 ( 1992). All use of narrative to tell history has the potential to illuminate, yet
stories may simultaneously distract or deceive. But see William Cronon, A Place for Stories:
Nature, History and Narrative, 78 J. AM. HIST. 1347, 1349 (1992) (stating that "the very
authority with which narrative presents its vision of reality is achieved by obscuring large
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remains an essential tool for searching out meaning in a complicated and
conflicted world. 26
I begin with the Sanctuary movement counterstory because of the power
of the official narration generally, and its specific exercise in regard to the
Sanctuary Movement, which has sought to eliminate from its annals any
trace of the Sanctuary protagonists' search for the moral interpretation of the
United States law in responding to refugees. 27 The official narratives,
constructed through the conventions of the legal system, are rendered with
a uniquely legal perception of the world. As Kim Scheppele reminds us,
"Those trained in the law learn to see the world in particular ways, and the
particular ways come to be seen unproblematicaly as the only truth there
is." 28 The force with which narrative studies have emerged within legal
scholarship in the past decade 29 attests to the function of the narrative form

portions of that reality"); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber
and Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REV. 665, 673 (1993) (explaining that "every narrative ... leaves
out something"); Michael A. Coffino, Comment, Genre, Narrative and Judgment: Legal and
Protest Song Stories in Two Criminal Cases, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 679, 684-85 (1994).
26. See Cronon, supra note 25, at 1374.
27. See David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2152,2155-56 (1989). See also Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 57, 109 (1984) ("The power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that
it can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to persuade people that
the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane
person would want to live.").
28. Kim L. Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2088
(1989); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 18 (1976) (legal
analysis transforms episodes from persons' lives into rules of law, thereby subverting the
stories that led to the cases); KIM L. SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1976) (judges construct
factual stories to justify their selection of legal rules); Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1982) (explaining that judges experience decision-making as
constrained by precedent); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353 ( 1978) (explaining that law responds to a narrow form of reasoning, by
demanding litigants to express their claims in high degree of rationality); see also Gunther
Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW &
Soc'v REV. 727, 740 (1989) (explaining that law constructs its own social reality, and its
language makes communication with other social discourses extremely difficult).
The multisided character of reality, rendered incompletely by any telling, is partially
recognized in studies of trial practice. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S.
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM (1981) (analyzingjury decisionmaking as assessment of the competing stories told through testimony); BERNARD JACKSON,
LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 61 (1988) (explaining that prosecutor and defense
counsel present facts in the form of a story, and both select from available facts to construct
a narrative that is persuasive, i.e., conveys meaning favorable to their respective "sides" of
the whole).
29. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991)
(explicating methodologies of feminist narrative scholarship and analyzing several critiques
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in judging the consequences of human actions. Thus, my aim in Part II is
to convey "from the inside" the perspectives of people doing the activities
of Sanctuary. Like most legal scholars using narrative methods, I share the
premise that a situated complex of live detail is instructive to us all as we
construct meaning in the processes of law and life. 30
The legal-system narrative, presented in Part IIV' takes the form and
outcome that we might predict based on patterns of judicial resistance to
citizen interpretation of legal obligation. With few exceptions, Sanctuary
prosecutions resulted in felony convictions, sternly conservative rationales
by two federal circuits, and utter disinterest on the part of the Supreme
Court. No sympathetic rules of law or dicta survived the court fights; some
repressive law was made concerning the legality of government surveillance
of church activities. Yet several participants in the Sanctuary movement see
important successes. Clearly, they look somewhere other than I did at the
start of this project.
Like social scientists studying Europeans who had come to the aid of
refugees from the Third Reich, 32 I initially framed my research to inquire

of feminist narrative scholarship); Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42
DUKE L.J. 630 (1992); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 ( 1989); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic, Norms and
Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (1991); Gerald
P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. I, 35 (1984) (using narratives in problemsolving to demonstrate "the nature of story and argument as meaning-making acts of persuasion"); Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 ( 1987).
30. Scholars who use narrative as a means of relating law and religion include:
MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW ( 1993) (providing narratives of seven lives in
the law, juxtaposed with Biblical and literary texts); Cover, supra note 2; Carol Weisbrod,
Charles Guiteau and the Christian Nation, 7 J. L. & RELIGION 187 ( 1989) (use of narrative
in discussion of religious faith and the law of insanity).
31. I use the phrases "legal-system narrative" and "official narrative" interchangeably, to indicate the depiction by government actors- federal investigators, prosecutors,
judges, and others-of the Sanctuary workers' context, motives, reasons, and conduct.
My sources for this section are a combination of primary and secondary sources. The
~ecord of Aguilar is huge: there are over 100 volumes of the reporter's transcripts containing
over 16,000 pages. Fourteen pretrial hearings and conferences entailed thousands of pages
of pleadings. The trial lasted six months, even though the defendants did not testify. I
reviewed portions of the trial record and appellate materials made available to me by some
Sanctuary defendants and by two members of the defense team, Ellen Yaroshevsky and
James Brosnahan. A large army of the press witnessed and reported the courtroom dynamics
and exchanges. One New York Times reporter observed much of the trial and conducted
extensive interviews with the principal government investigators and prosecutors and
published a well-documented book. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 7. I have cited to aspects
of this work where I have been able to corroborate her account through other participants or
sources and, in a few instances, where it is the only practically available source.
32. See SAMUEL P. OLINER & PEARL M. OLINER, THE ALTRUISTIC PERSONALITY:

i
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about the qualities that cause some people to help undocumented persons in
spite of government claims that such activity is a serious crime. I learned
that I was asking misleadingly individuated questions. The response of
Sanctuary was a communitarian one. Thus the more pertinent question
might be: In what kind of community are people empowered to act to
protect the human rights of others, despite the opposition of their own
government?
Part IV compares the inconsistent concepts behind the state-oriented
legalism of the official narratives, and the civil-initiative narrative of
Sanctuary participants. Here, the flashpoint is the official denial of any
interpretive authority for communities of citizens to frame appropriate
response to matters of human rights. While the Sanctuary civil initiative
perceived responsibility to do justice under principles of refugee law once
their government defaulted, the government actors used frames of criminality and alienation to obscure a very real crisis of legal meaning. In Part V,
I examine two strands of the vigorous judicial resistance to citizen
interpretation of legal meaning. One is the problem of judicial skepticism
of religious consciousness, particularly when this consciousness is not neatly
compartmentalized in a sectarian identification. The second problem is
judicial denigration of dissent, which is potentially a more serious blow to
vital democracy.
II. SANCTUARY AS AN ASSERTION OF
INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY

It is often reported that the participants of the Sanctuary Movement of
the 1980s generally concede the illegality of their assistance to undocumented Central American immigrants to the United States. 33 If providing
shelter, transportation, and protection did violate federal immigration Jaws,
then the media's framing of Sanctuary made sense: Sanctuary as a resurgent
movement to protest government policy, analogous to civil disobedience

RESCUERS OF JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE ( 1988); Kristen R. Monroe, John Donne's People:
Explaining Differences between Rational Actors and Altruists through Cognitive Frameworks,
53 J. POL. 394, 424 (1991 ).
33. See, e.g., Charles Austin, More Churches Join in Offering Sanctuary for Latin
Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1983, at Al8; Jim Bencirenga, Church Sanctuary-Ancient
Tradition in a Modern World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 22, 1983, at 5; Geraldine
Brooks, Offered Sanctuary: Scores qf Churches Take In Illegal Aliens Fleeing Latin
America, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1984, at I, 27; Ari L. Goldman, Churches Becoming Home
to Central American Exiles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. I, 1984, § 4, at 9; Marita Hernandez, Refugees
Travel Openly, ll/egal/y to Find a Haven, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1984, at I; Offering
Sanctuary to Salvadoran Refugees-ll/egal/y, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 5, 1985;
Churches DefY Law-Form Network to Harbor Salvadoran Reji.tgees, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, August 20, 1982, at 6; George Volsky, Churches Offer Sanctuary to Aliens
Facing Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1983, at AI, A16.
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during the Vietnam War era, with its images of deconstructed social order
and resultant prosecutions of individuals who conspired to question the
Administration's authority in foreign policy and other executive arenas.
This rendition of Sanctuary as law-breaking protest evokes a familiar picture
and, for many Americans, not a terribly troubling narrative of maintaining
social order through the rule of law in the world's premier democracy.
I want to disturb this still life, first by unsettling the claim that
participants in the Sanctuary Movement regarded their conduct as "illegal."
The network nearest the border with Mexico has had the most direct experience with refugees from Central American wars who, since 1981, have
sought safety in the North. As their numbers-and the decade-advanced,
so too did the activities and the understanding of Sanctuary providers
throughout the borderlands between the United States and Mexico. Theirs
was a situated knowledge, born of receiving refugees, many of whom were
physically scarred and emotionally shattered by the time they reached the
United States border. Their responsive practice developed in the circumstances of that time and place. The flood of needy new arrivals shaped a
community practice that differed in important respects from practices of
others concerned to do Sanctuary yet who lived far away from the border.
Among the people who have constituted the Sanctuary Movement in
American's Southwest, Sanctuary is an American instance of civil initiative:
the conscientious practice of people joined by a faith-based understanding
of the importance and possibility of responding to the sufferings of
strangers, by enacting a way for society to comply with human rights laws
although the Government persisted in violating them.
As practiced throughout the Southwest, Sanctuary honed and extended
the rule of law. Beyond protest, dissent against governmental practices, or
petitions to the Government to comply with law, Sanctuary workers together
established a public space for citizens to reclaim authority delegated to the
state because, in their view, Government officials violated federal and
international laws. 34

34. Two conceptions of lawful Sanctuary conduct among Sanctuary workers must be
clarified. First, very early on, many throughout the Tucson Sanctuary network and beyond
believed that they were complying with the positive law concerning refugees. This was true
for those who presented refugees for asylum application and who had first-hand experience
with the abrupt shift in administrative policy, in 1981, to arrest and deport, rather than to
process asylum applications for Salvadorans. See discussion infra part II.A. This early
stance and its positivist interpretive tenor coincided with an expectation--encouraged perhaps
by the Government's long delay in seeking indictments-that, should there be arrests and
confrontations in court, the INS' errors would be uncovered and brought into line. Second,
that understanding was supplanted over time among a number of movement participants by
a clearer denial to the government of full interpretive authority. This perception was
sharpened by defendants' and their colleagues' experience of the Tucson trial as an
obfuscating and farcical avoidance of the pursuit of truth, umpired by a government actor
with vested interests in state-sanctioned policy viewpoints. This two-part schema is, of
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Media, prosecutors, and courts have all vied with the Sanctuary workers
to speak authoritatively about the work of the Sanctuary Movement. The
story, as told by the press, was structured as an "underground railroad" tale
in which all were cast as secretive alien smugglers. Thus, many persons in
the press accepted and perpetuated the governmental definitions of illegality
even while they deemed it just or noble. 35 The Government prosecutors
utilized the discourse of illegality, criminal conspiracy, and immigration
law's focus on alienage, as they precluded the defendants' possible
explanations and defenses raised at trial. The judicial narrative tells of a
conspiracy by misguided, if not bad actors, to violate the social order and
breach the borders. That judicial tale shrouds and silences an inner story of
a conscientious, ecumenical movement among people who constructed a
community faith and practice for doing justice, and an interpretive practice
for reading the law. Sanctuary workers developed and employed a discourse
and interpretive commitment, very different from that used by the formal
institutions of the law, that simultaneously expressed and helped to
constitute their experiences of knowledge, faith, community, and responsibility for justice.
Surely several meanings may be deduced from the official rulings
resulting from the Sanctuary prosecutions. But which? Robert Cover shows
us that legal meaning can only be spoken in plural voice and that the task
of interpretation is inherently pluralist. The formal institutions of law, the
positive legal rules, and the conventions of the social order to cede to courts
the power of authoritative legal interpretation, are surely important in
answering this question. Still, they are "but a small part of the normative
universe that ought to claim our attention," for no set of legal prescriptions
can exist-much less claim our exclusive allegiance-wholly apart from the
narratives that give them meaning. 36 Legal meaning is discernable only
against the norms of the communities we inhabit. It is constructed or
received according to the interpretive commitments of our social existenceonly one of which is official application of legal rules.
In Robert Cover's vision, we inhabit a normative universe, a nomos,
within which "[ w]e constantly create and maintain a world of right and

course, a simplification; Sanctuary workers no doubt differed in the importance they attached
to thinking through such distinctions.
35. See SUSAN B. COUTIN, THE CULTURE OF PROTEST 47 (1993). Coutin observes
that accompaniment stories are free of this implication of risk before law, though full of
physical dangers of traveling in Central American countries.
36. Cover, supra note 2, at 95. Cover stated:
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate
it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a
scripture. Once understood in the context of the :mrratives that give it meaning, law
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.
/d. at 95-96.
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wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void." 37 Sanctuary participants
in the Southwest engaged in a nomos, creating an understanding of refugee
law that diverged from the State's official interpretation of refugee laws.
The law they created-like all law-was constituted both by interpretation
and commitment. Sanctuary workers sought to enact legal meaning when
they acted on their understanding that fleeing Central Americans were
refugees entitled to assistance and nonretum. State actors similarly did more
than merely interpret the law. Police, prosecutors, and judges also must
possess more than an interpretive understanding to make legal meaning
operative; they must commit to that meaning in order to employ the State's
apparatus to enforce the official illegality interpretation. 38
The commitment. of the State to its law is indicated by the narratives it
chooses, but the law of refugees, and the law of citizen conscience
unfettered by the government's preferences, are also parts of the construction
of legal meaning. Cover taught: "The normative universe is held together
by the force of interpretive commitments-some small and private, others
immense and public. These commitments-of officials and of others-do
determine what law means and what law shall be."39
For individuals, the normative universe is only partly comprised of the
rules and institutions identifiable as the legal structure. One's nomos is also
constituted, in significant part, by the stories told and heard. Cover
explains: "Every prescription is insistent in its demand to be located in
discourse-to be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and end,
explanation and purpose. And every narrative is insistent in its demand for
its prescriptive point, its moral."40
In constructing the Sanctuary Movement's own discourse, participants
drew on preexisting discourses and crafted new elements. First, theology
provided the discourse elements of Biblical injunctions to love thy neighbor,
to see Christ in the poor, and to live Christ's teachings or God's commandments. Because applications of such theological precepts have historical
predicates in social gospel ideas, these ideas dovetailed with Americans'
vague awareness of the forceful liberation theology in Central America.
Secondly, at church meetings, public Sanctuary caravans, and services
of welcome and celebration, Sanctuary participants adopted practices of
"testimonies" by Central American refugees. 41 These practices drew on the
history of the Holocaust, when the world declined to hear the pleas of those
who sought refuge from Nazism, and on the discursive practices within

37. !d. at 95.
38. See Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the
Possibility of Legal Interpretation, II CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, I701-02 (1990); Susan P.
Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1402 (1992).
39. Cover, supra note 2, at 98-99.
40. !d. at 96.
41. See COUTIN, supra note 35, at 67-68.
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Central American liberation-theology. 42 A third element of the Sanctuary
Movement discourse involved consciousness ofborder-crossings: not just the
borders of nations, but the psychological and political boundaries between
First and Third Worlds, between affluence and poverty, security and risk,
apathy and faith. 43 Finally, to call on the nation and its people to do
justice, the Movement countered governmental interpretations of reality
confronting Central Americans as well as the justice and legality of the
Sanctuary Movement's actions.
This discourse depicts something far from the picture of hardened alien
smugglers. The Tucson participants' crossing and transporting stories are
replete with their own inexperience, stupidity, and luck. 44 Sanctuary stories
underscore the primacy of concern for Central Americans' safety. 45
The courtroom proceedings of the Tucson trial were effectively insulated
from this Movement discourse by the Government's sweeping motion in

42. This practice was an expression of knowledge that we are located in history: our
sense of society as both moral and legal community. See David A.J. Richards, Interpretation
and Historiography, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 489 (1985); see also Susan Waysdorf, Popular
Tribunals, Legal Storytelling, and the Pursuit of a Just Law, 2 YALE J. L. & LIB. 67 (1991 ).
43. North Americans who traveled and worked in Central America with displaced
people commonly observed that their status as internationals with powerful governments and
access to press offered them appreciable protection from most political terror. Such crossings
between the First and Third World is something with which the legal system and its
discourse have extremely limited experience. But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980). In Filartiga, the court held that the family of a Paraguayan tortured there
could bring suit in the United States against the Paraguayan police officer who committed
the torture. !d. In so holding, the court recognized trends in modem international law to lift
traditional restraints on the adjudication by one nation of the conduct of another toward its
citizens. Such "transnational public law litigation" promotes important social purposes by
denying repose and safe haven to those who perpetrate international crimes. Harold H. Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2397-98 (1991).
44. Several participants echoed the view offered by one pastor who participated in
the border crossings, stating: "We didn't plan. We just got a call that somebody was at the
border, and you had to go. And, it was really dumb." Author's Interview with Sanctuary
Defendant Subject No. 47 (June 1992) (redacted transcript on file with the Tennessee Law
Review). Due to the author's assurances of confidentiality, more specific information
regarding dates and places of interviews with Sanctuary defendants are not available.
However, redacted transcripts of language quoted from these interviews are on file with the
Tennessee Law Review.
45. Some stories also indicate differences of opinion within the movement about the
degrees of care shown to the safety of refugees and border workers. Many Sanctuary
participants viewed this as a gendered split. The issue was whether Fife and Corbett were
too accommodating to the press who rushed to cover border crossings, when that energy
might be applied to ameliorating the immediate human needs of refugees. All of my
interviewees saw this tension in the incident in which two young women volunteers were
accidently left in the desert for several hours without water because of the rush to load
refugees and reporters into the cars. Author's interviews with multiple subjects.

HeinOnline -- 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 914 1994-1995

1995]

RELIGIOUS OUTLAWS

915

limine, which excluded as irrelevant every element of fact, knowledge, and.
understanding which gave meaning to the Sanctuary defendants' conduct. 46
That exclusion did not change the fact or effect of the movement discourse
on participants or on those persons who had access to information beyond
the media's portrayal of the trial. Indeed, what was allowed into court was
considerably narrower than what was available to the public. Beyond the
official forum, there were press conferences on the courthouse steps, press
reports, and the persistence of Sanctuary despite the government crackdown.47
To understand the effects that silencing this story in court may have on
the legitimacy, power, and vitality of citizen-initiated justice practices,
readers should hear, as I did, the defendants' telling unmediated by
prosecutors' and judges' privileged narration.
A. "The Awakening Church"
According to accounts of the Sanctuary participants, the Sanctuary
Movement arose spontaneously along the United States-Mexico borderlands,
in response to a dramatic increase, beginning in 1980, in the flow of
Salvadoran refugees into the United States. At that time, few Americans
knew much about El Salvador, although there were news reports that its
archbishop, Oscar Romero, had been assassinated while giving communion,
after he had made direct appeals to the Carter Administration to cease
supplying military aid to his country. Romero's murder pushed to the
international political stage significant religious and social realignments in
Central America since changes in the Catholic Church were implemented by
Vatican II during the mid-1960s. The Church had made a sharp rhetorical
shift to express commitment to the poor. Although Romero assumed the
post of archbishop as a conservative, he had been radicalized by the murder
of one of his priests because of his work with the poor. 48

46. See discussion infra part liLA.
47. The Movement paused for about 12 hours after the indictments. Sanctuary
participants moved refugees whom they feared might be arrested and briefly froze all pending
plans for refugee aid, but then unindicted workers continued the Sanctuary network's border
crossings and social assistance.
48. See GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, THE POWER OF THE POOR IN HISTORY 126 (Robert
R. Barr trans., 1983). Gutierrez wrote:
The reality of poverty, misery, and exploitation in the life of the vast majority of
Latin Americans doubtless constitutes the most radical challenge to the proclamation of
the gospel. ... [sic] [T]his is a society that is supposed to be Christian. But the gospel
reveals to us a God who - as Karl Barth put it, echoing the message of Scripturetakes sides with the poor.
!d. at 125 (citing Karl Barth, who stated that "God always takes his stand unconditionally
and passionately on this side and on this side alone: against the lofty and on behalf of the
lowly; against those who already enjoy right and privilege and on behalf of those who are
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At the 1968 Bishops Conference in Medillin, Colombia, religious leaders
sought to implement Vatican II principles and advocated formation of
Christian "base" communities to discuss the religious, doctrinal, human, and
political issues facing Catholics. As a result of the Medillin decisions, many
parish priests and nuns changed dramatically. Although they had begun the
1970s by ministering to the poor and obeying the instructions of their
bishops, they learned by experience that neither their commitment to the
campesinos nor the principles of Medillin could be carried out without
political action. Base Christian communities cried out against Church
tendencies to skirt the liberation of the poor by giving it a spiritual focus:
the communities viewed this as foreign to the Christian message and to the
concrete circumstances of Latin America's poor. 49 When peaceful attempts
to obtain food, land, and other rights ended without effecting changes in
repression, growing numbers of clerics moved to nonviolent opposition.
Some clerics even came to support violence/0 viewing violence as necessary to defend against the violence of suffering and destruction inflicted on
the poor by the social structures throughout Latin America. 51 Such
structures exemplify the majority's extreme material deprivation and
increasing exclusion from production, while small. traditional elites make
ostentatious display of great wealth.
When, in December 1980, four American religious women were raped
and murdered, and the Salvadoran National Guard was suspected of the
crimes, churches in the United States began to pay more attention to El
Salvador. American missionaries in Central America smuggled stories of
terror to their home churches. United States newspapers began to report,
with growing frequency and particularity, the allegations of death squads
and human rights abuses linked to the government of a United States ally.
Mounting armed conflict and human rights abuses in El Salvador and
Guatemala fomented an exodus of refugees to other Central American

denied it and deprived of it." 2 KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS 386 (1957)).
49. See GUTIERREZ, supra note 48. The "preferential option for the poor" is not
intended to exclude the not-poor. The Medillin Document on Poverty declared:
We wish to heighten our awareness of the obligation to have solidarity with the poor,
an obligation that is prompted by charity. This means that we shall make their problems
and struggles our own.
This must be fleshed out by our denunciation of injustice and oppression, by a
Christian struggle against the intolerable situation of many poor people, and by a
process of dialogue with the groups responsible for this situation that will help them to
appreciate their obligations.
!d. at 128-29.
50. See WALTER LAFEBER, INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN
CENTRAL AMERICA 222-23 ( 1984) ("A religious commitment to ameliorate poverty could end
in a political, even an armed, commitment to oppose the government.")
51. See, e.g., Robert M. Brown, Preface to GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, THE POWER OF
THE POOR IN HISTORY ix, supra note 48.
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nations, to Mexico, and to the United States. The conditions of civil war
prompted distressed people in El Salvador and Guatemala to choose between
persecution at home or exile in foreign lands.
One example of this recurring refugee story was captured in a bugged
conversation between undercover government agents and Sister Darlene
Nicgorski, one of the Tucson defendants. The agents were posing as
Sanctuary volunteers and had offered to drive a Salvadoran family, the
Nietos, from Phoenix to Albuquerque. The Nietos explained their departure:
We were neither in the military nor with the guerrillas. It's just that we
had worked with, you might say community work .... church services ...
with the church. Wi~h the, displaced communities. The product of the war
... There is a lot of displaced people in the country.... Many of the
priests have been killed- something like 12. [We had problems not with
the military] but with the government, yes, because of the policy that they
have towards the religious people. It's basically the same that they have
towards people that are collaborating against them. 52

Another example, also taped covertly by Government agents, was the
reunion of Lucio Chavez with his children in Los Angeles, whom he had
not seen for three years. During the drive from Arizona, Lucio described
his work for a labor union in San Salvador and the day the army burst in,
took and tortured him and others, insisting they were guerrillas. Numerous
accounts given by Sanctuary workers and refugees are similar. 53
Development of liberation theology in Latin America54 met with a long

52. Tape from Operation Sojourner Investigation Interview, by INS agents (July 26,
1984) (author's notes from transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review) (the author
studied the transcripts curtesy of Jim Brosnahan of Morrison & Foerster in San Francisco).
See also CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 156-58.
53. Tape of Operation Sojourner Investigation Interview, by INS agents (May 28,
1994). See also COUTIN, supra note 35; CRIITENDEN, supra note 7; GOLDEN &
MCCONNELL, supra note 7.
54. United States investigators mistakenly categorized liberation theology with leftist
political groups. See James V. Spickard, Transcending Marxism: Liberation Theology and
Critical Theology, 42 CROSS CURRENTS 326 (1992). Latin American liberation theologians
have borrowed Marxist analytic tools of immanent social analysis and an eschatological
vision of history, but they refashion them in a Christian form that remains quite distant from
orthodox Leninist Marxism, and from Latin American Communist parties. Important to this
analysis is an appreciation for the multiplicity of heirs to "Marxist" thought. This point has
been obscured in the United States by generations of Cold War demonization and the
silencing and fragmenting of the "Left."
During the early twentieth century, Marxists in Europe were divided over whether the
principal problem of workers as a class was their "oppression" (a political concept for which
the Social Democrats prescribed revision of the political system through the struggle for
political democracy), "exploitation" (an economic idea, animating the Leninist agenda to
struggle for a socialist economy), or "domination" (a cultural concept, championed by the
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tradition of religious activism in the United States. 55 An orientation to
religious activism was common among many participants in the Sanctuary
Movement. One participant was a seventy-nine-year-old Quaker woman
who had worked for the Red Cross in World War II and remained a devoted
pacifist. Another participant was a boy went door to door with his ministerfather collecting money for a New York Times advertisement that protested
the Christmas bombings of Hanoi. Many participants had been involved
with the civil rights struggle in the South in the 1960s. 56 For years,
religious activists pursued their convictions concerning nuclear disarmament,
housing for the homeless, farmworkers' rights, and divestment from South
Africa.
United States churches have a considerable history of caring for
refugees-from Cuba, Vietnam and Cambodia, Indonesia, and Chile-with
the support of the United States government. In July 1980, a group of
Salvadorans were discovered in the Arizona desert where their coyotes had
left them to die. 57 Several Tucson churches kicked into gear to aid the

Hegelian school emphasizing the consciousness of social actors and the role of social
construction of forms of thought that impede the development of working-class consciousness). !d.
Unlike Latin American Marxist groups which discredit the working classes, liberation
theologians hold as a central tenet the right and capacity of the common people to become
active, creative agents of their own history. Methodologically, liberation theology seeks to
empower poor people, respecting popular culture and its stories, songs, and folk art.
Liberation theology recognizes that Latin American Catholicism has been both a source of
oppression and a source of popular creativity. The eschatology in which it is set is not class
warfare but building the reign of God on earth and the full development of the human family
in physical, emotional, and spiritual terms. !d.
55. See, e.g., A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985)
(recounting the extensive involvement of religious people and bodies during many of the
significant changes in the course of politics in the United States). Since the beginning of the
eighteenth century, the Quakers and Methodists have been regarded as some of the first
religious people to abolish slavery. See WILLIAM H. SEIBERT, THE UNDERGROUND
RAILROAD FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 93-99 (1968); REICHLEY, supra at 190-93. The
Quakers and Methodists were also some of the first supporters of the Civil Rights Movement
of the 1950s and 1960s. See REICHLEY, supra at 247-50. Consider also the rise of the
Social Gospel Movement at the tum of the twentieth century, seeking to apply Christian
ethics to the country's social order. See SYNDEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 786-97 (1972). Religious involvement also appeared in the
temperance and Vietnam Anti-War Movements. See REICHLEY, supra at 215-17, 250-53;
HALL, supra note 22. Religious concerns also account for much of the emotive force in the
contemporary controversies over abortion and the turn to electoral politics of a "new religious
right." See REICHLEY, supra, at 319-30.
56. See CoUTIN, supra note 35, at 25.
57. See DAVIDSON, supra note 14 (recounting that 13 middle-class Salvadorans, illequipped for desert travel, died after being abandoned by their coyotes in Organ Pipe
National Monument); ARON SPILKEN, ESCAPE! (1983) (relating the same tragedy based on
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survivors, and found that the INS was preparing to deport them to the nation
they had fled. Thus began American church workers' lesson in the
difference to the Government between a refugee and a "refugee," a
politicized legal status rather than a state of need.
The five men and six women, whom the Government would later
prosecute in United States v. Aguilar as key to organized Sanctuary, already
lived and worked in the border region. Many were employed by church
organizations to provide basic social services to migrants and other poor
people in the region. Father Tony Clark was a parish priest at Sacred Heart
Church in Nogales, Arizona, a twin city to Nogales, Mexico, separated by
the barbed-wire fence that is "the border." Long before the spread of
Sanctuary among United States churches in the 1980s, his church had
provided food and shelter to people in need-many who were no doubt
Mexicans and Central Americans without documents to enter the United
States. Just across the border in Mexico's Nogales, Father Ramon Quinones
was pastor of Our Lady of Guadalupe, a church which also had established
an all-purpose social service agency for refugees. Maria del Socorro Pardo
de Aguilar, a fifty-eight year old widow, was a devoted parishioner of Our
Lady Guadalupe, helping with the mission work and opening her home in
Nogales to people who came to the church for help. 58
Jim Corbett, a fiftyish, grizzled, one-time philosophy professor, rancher,
and Quaker, for years had lived and moved freely through the Sonoma
desert country. In this area which embraces Tucson yet extends deep into
Mexico, Corbett raised goats and worked with others on both sides of the
border to develop a cooperative for goat milk products. 59 His experience
with refugees began in May 1981 when he accompanied a friend to the INS
office to learn what had happened to the Salvadoran hitchhiker picked up
by his friend the night before but who was arrested when the Border patrol
stopped the car. Corbett is widely credited with prompting the organization
of efforts to protect Central Americans, both by his personal decision to lead
undocumented Salvadorans across the border, and by his circulation of
position papers created by Tucson Sanctuary workers seeking agreement on
guiding principles. Corbett was made a national embodiment of the
movement by media coverage, including a 60 Minutes broadcast. 60

interviews with the survivors).
58. See CRITTENDEN supra note 7, at 50-51,84, 136 (discussing individual members
and leaders of the Sanctuary Movement).
59. See JIM CORBETT, GOATWALKING (1992).
60. See 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 12, 1982). Ironically, Corbett
was not convicted on any charge. Evidence supporting the government's case relied upon
bits of the undercover tapes of the Ecumenical Council's meetings. Through much of the
period when these tapes were made, Corbett traveled through Mexico, and much of the
border crossing was conducted by numerous other Sanctuary volunteers. Author's interviews
with Jim Corbett, infra part III.

HeinOnline -- 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 919 1994-1995

920

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:899

Similarly, the Reverend John Fife was treated in numerous press
accounts as a cofounder, because the church he pastored, Southside
Presbyterian Church in the Tucson barrio, was a hub of Sanctuary services
as well as the first church to declare itself a public sanctuary. Southside's
ministry got under way in 1980, when "refugees started to show up in
Tucson."61 With a small group of clergy who met to discuss their concerns
for "the persecution of the church in El Salvador," the pastor began an oldfashioned prayer vigil once a week, at the federal building in downtown
Tucson, which became a focal point for people who wanted to learn more
about Sanctuary. 62 As a long-time pastor and national officer in a mainstream denomination, Fife also generated recognition for the movement
within established church circles. 63
Peggy Hutchison worked in Tucson in the early 1980s, first for two
years as a stateside missionary for the United Methodist Church, and then
for the Tucson Metropolitan Ministry, a local social service agency. Her job
included establishing a "border ministry for undocumented Mexicans and
Central Americans."64
Hutchison volunteered to assist Corbett and
Quinones in their visits to the Nogales, Mexico prison, as a natural
outgrowth of her work. 65
Philip Conger, the son of Methodist missionaries, grew up traveling
through Central and South America. As a social worker with the Tucson
Metropolitan Ministry, he too joined in the prison visits, and in 1982, he
became the part-time director of the Tucson Ecumenical Council. 66
Hutchison and Conger visited regional jails and detention centers, and aided
people to apply for asylum, and as they did so, learned the dismal odds for
approval. 67 Both became involved in border crossings.

61. Author's Interview with Rev. Fife, in Tucson, Ariz. (June 28, 1992) (redacted
transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
62. !d.
63. In 1992, despite a felony conviction, Fife was elected to head the three million
member Presbyterian Church (USA). See Tom Turner, Sanctuary's Rev. Fife to Lead
Presbyterian Church, ARIZ., DAILY STAR, June 4, 1992, at I; see also CRITTENDEN, supra
note 7, at 69-71.
64. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 97.
65 .. !d.
66. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 97-98. Conger subsequently attended seminary and
became an ordained minister in the United Methodist Church, and he now pastors a church
in the border region. !d.
67. !d. Hutchison later recounted the choices she saw for herself then:
I could lobby Congress; I could work for extended voluntary departure; I could educate
people; I could visit the jails and detention centers. That could be my ministry. Or I
could get involved on a deeper level, with the sanctuary ministry. I studied the 1980
Refugee Act and the international refugee laws and concluded that it was the INS that
was breaking the law. If the values I had been brought up by meant anything, I had to
get involved in sanctuary.
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Darlene Nicgorski was ·a nun of the order of the School Sisters of Saint
Francis. From 1980 to 1981, she was a missionary in rural Guatemala, until
the rising level of paramilitary violence came to her parish with the murder
of its priest. She and the Guatemalan sisters managed to escape first to
Honduras, and then to Mexico where over 100,000 Guatemalan refugees
lived in refugee camps. She returned to the United States in October 1982;
while recuperating with her family in Phoenix, she sought to develop
Central American aid groups. Through other nuns, Nicgorski came to work
with refugee families to identify safe settling points away from the border.
In 1983, the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America, coordinating
with Tucson churches, asked her to screen and counsel refugees. The
remaining defendants were only peripherally involved. 68 Numerous other
Sanctuary workers were never indicted. 69
When the Tucson religious community first began assisting Central
Americans in 1980, the INS would release detainees on their own recognizance if they had a letter written on church stationery stating that the church
would provide social services for them. Legal assistance for asylum
applications was provided by the Manzo Area Council, a community
organization founded during the 1960s War on Poverty to work with
Mexican migrant workers. By 1981, the Council found increasing numbers
of undocumented Central Americans among its clients. Several months after
Reagan's inauguration in January 1981, however, this INS policy changed
to a policy of mass detention and aggressive deportation. 70 Manzo Area ·
Council found several of its clients detained at El Centro, hours away in
California, and found 200 other Central Americans detained in deplorable

CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 98 (quoting Peggy Hutchison).
68. The prosecutor explained, "A conspiracy doesn't function without the gofers ....
This prosecution was really for deterrence; it was not for punishment." CRITTENDEN, supra
note 7, at 193 (quoting Don Reno). Wendy LeWin, a 26-year-old volunteer in Phoenix, was
convicted of transporting illegal aliens because she drove a family of Guatemalan refugees
to Albuquerque. The evidence, however, was ambiguous as to whether she knew that they
were undocumented. See Brief of Appellant at 136-42, United States v. Aguilar (9th Cir.
1987) (Nos. 86-1208, 86-1209-1210, 86-1212-1215). Her conviction was nonetheless
affirmed on appeal. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1988).
Nena McDonald, a Quaker nurse and volunteer for the TEC Task Force, and Mary Kay
Espinoza, director of religious education at Father Clark's church, were found not guilty.
CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 284-85. Crittenden suggests the inclusion of these three came
to symbolize the appeal of the movement to "ordinary" Americans beyond those who
followed overtly religious vocations. !d.
69. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 667 (explaining that eight sanctuary workers were
convicted, three were found not guilty, sixteen were indicted, and 60 co-conspirators were
named, though not indicted).
70. See Arthur Helton, Legality ofDetaining Refugees in the United States, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353, 363-64 (1984) (discussing change in detention policies). See
also COUTIN, supra note 35, at 26.
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conditions. 71 Participants from the prayer vigils, the ecumenical council,
and Manzo Area Council met, and initiated an energetic effort to raise bond
money to bail out every Salvadoran. 72
Individuals put up their homes for bond; church workers acquired handson knowledge of the obstacles facing Central Americans seeking political
asylum. Translating refugees' stories into government application forms was
a transforming, committing experience for many participants. 73 The bondraising effort garnered $1 million in two weeks, yet the government's
capacity to detain and deport seemed boundless. A southwestern regional
meeting of religious and legal groups in the fall of 1981 revealed that the
impediments to. asylum applicants from Central America were systematic
and widespread, and "'not the isolated situation of some red-necked
administrator. '" 74 Bond amounts escalated; once fixed at $1,000, they
jumped to $3,000, then $5,000. 75 The INS was separating families in
detention and employing deception to obtain waivers of asylum rights:
telling one member that the other had signed deportation papers, insisting
that Central Americans sign papers printed in English and denying them
counsel. Salvadorans and Guatemalans were denied asylum uniformly
around the country. 76 Legal workers reported INS harassment. Corbett
concluded:
"The most urgent need of the vast majority of Salvadoran refugees is
to avoid capture. Actively asserting the right to aid fugitives from terror
means doing it-not just preaching at a government that is capturing and
deporting them, not just urging legislation that might help future refugees."77

To this end he formed the "Tucson refugee support group" (Trsg) with other
Quakers and members of the goatmilking cooperative. 78

71. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 15.
72. !d.
73. !d. at 26.
74. !d. at 27 (quoting one of the Tucson ministers involved in the bail-bond effort).
75. !d.
76. !d. See also figures and sources, infra note 132 and accompanying text.
77. Jim Corbett, Preliminary Statement Concerning Salvadoran Refugees, Speech
Before the National Council of Churches of Christ Consultation on Immigration (Jan. 28-30,
1982), reprinted in Borders and Crossings: Some Sanctuary Papers 86B (April 1976)
[hereinafter Corbett, Borders and Crossings] (unofficially published papers, cited portions of
which are on file with the Tennessee Law Review) (listing a series of documents related to
the Sanctuary Movement). See also COUTIN, supra note 35, at 27 (quoting Jim Corbett).
78. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 27.
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B. Living Faith Traditions
1. The Transformations of Personal Knowledge
From their first-hand experiences with Central Americans who showed
the marks of torture and recounted terror and persecution, religious workers
along the border concluded that these people were indeed refugees who
needed and were entitled to safe haven in the United States. Knowledge of
the refugees' sufferings led many volunteers into Sanctuary work. When
asked why one of the earliest border crossers became involved with the
Sanctuary Movement, the worker answered,
Refugees were arriving. Many had suffered [sic] torture, had lost
immediate relatives, in ways that involved extreme inhumanity.... [The
principles of] what one does in these circumstances had been settled after
the Second World War. There was really no question of simply turning
our backs on them. You don't send people back to conditions like that. 79

The immediacy of direct personal knowledge was key for many people
to take action to implement the principle that someone should prevent the
arrest and return of refugees. "I don't think I would have responded the
way congregations responded farther away from the border, ifl [had]n't run
into it personally," Corbett told me. 80 Other interviewees made similar
observations, for example: "when [ordinary folks] got to know the refugees
as people ... they began to change. . . . It was a kind of conversion
process. " 8 '
"We did everything that we could think of to stop the deportations.
Increasingly, people knew what the true story was, and they learned what
was happening in these countries. We wondered what we could do to stem
the flow. Because if a legal office ... is all that we do-and don't
misunderstand me, I think that it's important-but if it's all that we do,
then the conditions that cause people to flee from their country won't
change .... [sic]
What we were doing wasn't getting anywhere. We realized that
number one, when we had had firsthand experience with real live refugees,
our own lives and our understandings had changed. Since that's how we'd
been converted, we thought that it might work for others as well .... [sic]
They could always dismiss us as bleeding hearts, or naive, or liberals, or

79. Author's Interview with Sanctuary Defendant Subject No. 66 (redacted transcript
on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
80. Author's Interview with Jim Corbett (June I 992) (redacted portions of the
transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
81. E.g., Author's Interview with Sanctuary Defendant Subject No. 38 (June 12,
1992) (redacted transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
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'Oh, they're just church people,' or whatever. But they couldn't dismiss
the refugees who told about their own experiences .... [sic]"82

These Sanctuary volunteers experienced some of the risk entailed in
listening to human suffering. Hearing refugees' traumatic narratives can
shake one into a crisis of perception about one's own boundaries, one's
separateness, and one's connectedness to others. Professionally trained
receivers of testimonies about war's atrocities pass through such crises too;
for some listeners, there develops a sense of obligation to act on the
knowledge one listens to with care. 83
Many Sanctuary volunteers who lived through World War II recalled the
boatloads of Jews fleeing Nazism, which were turned away at every port. 84
The analogy of Central Americans' flight to lands with unwelcoming
governments was particularly powerful for many Jews in the Sanctuary
Movement. One example is this housewife from Tucson:
"My son in particular became fast friends with the little boy in the
[Salvadoran] family that I was involved with, and every time I used to see
them together, I used to think of my own child, and I would think, 'What
if the situation were reversed? What if it was Germany?' And I would
hope that someone would be there to help my kids. " 85

Unlike most Christian Sanctuary workers who labored to comprehend
the experiences of the Central American refugees, many of the Jewish
Sanctuary workers had themselves been refugees, or were the children or
grandchildren of refugees. 86 Among Coutin's subjects, one Jewish man
related that his parents entered the United States illegally by bribing federal
officials; others recounted their own flights from Germany as children. A
Tucson rabbi said,
"My father was an undocumented alien. And I figure that it's the same
thing whether you escape from the Kaiser in 1913, or whether you escape
from Central America in the 1980s. I had an aunt and uncle that escaped

82. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 28 (quoting an unnamed minister from the Tucson
Sanctuary Movement).
83. See FELMAN & LAUB, supra note 25, at 57-73.
84. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 26 (quoting the same unnamed minister from the
Tucson Sanctuary Movement).
85. !d. at 80 (quoting Adele Tilberg, a member of the Tucson Sanctuary Network).
For some Jews in uninvolved synagogues, comparisons to the Holocaust were oftputting
rather than apt, in that the Holocaust was hatred and execution of a people rather than the
more indiscriminate persecutions in Central America. One rabbi responded to such
arguments by distinguishing the experience of the Holocaust from the lessons it teaches,
particularly the honor shown to the Righteous Gentiles for putting themselves at risk to save
Jews. "You honor the dead by creating a situation where the living don't have to repeat the
horror that the dead experienced." !d.
86. !d.
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to France, and they couldn't find anyone to take them in, and so they were
sent back to Germany, and they were killed in a concentration camp, so I
know. I know what happens to people when you don't let them in." 87

The religious journey led to the parallel invention of Sanctuary,
independently arrived at in distant parts of the nation. In Arizona, Corbett
requested the churches in Tucson to tum the space of their houses of
worship into shelter, and sent letters around the country making the plea.
In 1981, congregations in the San Francisco Bay area which had joined for
Bible study and succor of Central Americans, independently formed a
covenant of support for the two churches that literally sheltered refugees,
including one of the survivors of the group abandoned in the Organ Pipe
desert by paid coyotes. According to the pastor of one of these churches:
"We decided that we should establish some achievable goals .... [sic] We
said that [the refugees] would stay in the church building for five days,
from Wednesday through Sunday. And during those five days we would
try to do certain things. We would try to get 500 letters written to Ronald
Reagan. We would try to get 100 volunteers to go over and monitor
asylum hearings in San Francisco. We would try to get ... [sic] twenty
people who would be trained to do paralegal work and help in filling out
asylum applications, and I think it was $5,000 we wanted to raise. And
we did all of those things in those five days. We did everything.
And then we had a procession after church of all of the five churches
... [sic] and we celebrated that we were doing this; we were involved in this
together." 88

By the covenant, East Bay churches embodied "their sense of functional
legitimacy, congregational authority, and organizational identity."89 Tucson
participants cohered differently, through personal connections, bonds of
work, faith and trust, both within and across participating congregations.
Rev. Fife explained:
[T]he real importance of the sanctuary movement [is]: we didn't ground it
in exceptional individuals. We grounded it in congregations who had to
make that [sanctuary] decision as ordinary folks together. It really was
grounded in mainline, conventional religious communities .... [W]hen the
government did try the indictments ... [t]here was no give in at all, no
backing off at all by anybody. And I think that's because it was grounded
in ordinary grass roots communities of faith . . .. [I]t was pretty hard for
the folks in Tucson to believe [the prosecutor's view] that all those
[church] folks ... were a bunch of radical communist atheists. 90

87. ld. at 80-81 (quoting a Tucson Rabbi involved in the Sanctuary Movement).
88. !d. at 30 (quoting a minister whose church was involved in the Sanctuary
Movement).
89. ld. at 31.
90. Author's Interview with Rev. Fife, in Tucson, Ariz. (June 28, 1992) (redacted
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Jewish congregations also participated in the ecumenicism ofthe Tucson
wing of the Sanctuary Movement. At one synagogue which initially
declined, its rabbi raised the issue a second time. He explained:
"I decided that this was the most important issue that everything else
depended on, and I prayed to God, I prayed to please let it go through.
And I decided that if it didn't pass [the second time], I would give up my
rabbinate. So, when Yom Kippur came around, which is one of the most
important Jewish holidays, I didn't write a normal sermon, and I didn't
speak from notes. I walked away from the pulpit and I preached a sermon
facing the congregation eye-to-eye. And the president of the congregation
walked out halfway through the sermon. But afterwards, a man came up
to me with tears in his eyes, and he said, 'Now I know why I belong to a
synagogue. '"91

The Sanctuary declaration passed two-to-one on the second vote. 92 Jewish
activists in the Bay area invited a rabbi to address their group a few months
later and, as was the testimonial practice, a refugee spoke as well. As one
of the 100 persons in attendance related,
"[I]t was the most moving thing. And after that they said, 'Whoever wants
to help get Jews involved in sanctuary, please come up to the front.' So
I went. I mean, I was crying, that's how moving it was. He related it all
to the Holocaust, and he was a brilliant speaker. " 93

Many participants described the work of Sanctuary as profoundly
spiritual. One defendant recalled the collective effort this way: "In some
ways it felt like a Christian base community, in that we were together every
Monday night, struggling over the issues of how to put our faith into
action .... [W]e were doing things that were risky and we had to trust each
other."94
Another volunteer, a white-haired grandmother who regularly invited
refugees staying at her church home for Sunday dinners, made her first
border crossing in 1984, and helped a group of two women and five
children cross through a desert canyon near the border. She explained her
decision as one required in order to live her faith:
I . . . would expect churches to be the first place, the first people to reach
out to someone who needed help .... [O]ur church attempts at least to live

transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
91. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 32 (quoting the rabbi who lobbied among members of
his Tucson synagogue for them to declare themselves a sanctuary).
92. !d.
93. ld. at 33 (quoting attendee Karen Hirsch).
94. Author's Interview with Sanctuary Defendant Subject No. 32 (June 1992)
(redacted transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
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what we were taught, and [what] we know Jesus would want if he were
here physically .... I could just see him with these people. 95
As knowledge of the terrifying patterns among the refugees' experiences
spread, many North Americans thought of their comparative safety as United
States citizens. One stated:
[Y]ou can't do what Jesus would like to have us do and not take
risks .... I would think about what the Central Americans were living
through all these years .... the risk that they were in, just trying to keep
their head above water ... and that anything we might suffer by being
arrested would be so much less then [sic] what they go through daily ....96
Sanctuary workers who had worked in refugee camps in Mexico and
Honduras learned from their own observations of military's in terrorem
tactics to control the people. In the face of these tactics, they reported that
they were startled and instructed by the compassion and deep faith among
the camps' refugees. Many were also aware of their relative immunity from
physical harm by virtue of being United States citizens, and viewed this as
a further injustice because the Central Americans did not deserve the cruel
treatment that they received. 97 Several North Americans recounted their
rising awareness that the United States provided massive military material
for the killing and containment that they observed. 98 For many in the

95. Author's Interview with Sanctuary Defendant Subject No. 70 (June 29, 1992)
(redacted transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
96. !d.
97. El Salvador endured cycles of suppression by opponents of military-dominated
governments since the 1930s. In 1980, the most recent cycle intensified with the escalation
of death squads' campaigns against the networks of political organizers, labor leaders, human
rights workers, teachers, and the religious, who had organized opposition and massive
demonstrations against rightist governments and their military supporters throughout the
1970s. The killings became less and less discriminating as the 1980s advanced.
The institutionalization of violence against the civilian population is chronicled by the
Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. The Commission established the January 1992
peace accord "to seek, find and publicize the truth about the acts of violence committed by
both sides during the war." Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, U.N.
Doc. S/25500 (Apr. I, 1993) reprinted in From Madness to Hope: The Twelve-Year War in
El Salvador, Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, at 18, U.N. Doc. 5/25500, Annex I
( 1993) (on file with the Tennessee Law Review). The Report analyzes the evidence of cases
and patterns of massacres of peasants by the Government armed forces and.of assassinations
by death squads, executions and abductions by the rebel forces of the FMLN; lists victims
of the violence; and makes recommendations of legal, political, and administrative measures
to prevent the recurrence of such horror. !d.
98. See Mark Danner, The Truth of El Mozote, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 1993, at
50. Danner provides a concise and readable history of El Salvador's civil war and United
States financial and political support for the government despite evidence of human rights
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Sanctuary Movement, this situation was the international expression of the
power of the rich to trample on the poor. Sermons in Sanctuary churches
often reflected this political understanding. One minister expressed this as
a choice between conventional thinking and serious Bible reading:
[1]hat 's what the Gospel says. If you read the Bible that's the A-numberone issue the Bible talks about. That is, the [divide between] the poor and
the rich. I mean, that's what preoccupied Jesus and that's what preoccupied the Prophets .... It's why the whole story [of] the people of Israel,
was formed in the first place: to try to provide some care to the folks who
were outcast. ... So I guess that's primary. I really am convinced that
you can't be part of the dominant culture and still preach the Gospel. It's
just impossible. 99

2. The Sanctuary Movement's Continuity with
Ancient Traditions of Sanctuary
In describing their relief work as "sanctuary," participants drew upon an
ancient tradition of accommodation between religious and governmental
senses of social order. The deep chord of memory struck by "sanctuary"
was indicated by the rapidity with which the practice spread and the strength
and breadth of its support, following the first public declaration of sanctuary

violations on a grand scale.
Multiple United States Administrations' policies in Central America had been marked
by anxiety to deter the spread of international Communism. It is perhaps important to note
that these events were shaped before the "end of the Cold War," the fall of the Berlin Wall,
and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. When, in 1979, Nicaragua's Somoza government,
the rightist regime supported by the United States, was successfully deposed, some
policymakers in Washington feared that El Salvador's ongoing civil war might also be won
by Leftist rebels.
Even President Jimmy Carter, who pressed the Salvadoran government to improve its
regard for human rights, and who cut off all United States aid after the government-linked
murder of four American churchwomen, succumbed to that fear. He restored millions in aid
just weeks later. In January 1981, newly elected President Ronald Reagan immediately
increased the amount of military and other aid for El Salvador's government, as well as
funding for the contras in Nicaragua. By the time the 12-year civil war ended, the United
States had spent more than $4 billion to fund the war. !d. at 53.
99. Author's Interview with Sanctuary Defendant Subject No. 47 (June 1992)
(redacted transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review). The Old Testament is replete
with instances of God's condemnation for those who enrich themselves through unjust
practices. For example, Isaiah 3:13-15 reads: "The lord comes forward to argue his case and
stands to judge his people .... You have ravaged the vineyard, and the spoils of the poor
are in your houses. Is it nothing to you that you crush my people and grind the faces of the
poor?" Isaiah 3:13-15 (The New English Bible, 1970). Consider also Isaiah 10:1-2, which
states: "Shame on you! you who make unjust laws and publish burdensome decrees,
depriving the poor of justice, robbing the weakest of my people of their rights, despoiling
the widow and plundering the orphan." Isaiah I 0:2.
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for Central American refugees by Southside Presbyterian Church in Tucson
in March 1982.
Sanctuary workers cite Biblical injunctions for the care they show to
refugees. For example, the Old Testament instructs that "the alien living
with you must be treated as one of your native-born. Love him as yourself,
for you were aliens in Egypt." 100 The Gospel adds that the Lord himself
is present in the refugee who needs our help. 101 John Fife, pastor of the .
Southside church, repeatedly invoked the following text:
Keep on loving one another as brothers and sisters. Remember to
welcome strangers into your homes; there were some who did that and
welcomed angels without knowing it. Remember those who are in prison
as though you were in prison with them. Remember those who are
suffering as though you were suffering with them. 102

To understand the chord struck by the claim to offer "sanctuary" in a
religious tradition, one must reckon with more than the recognition of
sanctuary in English common law, and its abrogation before the common
law leapt the Atlantic ocean.. The history of the notion that sanctified
ground will protect the fugitive and its religious roots is voluminous and
ancient. The Old Testament cities of refuge 103 incorporated the provision
of asylum into the ancient regulation of blood retribution, mitigating the
harshness of that regime. 104 An earlier practice of altar sanctuary also

I 00. Leviticus 19:34.
101. Matthew 25:35-40. See also JIM CORBETT, THE SANCTUARY CHURCH 6 (1986)
[hereinafter, CORBETT, THE SANCTUARY CHURCH]. Both of these scriptural texts resonated
and were quoted or cited frequently by Sanctuary workers with whom I spoke. The text
from Leviticus 19:33-34, begins, "When an alien resides with you in your land, you must not
oppress him. He is to be treated as a native born among you." !d. Additionally, Matthew
25:35-40 states, "For when I was hungry, you gave me food; when thirsty, you gave me
drink; when I was a stranger you took me into your home, when naked you clothed me;
when I was ill you came to my help, when in prison you visited me." Matthew 25:35-40.
I 02. Tape of Camelback Service from Tape No. 74 of Operation Sojourner Investigation 4 (Oct. I, 1984) (referring to Hebrews 13: 1-3) (transcript on file with the Tennessee Law
Review).
103. See Numbers 35:15 ("These ... cities shall be places of refuge so that any man
who has taken like inadvertently, whether he be Israelite, resident alien, or temporary settler,
may take sanctuary in one of them."). The primary Biblical text is Numbers 35:6-34. See
also Deuteronomy 19:1-13; Joshua 20:1-9; Exodus 21:12-14.
I 04. The underlying presumption was that any killing could not be expiated by
payment of money, but only by the taking of another life. The advent of refuge cities was
roughly equivalent to converting a sentence of death into one of life imprisonment, for the
accused "manslayer" had to reach a refuge city, and once there, prove through trial by the
"congregation" that the killing had indeed been accidental. A fugitive who did so was
protected, so long as he remained within the asylum city. If found outside, he could still be
killed. The fugitive could return home, and the right of vengeance ended, upon the death
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appears in the Old Testament, where fugitives who fled to the local temple altar
received protection. 105 The ancient Phoenician, Syrian, Egyptian, and Greek
civilizations practiced Sanctuary. 106 The Roman concept granted protection and
immunity from violence until a formal inquiry could be made and judgment
rendered based on evidence offered. 107 After Constantine established Christianity as the state religion in the Roman Empire, Roman law reflected the Christian
churches' broad privilege to provide sanctuary, 108 and thus interposed the
Church as intercessory moral force and physical protector. 109 A significant

of the reigning high priest, which substituted to satisfy the requirement of expiation by blood.
See BAU, supra note 7, at 125-26 (citing W. GUNTHER PLAUT ET AL., THE TORAH: A
MODERN COMMENTARY 1249 (1981)).
While much rabbinic tradition and law regarding cities of refuge developed in
succeeding centuries, it is not known how long the cities operated, especially after the
centralization of worship in Jerusalem under King David and his successors. BAU, supra
note 7, at 127.
105. The promise in early Mosaic law to set aside a place of refuge beyond the altar
for those who accidentally kill another suggests that Sanctuary predated the cities of refuge
and implicitly refers to altar sanctuary:
Whoever strikes another man and kills him shall be put to death. But if he did not act
with intent, but they met by act of God, the slayer may flee to a place which I will
appoint for you. But if a man has the presumption to kill another by treachery, you
shall take him even from my altar, to be put to death.
Exodus 21:12-14 (emphasis added). The First Book ofKings recounts the use of sanctuary.
At the time of Solomon's ascendancy as king of the Israelites, he provided temporary refuge
for Adonijah who had unsuccessfully attempted a coup. See I Kings I :50-52. To that place
of safety, Solomon sent the message that if he would prove worthy and not wicked, his life
would be spared. See I Kings 2:28-29. His co-conspirator was not so lucky. Id.
Arab desert dwellers shared an ancient recognition that any tent could serve as a temporary
sanctuary for a period of days, and some tents or other places were set aside as perpetual
places of refuge. See BAU, supra note 7, at 127-28.
106. C. RECHT, THE RIGHT OF ASYLUM 4-5 (1935). In classical Greece, asylum was
respected for all crimes, for a time, and nearly every temple was thought to afford divine
protection. Later, the Athenians limited the use of asylum to people who had committed
unintentional crimes, or who were at risk of summary vengeance. Trenholme, The Right of
Sanctuary in England, 1 U. Mo. STUD. 298, 301-302 (1903).
107. Trenholme, supra note 106, at 303.
108. J. CHARLES COX, SANCTUARIES AND SANCTUARY SEEKERS OF MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 3 (1911). Explicit references may be found in the Theodosian Code of 392 A.D.
Most early Roman Christian legislation of Sanctuary addressed the flight of slaves from their
masters. Many wrongdoers were excluded from seeking Sanctuary, including embezzlers,
Jews, heretics, and apostates. BAU, supra note 7, at 131. Robbers and those guilty of grave
crimes, such as murderers, adulterers, and rapists, were also excluded from sanctuary. !d.
at 132 n.35.
I 09. Early legal provisions appeared to focus on the sanctity of the place, but the
concept slowly extended Sanctuary from the church building, to the churchyard and precincts,
and then to the houses of the bishops and clergy, cloisters, and cemeteries. See Cox, supra
note 108, at 5; Charles H. Riggs, Jr., Criminal Asylum in Anglo-Saxon Law, UNIVERSITY OF

HeinOnline -- 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 930 1994-1995

1995]

RELIGIOUS OUTLAWS

931

occasion for this intermediary practice was in securing humane treatment for
fugitive slaves. 110
3. Sanctuary's Essential Independence from its Recognition
at English Common Law
Recognition at English common law has little to do with the power or
enduring quality of the idea of Sanctuary. Sanctuary featuring the intercessory
role of the Church continued for centuries. Ecclesiastical asylum rules served,
above all, to preserve the fugitive from violence and bloodshed, both during the
asylum and when he left it. 111 Sanctuary was recognized in early Anglo-Saxon
legal codes, 112 but as the modem legal tradition was born in the general cultural
revival of the twelfth century, the governmental institution of outlawry grew up
into an elaborate and competing procedure alongside the church-based sanctuary

FLORIDA MONOGRAPHS, Social Science 21 (1963). A papal decree in the fifth century added
the requirement that an inquisitor of the church examine all fugitives seeking sanctuary, thus
importantly shifting the sanctuary privilege to one of intercession by the clergy. BAU, supra
note 7, at 133.
110. BAU, supra note 7, at 133.
Ill. See Riggs, supra note 109, at 37-38. In 813 the Council of Mayence decreed:
Let no one dare to remove a wrongdoer who is a fugitive to a church, nor give him up
from there to punishment ... or death, that the honor of churches may be preserved;
but let the rectors be diligent in securing his life and limb. Nevertheless he must
lawfully compound for what he has wrongfully done.
!d. Notorious wrongdoers, such as those with a criminal record who might attempt to abuse
the church's sanctuary, were not eligible. See JOHN G. BELLAMY, CRIME AND PUBLIC
ORDER IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 107 (1973); COX, supra note 108, at 23.
112. See Riggs, supra note I 09, at 6 ("If anyone renders himself liable to the lash and
flees to the church, he shall be immune from scourging."); see also BAU, supra note 7, at
134-36.
As tensions between church and state increased, other purely secular types of Sanctuary
were developed and protected under Saxon kings. One form was created under a royal
charter and protected by the king's peace. Another form of secular Sanctuary existed in the
jurisdiction of every local lord who had royal rights and where the king's writ did not run.
Thus, even after the general church Sanctuary privilege was abrogated by Henry VIII in the
fifteenth century, many sanctuary-seekers continued to seek Sanctuary with the central
churches of these independent jurisdictions. See Isobel D. Thornley, The Destruction of
Sanctuary, in TUDOR STUDIES PRESENTED BY THE BOARD OF STUDIES IN HISTORY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 182 (R.W. Seton-Watson ed., 1924)); see also BAU, supra note 7,
at 140.
Churches and clergy emphasized the sanctity of the place of church sanctuary,
irrevocable by the king, whereas kings claimed the privilege was merely personal, granted
to particular clergy and revocable at the king's will. BAU, supra note 7, at 141-50. Into the
eleventh century, Sanctuary remained a part of the basic Saxon law curtailing the bloodfeud
tradition, under which vengeance was traded for damages and fines (the Church collected all
fines for Sanctuary violations). BAU, supra note 7, at 141.
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privilege. A fugitive from justice whom the local sheriffs could not locate
was declared an outlaw by the county court. An outlaw forfeited his goods
and chattels to the king and his lands escheated. Outlaws were subject to
summary execution upon capture, 113 with the result that they could more
readily be driven into churches, and made to submit to the law. 114 The
criminal law incorporated and reduced the sanctuary privilege through the
adoption of abjuration of the realm, by which a fugitive in sanctuary was
required to choose either to undergo trial and punishment or given a "safe
conduct" to leave England permanently. A sanctuary seeker would be
protected for thirty days, during which time civil authorities were without
power to compel him or her to leave sanctuary. 115
The increasing governmental regulation of widespread church sanctuary
tended to secularize the practice, impressing clergy into the roles of royal
officers of the courts, rather than of ecclesiastical intercessors. Furthermore,
as the Middle Ages advanced and England's society became increasingly
commercial, more of those running afoul of the law and seeking sanctuary
were debtors seeking to escape their creditors, rather than fugitives seeking
to evade blood revenge. During the fifteenth century, the Pope restricted
sanctuary to fugitives at physical, rather than economic risk. 116 The king's
judges limited sanctuary in law through the application of rigid rules of
procedure: a person in sanctuary would be arrested and removed if the
proper pleading was not made to the king's officers, and if wrongfully
removed, he could only assert violation of sanctuary as a defense upon
meeting another rigid pleading requirement. 117
Vigorous efforts by government to end sanctuary's legal life demonstrate
that sanctuary continued to survive as a customary matter. 118 Not until the

113. See BELLAMY, supra note Ill, at 105-06. The assassination of Thomas of
Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury, in his own cathedral may be the most famous violation
of church sanctuary. See Cox, supra note I 08, at 34-35. In its stark moral confrontation,
it prefigures the assassination of Archbishop Romero eight centuries later. See discussion
supra part I.A. I.
114. See Riggs, supra note 109, at 43-45.
115. See BAU, supra note 7, at 145-46 (citing BELLAMY, supra note Ill, at I 08).
116. The papal bull.provided that sanctuaries were only to protect fugitives in physical
danger, that a fugitive lost the protection of a sanctuary upon leaving it, and that the king
could send soldiers into the sanctuary to guard fugitives who had committed treason. See
Thornley, supra note 112, at 200; see also BAU, supra note 7, at 152.
117. See BAU, supra note 7, at 152-53.
118. Henry VIII enacted limiting regulations for much of his reign. See Thornley,
supra note 112, at 203-04. Catholic Church canon law incorporated sanctuary for centuries:
"A church enjoys the right of asylum, so that guilty persons who take refuge in it must not
be taken from it." Id. (citing Code of Canon Law of the Roman Catholic Church, canon
1179). When revised in the mid-1980s, this provision was omitted. BAU, supra note 7, at
153.
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eighteenth century could Blackstone report that sanctuary was abrogated
from English common law (as a vestige of "popery"). 119
Although
formally extinguished at Jaw, some sanctuary practices nonetheless persisted
as a matter of political life, as the Crown, the Government, and the courts
all maintained as inviolate the privilege of the monarch to grant sanctuary
to aliens who fled persecution in their own countries. 120
4. Sanctuary in America
The Pilgrims and Puritans first settled in America soon after the formal
abolition of sanctuary in English Jaw. The colonists' journey was an exodus
from the religious and social oppression of England, and the entire continent
was a sanctuary-a refuge from the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic
Counter-Reformation. Though few colonies had Jaws specifying the rights
of sanctuary, 121 there are recorded instances of its practice. 122
When, some two hundred years later, the Underground Railroad
similarly provided practical sanctuary for escapees from slavery, it did so
without an express invocation of a legal privilege. Its participants labored
in the face of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which prohibited the
harboring or assistance of fugitive slaves anywhere in the United States.
Thus, the Fugitive Slave Act ended the safe haven formerly available to
escaped slaves who made it into the free states of the North. Of innumeraNumerous legislative efforts were made to extinguish any governmental authority for
sanctuary. Bills against the privilege were introduced throughout Elizabeth's reign. In 1624
Parliament declared "that no Sanctuarie or Privilege of Sanctuary shall be hereafter admitted
or allowed in any case." !d. at 157 (citing 21 James I, c.28).
119. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *332.
120. See RECHT, supra note 106, at 12; Regina v. Bernard, 8 L.J.Q.B. 887, 1055, 1061
(the trial court concluding that providing sanctuary to a persecuted foreigner was "glory of
this country").
121. Massachusetts Bay Colony did provide a right of asylum for Christians fleeing
persecution. See BODY OF LIBERTIES OF THE MASSACHUSETIS COLONY IN NEW ENGLAND
2, 89 (Mass. 1641 ).
122. For example, in New Haven in 1660, the same ship that brought the news that
Charles II had taken the throne, also brought two officers of Cromwell's army and Justices
of the court that had tried Charles I and issued his death warrant. They became fugitives and
fled to New Haven to escape royal officers who arrived to bring them back to England for
trial.
Rev. John Davenport received the fugitives, and the governor of New Haven Colony
delayed the king's officers, requiring the officers to attend Sabbath services, where the Rev.
Davenport preached on the scriptures of Isaiah 16:3: "Hide the fugitives, do not betray the
refugees." The governor also had the royal arrest warrants read aloud in a public meeting
rather that treated as secret government documents. The king's officers were unable to find
the fugitives in New Haven. They lived in the colony for three years and then in Massachusetts for another seven, dying of natural causes. See ROLLIN G. OSTERWEIS, THREE CENTURIES OF NEW HAVEN 1638-1938 at 55-57 (1953)); see also BAU, supra note 7, at 160.
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ble operators, many were prosecuted for violating the Act. 123 Churches
and church communities also were involved 124 and employed Biblical
texts 125 to support their work for the abolition of slavery and the relief of
the suffering of fugitive slaves. 126
Explicit invocation of church sanctuary in the United States during the
Vietnam War, also drew from the religious traditions of sanctuary rather
than on its recognition at English common law. 127 Churches that offered
sanctuary to draft resisters conceptualized the strength of sanctuary in its
moral and political stance against the will of the state. One church put it
this way:
The offer of sanctuary means what the medieval church offered to
individuals who were being persecuted, namely the moral protection of the
Christian community. Food and lodging would be offered so that if there
is to be an arrest, it could take place in the church building where the
moral confrontation will be obvious. 128

123. See SIEBERT, supra note 55, at 272-81.
124. /d. at 93-98.
125. /d. at 160 (quoting Deuteronomy 23:16-17) (stating "If a slave has taken refuge
with you, do not hand him over to his master. Let him live among you wherever he likes
and in whatever town he chooses. Do not oppress him."). See also HORATIO T. STROTHER,
THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD IN CONNECTICUT 182 (1962) (sermon themes following the
Dred Scott decision, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)).
126. Furthermore, for most of the nation's history, the image of the United States as
a haven for the oppressed has enjoyed considerable political vitality, if not unanimity of
view. The Declaration of Independence protested England's obstruction of immigration and
naturalization to America, and the new nation adopted liberal national policies toward
immigration. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE~ 9 (U.S. 1776). Throughout the
nineteenth century, both Republican and Democratic political parties' platforms invoked the
image of the United States as asylum. See RECHT, supra note I 06, at 18.
127. No legal doctrine of sanctuary was recognized in United States law because
English common law formally abrogated this practice in England by the time of the
American colonies' independence. See Warden Maryland State Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 321 ( 1967) (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
128. See Dennis Willigan, Sanctuary: A Communitarian Form of Counter-Culture, 25
UNION SEMINARY Q. REV. 533 (1970)(discussing Declaration of the St. Andrew United
Presbyterian Church of Marin City, California)); see also BAU, supra note 7, at 162. In the
first such declaration, made in a "Service of Conscience and Acceptance" in October 1967,
at a Boston church, where some 300 draft resisters turned their draft cards over to members
of the clergy as a protest against the war, the Rev. William Sloane Coffin Jr., then chaplain
at Yale University, preached:
Now if in the Middle Ages churches could offer sanctuary to the most common of
criminals, could they not today do the same for the most conscientious among us? And
if in the Middle Ages they could offer forty days to a man who had committed both a
sin and a crime, could they not today offer an indefinite period to one who had
committed no sin?
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Countless churches became centers for public witnesses against the
war. 129 The Government's response, as anticipated, resulted in the
invasion of all recognized sanctuaries by civil or military authorities. 130
All sanctuary seekers were eventually prosecuted by civil and/or military
courts, although no sanctuary providers were prosecuted for harboring
deserters. 131
5. The Practice of Public Sanctuary for Central Americans
Both Biblical and English-derived notions of sanctuary had formative
influence on the development of the Tucson Sanctuary Movement. The
decision to claim publicly the mantle of the religious "Sanctuary" tradition
was an alchemy of religious expression and preemptive strike. By the fall
of 1981, a handful of Tucson ministers and parishioners had accepted Jim
Corbett's conclusion that the refugees' greatest need was to avoid capture
in the first instance. In their minds, some unaided refugees faced death; at
best, capture and detention in the United States were the first steps to a fate
of dread and brutality. 132 Corbett employed his desert knowledge by

. . . Should a church declare itself a "sanctuary for conscience" this should be
considered less a means to shield a man, more a means to expose a church, an effort
to make a church really a church.
For if the state should decide that the arm of the law was long enough to reach
inside a church there would be little church members could do to prevent an arrest. But
the members could point out what they had already dramatically demonstrated, that the
sanctity of conscience was being violated.
!d. at 532.
!29. Churches became more integrally involved in the larger anti-war movement.
Several American universities, in !968 and 1969, also declared themselves secular
sanctuaries. Sanctuary was eclipsed by the mute public and massive mobilizations of protest,
in which a broad spectrum of churches participated to different degrees. See HALL, supra
note 22 at I 70-77.
130. BAU, supra note 7, at 164-67. In 1968, police removed deserters from a church
in New York's Washington Square; in 1971, military authorities did so in San Diego.
131. The law permitted invasions of the sanctuaries. But see 8 U.S.C. § 1071. See
Bridges v. Davis, 443 F.2d 970, 971 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972)
(churches provided sanctuary for AWOL servicemen); United States v. Beyer, 426 F.2d 773
(2d. Cir. 1970) ("symbolic sanctuary" established in a church during the Vietnam War).
Coffin's role in the service led to his conviction for conspiring to counsel, aid and abet those
refusing induction into the army, and was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a $5,000
fine. The conviction was overturned on appeal in 1969. See BAU, supra note 7, at 162
(citing Michael Ferber, "A Time to Say No," in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA 271 (David
R. Weber ed., 1978)).
132. Between mid-1980 and mid-1981, approximately 13,000 Salvadorans had b.een
apprehended at the border, and more than 10,000 were returned after signing "voluntary
departure" statements. Virtually all the remainder were deported in the ordinary sense.
CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 55. They returned to a country where 9,000 civilians died by
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helping refugees safely cross brutal deserts from the border into the United
States, and then caring for their basic needs. Corbett and his wife had been
hosting from twelve to twenty Salvadorans at a time in tiny trailers on their
ranch when he appealed to Rev. Fife in Tucson to use his church to house
Central Americans. The church elders of Southside Presbyterian Church
acquiesced. Fife drove refugees from the border to Tucson once or twice
a week, without publicizing this fact. 133 However, he did make public
statements that his congregation was providing refuge for Central Americans.
Their efforts soon reached INS officials in Tucson, as rumors spread that
the city's clergy were defying the immigration laws. INS sent a message
through a Manzo Area Council attorney who stated, "We're not sure what
Fife and Corbett are up to, but tell them to stop or we'll indict them." 134
Late in November 1981, Sanctuary workers met in Fife's living room to
consider their options. They could stop the border crossings and other
assistance, which none of them believed was possible in good conscience,
or they could continue their efforts and face criminal prosecution.
Unappealing as that might appear, the most troubling possibility was that the
Government would impanel a grand jury and seek to compel the disclosure
of the names and whereabouts of refugees and others in the Sanctuary network. Sanctuary leaders and workers could prevent disclosure by refusing
to testify. However, a judge could imprison them for contempt without
giving them an opportunity to explain their actions to the country. Fife
proposed to "beat 'em to the punch," to go public about their rescue work,
so that even if indictments did follow, at least the national church community would understand the issue. 135 Many churches in the border region
remembered the religious tradition of Sanctuary, and a letter from the
Lutheran Social Services of California in October 1981 reintroduced
Sanctuary as a means of seeking justice for refugees deprived of it. 136

political violence in 1980 alone, according to the estimates of the State Department. !d.
133. In hindsight, Fife describes his border runs as insane and reckless in manner,
although not in purpose. He and his Isuzu pick-up were well-known to officials in the
region; he had little knowledge of Border Patrol roadblocks; and used neither secret routes
nor careful precautions. He just "got on the main highway and headed north." /d. at 57.
134. /d. at 61.
135. E.g., Author's Interview with Rev. Fife (June 1992) (notes on file with the
author).
136. Letter from Rev. John H. Wagner, Jr. to Author (Oct. 22, 1981) (on file with the
Tennessee Law Review). The letter recounted that a man being pursued by an INS officer
had run into a downtown church. The officer chased him through the nave and finally
caught him, then led him away in handcuffs to deportation. The local INS director, in
response to a complaint by church representatives, pledged to issue an administrative order
to immigration officers that under no circumstances was a person to be pursued if he or she
entered a church, hospital, or school. Invoking the intercessory aspect of historic church
sanctuary, Rev. Wagner described sanctuary's function as "negotiator/advocate.... The
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The decision came when many in the Tucson region interpreted the
experiences of Central American asylum applicants to mean that the legal
system did not work and neither did the political system. 137 Political
efforts to lobby Congressmen and INS regional staff had no discernable
effect. Many people thought that if the United States were financing the
planes that bombed Salvadorans and their children, the citizens of the United
States had an absolute moral obligation to help the victims escape. 138
Since the summer, they had raised some $750,000 for bonds, and they saw
no means to raise such sums indefinitely to pay what they considered to be
ransom. Furthermore, by mid-1981 the task force had filled out hundreds
of asylum applications, and not a single one had been granted. 139
Thus, the Tucson group devised a public declaration and an enactment
of their experience of the church, as historic possessor of moral authority to
provide sanctuary from hostile powers. 140 The authority to provide
sanctuary was clearly religious and moral, not a legal privilege as had
existed for a time in England. And, while rooted in the customary
sacredness of churches and temples, the sanctity of Sanctuary for Central
Americans was conceived as deriving from the consecrated, committed
church community rather than from the physical site understood to be
inviably sacred by ancient Hebrews, Greeks, Romans, or medieval English.
The day before the public declaration, a letter from John Fife was
delivered to the Attorney General, the United States Attorney, and the
Border Patrol, pledging that until deportation proceedings of Salvadoran and
Guatemalan refugees ceased, "we will not cease to extend the sanctuary of
the church to undocumented people from Central America. Obedience to
God requires this of us all." 141

Church walks through the process with the person. If a person has sought sanctuary, they
have a story to tell, and they are apprehensive of the systems used to resolve the situation."
!d.
137. Doonesbury cartoon: "What do I need [to meet the burden of proof of wellgrounded fear of persecution?]" "A note from your dictator." The legal office, run by the
Manzo Council and independent of the churches, was not keen on a declaration of sanctuary,
which might detract from the litigation-based effort to aid refugees (cartoon on file with the
author).
138. Author's Interviews with Sanctuary Defendant Subjects Nos. 23, 32 (redacted
transcripts on file with the Tennessee Law Review); see also CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at
65.
139. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 64-65.
140. Because church-based sanctuary had never been entirely lost in American
religious practice, it was resurrected by others outside the Tucson network. Also in the fall
of 1981, a group of congregations in the San Francisco area formed the East Bay Sanctuary
Covenant. Several of these agreed to coordinate announcements of public Sanctuary with
that in Tucson.
141. Letter from Rev. John M. Fife to Hon. William French Smith, Attorney General
of the United States (Mar. 23, 1982) (unsigned copy on file with the Tennessee Law Review
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On March 24, 1982, the public declaration of Sanctuary took place
before eight television cameras and local, national, and international
reporters. 142 The declaration was a step by a community of faith, seeking
to serve justice by providing shelter and aid to refugees. Identity obscured,
"Alfredo," the head of the refugee family who had agreed to enter public
sanctuary 143 at Southside, outlined conditions in Central America. Corbett
made brief remarks on the moral necessity of Sanctuary aid to Salvadorans
seeking asylum and as church witness against deportations of Central
Americans. These deportations were "violations of international law" and
"[a]bduction, torture and murder pos[ing] as law and authority." 144 John
Fife explained the decision to declare Sanctuary, and told of the financial
and resettlement support provided by 100 churches around the countryeither financially or by receiving refugees for resettlement. After a
procession through downtown Tucson, a dozen clergy led some 200 people
in the first of many ecumenical services in "human solidarity" to receive
refugees into church-sponsored Sanctuary. 145 The service featured a

and copy on file with the author).
142. After extensive efforts by the Tucson group to plan in secret, in keeping with
their strategic sense to seize the advantage by going public, the announcement was leaked
to the FBI by a dissenting Southside member. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 70. The local
paper and the Washington Post got wind of the story, and five days beforehand, the story was
out. "Next week," the local paper reported, Rev. Fife "will publicly defy the U.S. government
to arrest him as a felon in violation of immigration laws .... Fife and his church will dare
the government to stop their work." Randall Udall, Local Pastor and Church to Defy the
Government on Aid to Salvadorans, TUCSON CITIZEN, Mar. 19, 1982, at I.
143. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 72. In the typical Sanctuary arrangement, a
congregation openly housed a refugee family, either in its church or synagogue, or in a
member's home. Refugees who went into "public sanctuary" committed to recount their
experiences to North American audiences of congregation members, journalists, and others.
CHICAGO RELIGIOUS TASK FORCE ON CENTRAL AMERICA, PUBLIC SANCTUARY FOR
SALVADORAN AND GUATAMALAN REFUGEES: ORGANIZER'S NUTS & BOLTS (1982) (copy on
file with the Tennessee Law Review); see also CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 119-20. At
John Fife's church, newly arrived refugees regularly bedded down at night literally in the
sanctuary in which church services were held on Sundays.
Many congregations supported Sanctuary in different fashions, however, such as
contributing funds for bail bonds, rental of refugee houses, sending volunteers to provide
social services, organizing community events to foster awareness of Central American issues,
or financing delegations to Central America. In Tucson, many volunteers took in refugees
for days, weeks, or longer, without publicizing the fact or expecting public presentations from
the immigrants they housed.
144. Jim Corbett, Press Release at Southside Presbyterian Church (Mar. 24, 1982) (on
file with the Tennessee Law Review).
145. ld. Many churches throughout the United States independently developed
connections with Central Americans, and it would be erroneous to regard Tucson as the
pivotal point in a well-oiled administration of entry and passage to resettlement sites.
American congregations established sister-church relationships with congregations in Central

HeinOnline -- 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 938 1994-1995

1995]

RELIGIOUS OUTLAWS

939

sermon of support for the provision of Sanctuary by the head of the United
Presbyterian Church, USA; other prominent clergy participating were the
monsignor of the Catholic cathedral in Tucson and the rabbi of the city's
largest Reform synagogue.
Ultimately, the Biblical "city of refuge" was reinterpreted and reenacted
by a dozen United States cities to afford sanctuary to Central Americans. 146 The effect of the· declarations was to remove local city agencies,
including the police, from enforcement of the immigration laws by checking
alien status or turning suspected aliens over to the INS. 147
C. Law Read Through Religious Sanctuary: Melding Discourses

Corbett, Fife, and the ecumenical group of concerned others in Tucson
first engaged the official meanings of immigration and asylum law through
the bail-bonding efforts, which at the outset did not challenge official
interpretations of the law. But the revised INS practices-to detain all
applicants, double the cost of bail bonds, and forcibly return Central
Americans-appeared intentionally to defeat the citizens' efforts to help
Central Americans navigate the asylum system.
The Refugee Act of 1980 defined "refugee" as a person who flees her
country as a result of a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

America, which enjoyed years-long correspondence, support, and intervisitation and an
independent basis for observation and verification of the political conditions reported by
Central Americans.
In several instances such relationships resulted in American congregations' aid to
Salvadoran clergy and church members known to them. Several churches who were not the
focus of press or government attention unilaterally established programs to assist Central
Americans to travel to, and surreptitiously enter, the United States. E.g., Hearings on BreakIns of Sanctuary Churches Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Const. Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 43-58 (1987) (Testimony ofRev. Donald J.
Cook).
146. The cities included Madison, Wisconsin; San Francisco, California; Los Angeles,
California; Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Santa Fe, New Mexico, which during the Tucson
trial, proclaimed itself a "city of refuge for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemala," and
Governor Toney Anaya issued a statement declaring the support of the entire state of New
Mexico for the Sanctuary movement. Toney Anaya, Sanctuary: Because There Are Still
Many Who Wait for Death, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 102-03 (1986) (explaining the
proclamation, and recounting that, as a result, the INS accused Anaya of promoting anarchy
and of perpetrating a "cruel hoax" to "lure aliens into the Land of Enchantment"); see g/so
Arthur Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy,
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493,496 (1986).
147. The New Mexico declaration was the basis for the acquittals of the last Sanctuary
case prosecuted. Two Acquitted ofSmuggling in Salvadorans in Sanctuary Case, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1988, at I.
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political opinion," 148 and provided that a refugee may not be deported
back to the place of persecution. 149 Yet in the Tucson region, the INS
routinely deported all Central Americans. Evidence accumulated that the
1980 Refugee Act was discriminatorily applied. At the time, only 2-3% of
Central Americans' applications for refugee status were granted nationwide,
while over 40% of the applications by Soviet Bloc citizens were granted. 15° Criticism mounted that Cold War ideology directed asylum decision-making, contrary to the politically neutral standard and procedure of the
1980 Act. The Administration refused to provide safe haven status to
Central Americans and to delay departure from this country until conditions
improved in their own countries on the grounds that these were economic

148. Immigration and Nationalization Act§ IOI(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § IIOI(a)(42) (Supp.
1994). This statute incorporated the "well-founded fear of persecution" standard of United
States obligations under international law. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
Nov. I, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223.
The purpose of the 1980 Act was to commit the United States to make refugee status
available according to the terms of the Protocol, which were deemed politically neutral in
contrast to the prior United States standards, which were based on the political nature of the
country from which the refugee fled. Prior to the ratification of the Protocol, ideology and
geography directed decisions to admit refugees, under either of two procedures, "conditional
entry," or the exercise of the Attorney General's power of parole. The failure of the INS to
follow the politically neutral standard of the Protocol prompted the passage of the 1980
Refugee Act.
149. The Refugee Act of 1980 § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Section 243(h) incorporates the non-refoulement mandate of the Refugee Convention that no
refugee be returned to a place where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on any
of the enumerated grounds. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33.1, July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
The Refugee Act also created a statutory basis for asylum, by authorizing the Attorney
General to grant asylum to those who satisfy the definition of "refugee." The Refugee Act
of 1980, §208(a), 8 U.S.C. §1158 (1988).
150. See Arthur Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243, 253 (1984); Scott M. Martin, Non-Refoulement of
Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357,
368 (1983). The determination of whether an applicant's fear of persecution is well founded
turns on Department of State advisory opinions to the immigration authorities.
To critics, this process ensured that determinations would be based on United States
foreign policy considerations, rather than politically neutral evaluation of applications. See
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 3195 Refugee Assistance, 98th Cong., I st Sess. I 0710 (1983) (statement of Arthur C. Helton, Director, Political Asylum Project, Lawyers
Committee for International Human Rights); see also, Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation
of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. I, 35-36 (1984) (observing that foreign policy
influences on immigration policy have made the administration of the Refugee Act of 1980
"seem incoherent and arbitrary," yet defending such influence as a manifestation of increased
U.S. dependence on the good will of other nations in attaining its foreign policy objectives).
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rather than political refugees. 151 Considering that several other groups of
aliens from other parts of the world received refugee status, the
Government's explanations appeared thin, and essentially unreviewable. 152
The Tucson network needed time and experience to develop the
understanding that their Sanctuary work upheld the law rather than defied
it. Praxis came first, theoretical framing later. First, people behaved as they
thought they should and deferred their worries about the relations among
citizens, the law, and the state. In the border region in particular, the
participants' primary th,oughts were dominated by the overwhelming
magnitude of the need.
In a state of emergency, and with little deliberate rhetoricism, early
participants in the Tucson area sometimes spoke in terms of the 1960s
concept of civil disobedience, with its ready imagery and repertoire of
resistance to oppressive legal authorities. 153 Indeed, Fife's letter to the
Attorney General heralding the original declaration of public Sanctuary
asserted that his congregation would "publicly violate the Immigration and
Nationality Act, Section 274(A)." 154 With equal vigor the letter asserted
that the government was violating its own laws, 155 and insisted that the

151. This view is still reiterated, even after the Sanctuary trials and appeals faded from
the public eye. In the fall of 1989, Senator Alan Simpson opposed a bill to provide safe
haven status for Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, arguing that economic conditions motivated
the flight of Central Americans and insisting that there is '"no proof that "returnees" lives
are in danger.'" Recent Developments, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES, Oct. 30, 1989, at 1197,
1199 (quoting Sen. Simpson).
152. The procedure for establishing safe haven status requires a decision by the
Attorney General to grant "extended voluntary departure" (EVD) status to specified groups
of aliens. In a lawsuit challenging the Attorney General's decision to withhold EVD, the
D.C. Circuit ruled that the decision to grant or withhold the status is squarely within the
broad powers granted to the Attorney General by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a)(l988), authorizing the Attorney General to issue regulations and perform
such other acts as he deems necessary to administer his statutory authority. Hotel and
Restaurant Employees Union v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court
found the reasons proffered by the Attorney General to be a facially legitimate exercise of
that discretion, and thus sufficient to withstand its very limited and deferential review. !d.
The Government asserted that its decision not to grant EVD status to Salvadorans was
based on (a) the number of Salvadorans in the country already; (b) the current surge of illegal
immigrants in the country; (c) the prospect that EVD would induce still more Salvadorans
to come to the United States; (d) the drain of illegal immigration on the finite resources of
the United States for law enforcement, social services, and other economic resources; and (e)
the availability of other, statutory means of relief, particularly application for asylum. Smith,
846 F.2d. at 1510.
153. But that does not mean their later analysis was merely instrumental or false:
meaning-making is a social process, the creation of culture through the experiences of
providing sanctuary. See discussion supra in part Il.A.2.
154. Letter from John Fife to William French Smith, supra note 141.
155. "We believe our government is in violation of the 1980 Refugee Act and
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declarants would do what was just under that law-i.e., provide Sanctuaryuntil the government did so. 156
Thus, officialdom's administration of the law to deprive Central
Americans of the law's apparent promise-a promise of individuated
opportunity to demonstrate fear of persecution-set the stage for the Tucson
Sanctuary workers to reconceive the legal obligations of citizens and state
for the implementation of the law. The "civil initiative" conception signifies
the right and obligation of citizens to enforce laws, where the government
fails to do so. For participants in the Sanctuary Movement, this understanding entailed two significant dimensions: belief and action. First, they
independently interpreted United States immigration laws, concluding that
individuals who merited asylum were "refugees" whether or not labelled by
a court. This interpretive independence declared that private citizens could
recognize an individual's refugee status as well as government officials
could. 157 Second, Sanctuary workers enacted their legal interpretations,
reasoning that to provide shelter and transportation to Central American
refugees obeyed rather than violated the law, and eventually established a
process to screen those who sought their aid.
"The transformation of interpretation into legal meaning begins when
someone accepts the demands of interpretation and, through the personal act
of commitment, affirms the position taken." 158 The crucial difference is
between speculation and practical interpretation.
Sanctuary workers
produced an alternative legal reality, part critique and part replication of the

international law by continuing to arrest, detain and forcibly return refugees to the terror,
persecution and murder in El Salvador and Guatemala." /d.
156. The writer continued:
We take this action because we believe the current policy and practice of the United
States Government with regard to Central American refugees is illegal and immoral. ... We believe that justice and mercy require that people of conscience actively
assert our God-given right to aid anyone fleeing from persecution and murder. We ask
that "extended voluntary departure" be granted to refugees from Central America and
that current deportation proceedings against these victims be stopped. Until such time,
we will not cease to extend the sanctuary of the church to undocumented people from
Central America.
!d.
!57. In California, the East Bay Sanctuary covenant likewise identified its legal basis
in United States obligations under international law, citing the 1951 United Nations
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Agreements on refugees, which establish the rights of
refugees not to be sent back to their countries of origin, as well as the United Nations
declaration that Central Americans were legitimate refugees of war. COUTIN, supra note 35,
at 109.
158. Cover, supra note 2, at 144. This quote cites and slightly modifies Heidegger's
more general proposition of Being-toward-possibilities: interpretation as "the working out of
possibilities projected in understanding." !d. at 145 (quoting M. HEIDEGGER, BEING IN TIME
188-89 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans., 1962)).
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official enforcement of asylum laws-intertwining power and resistance.
Their commitment to the proposition that the Sanctuary Movement followed
the law is illustrated by the growth of Movement screening practices in
1983. Screening took place after the Tucson network was contacted by
Central Americans seeking help to cross into the United States, and a
counselor was sent to the border. Essentially the counselor assessed the
possible political asylum claim under the United Nations Refugee Protocol
and Geneva Conventions: Why had they left their countries, what did they
fear would happen to them if they returned, had they experienced persecution? Those people deemed refugees received help across the border, 159
while those not determined refugees did not; 160 other forms of assistance
were generally provided, nonetheless.
Some Tucson Sanctuary workers found it difficult to reconcile the faith
basis for their participation with the civil initiative commitments to uphold
law, and they struggled to observe both. For example, consider this account
by a counselor who struggled with Matthew 25 (in which Jesus tells his
followers that when they aided the needy, they aided him):
Once, when I was in Hermosillo, we went down to talk to what we thought
were seven people who were interested in crossing the border, but once we
got there, we actually met twenty-five-including ten people with babies
who were just emaciated from hunger. And we really had to struggle with
what our decision was going to be as to whether or not to cross them.
Were they politically persecuted? And we had to conclude that they
weren't. The way that we reached that decision was to go back to the
Refugee Act of 1980, which is what sanctuary is based on .... [sic] [F]or me
it was a dilemma between the 1980 Refugee Act and Matthew 25.
Matthew 25 called me to help all those who are in need. So what we did
in the end was that we assisted them with food and with advice about how

I 59. The Sanctuary counselors first determined the refugee status of people who could
not stay in Mexico and who did not intend to accept voluntary departure if detained. For
these individuals, counselors determined which of three legal-action categories best fit
persons determined to be refugees: (I) affirmative application for asylum in the United
States; (2) refugee in transit to seek asylum in another country; and (3) further legal
counseling needed for refugees unable to decide.
After the Fifth Circuit reversed Merkt's conviction, United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d.
266 (5th Cir. I 985), the Tucson participants further formalized their crossing assistance to
require that a letter be sent notifying the INS District Director of refugees' arrival with the
ongoing assistance of Tucson Sanctuary volunteers to obtain legal status. Author's interview
with Jim Corbett, supra note 80, at 49 (redacted portion of transcript on file with the
Tennessee Law Review).
160. Tucson Sanctuary workers declined to assist those who ·~ust wanted a job" or a
cheaper, safer transit than those sold by coyotes, on grounds that such assistance failed to
further the civil initiative and possibly endangered their networks of safe passage for refugees
fleeing persecution.
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to come to the U.S., but we didn't cross them. Crossing them wouldn't
help the goal of sanctuary. 161

Tucson declared it would aid refugees from both the Right and the Left in
order to rectify what it perceived as a political bias in the official asylum
process. 162 After the development of "public sanctuary" as legal and media
strategy, the Chicago Religious Task Force encouraged those working on the
border to give priority to refugees who would be willing and effective
spokespersons regarding the political conditions in Guatemala and El Salvador.
Tucson Sanctuary givers varied in their sympathy to this view, but, as a practical
and spiritual matter, felt they had to deal with anyone who arrived at the border
who fit the civil initiative's definition of"refugee." Their interpretation allowed
them to resolve that they not limit their aid only to Central Americans with a
political message. 163
Early publications within the movement offered information on Sanctuary's
legal, constitutional and human rights dimensions. Additionally, publications
offered practical advice that stressed the need for a congregation's shared
commitment to adequately support refugees. 164 Publications after the arrests of
Conger, Merkt, and Elder in 1984, also emphasized the conflict between
Sanctuary proponents' legal interpretations and the Government's interpretations.
"To declare sanctuary is a serious decision. The reasons that justify challenFg
the current administration's interpretation of the law must be understood." 16

161. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 114-15.
162. Texas defendants, on the other hand, did make distinctions on the basis of country
of origin, declining to assist most Nicaraguans, on the view that the Sandanista government
was not comparably brutal. GOLDEN & McCONNELL, supra note 7; CRITIENDEN, supra note
7, at 93.
163. Author's Interviews with Sanctuary Defendant Subject Nos. 23, 32, 38 (on file
with the Tennessee Law Review).
164. E.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITIEE AND CHURCH WORLD SERVICES,
SEEKING SAFE HAVEN: A CONGREGATIONAL GUIDE TO HELPING CENTRAL AMERICAN
REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); CHICAGO RELIGIOUS TASK FORCE ON CENTRAL
AMERICA, supra note 144.
165. Wiesel, supra note I, at 199 (advising on the organizational, practical, economic,
psychological and social needs of refugee families and obligations of the community that will
shelter them; and outlining legal risks). The necessity of congregational grounding was
emphasized: "[i]t is essential that the entire community (congregation) reach a consensus
before declaring sanctuary" and "[t]he decision should come from a faith commitment." !d.
at 199-200.
Charges to which undocumented aliens and Sanctuary workers expose themselves, were
framed this way:
The INS, following administrative policy, refuses to recognize that Central Americans
have a well-founded fear of persecution that entitles them to political asylum under the
UN Convention on Refugees and the U.S. Act of 1980. Neither does it recognize the
right not to be returned to their homeland. . . . The refusal of the administration to
recognize the legitimacy of their claims to refugee status under U.S. and international
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The Sanctuary workers' concern to know and enforce the law revolved
around securing the safety of Central Americans. Sanctuary workers, like rescuers
of Jews from Nazi Europe, were aware of the potential risks and costs to
themselves by giving help. But these risks were viewed strategically, affecting
how a rescuer might go about giving help, without affecting the decision whether
to try to help. 166
Essential to their religious approach was concern for the refugees as persons.
Like the rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, Sanctuary rescue behavior may best be
explained by a common perception among rescuers who perceived themselves as
strongly linked to other people by virtue of their shared humanity. To hear
Central Americans recount their persecution and suffering, and to come to know
particular families housed and aided by one's church impressed many of the
middle-class North Americans, who respected the courage, faith, and spirituality
of Central America's poor. Several Sanctuary workers remarked, as did this one:
Why is it that I should deserve to make $26,000 and live in a nice home and
have all the food I can eat, and someone who earns $2,000 a year doesn't have
the right to do this, and it's my tax-paying dollars that keeps the person in
poverty through oppression and through that kind of regime? 167

This attitudinal orientation formed the basis for the stinging rejection by the
Tucson network of the more narrowly political stance of some other solidarity
groups. Under this conceptualization, the church cannot aspire to become the
State or to access its powers, which is the objective of political contestants. The
alternative of the Church is to forge an inclusive human community by offering
love to the refugee at the door. It cannot be mimicked or substituted by the
ideological interpretation of events thousands of miles away. 168

law does not render their presence unlawful. The position of the sanctuary movement
is that what it is doing is lawjitl. It may, however, be years before the courts make a
definitive ruling. In the meantime, all sanctuary workers and refugees are subject to
prosecution. So far, only two have been convicted [Elder and Merkt, in Texas] ... and
the convictions are being appealed. Others have been indicted and await trial.
!d. at 204-205 (emphasis added).
166. Kristen R. Monroe et al., Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers
of Jews in Nazi Europe, I 0 I ETHICS I 03, I 08 ( 1990) (recent empirical research on rescuers
of Jews from Nazi Europe, rejecting the traditional idea that cost-benefit calculation precedes
the choice to act altruistically); see also Monroe, supra note 32.
167. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 68. Monroe found no pattern whatsoever in adherence
to particular ethical or religious standards: rescuers came from all over the spectrum of
organized religions, and included agnostics and atheists as well. Monroe et al., supra note
166, at Ill. Yet "a spiritual belief of closeness to others or of being part of a family of
man", is reported as important among the rescuers. The independence of this dimension
from organized denominations was described by a typical subject as "pious from the inside."
Monroe, supra note 32, at 418-19.
168. Jim Corbett, Address at Austin, Texas (Oct. 28, 1982) (on file with the Tennessee
Law Review).
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While participants of the Tucson network who spoke with me viewed their
work as an undertaking required by religious understanding, none of them
appeared to believe that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution either did, or should, protect them as "religious" people
from adverse governmental reactions to their conduct. 169 This result coincides
with the state of Free Exercise jurisprudence; religiously motivated acts that
contravene governmental prescriptions are almost uniformly rejected on this
constitutional ground. 170 The saving features appear to be a clearly confinable
instance of a worship-practice which is church-directed, church-contained (it does
not send one into deserts to rescue refugees) and hard to confuse with political
action.
III. THE LAW'S REBUKE: CONSTRUCfiNG SANCTUARY
GIVERS AS RELIGIOUS 0UTLA WS

A. The Illegality Narrative of Investigation and Prosecution
The Sanctuary Movement prosecutions were based as much upon the media's
characterization of the Sanctuary activities as illegal as on the actual assistance to

169. Free Exercise claims were made by the Tucson defendants' lawyers on appeal,
after their exclusion by the trial court's grant of the government's motion in limine. The
Ninth Circuit rejected their claims handily. See discussion infra part III.B.
170. The few exceptional winners have been the Amish school children, excused from
compulsory attendance laws in recognition of the insularity of Old Order Amish religious
communities, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and seventh-day Sabbath observers,
exempted from aspects of unemployment compensation schemes which effectively
conditioned receipt of government benefits on religious beliefs, see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
( 1963 ). All other points of contest that cannot be tucked neatly into a state-dominant view
of rhe relation between citizens of religious conscience and their government are losers in
court.
All the more so since the Supreme Court's startling abandonment of compelling interest
analysis in favor of the starkly formalistic neutrality of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990) (finding no Free Exercise infringement in application of a generally applicable
and religiously neutral controlled substance statute to the use of peyote by members of the
Native American Church, of which peyote use is sacramental). The opinion has been roundly
criticized by scholars and religious communities, and Congress has sought to reverse its
effect by enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(b) (Supp. 1994) (explaining that the act's purpose is to "restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in" Sherbert and Yoder "and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened").
In June 1993, prior to enactment, the Court did uphold a Free Exercise claim under the
Smith test, unanimously invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting ritual animal sacrifice as
neither neutral (because its purpose was to suppress the Santeria sect's practice) nor generally
applicable (because only directed at sacrifice for religious purposes). Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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Central Americans. On appeal of the convictions, the Government brief
painstakingly outlined two years' worth of press reports prior to any active INS
investigation. This "passive investigation" followed the media and other public
materials, beginning with Southside's public declaration ceremony in March 1982
about which the INS noted that one Tucson paper reported that Fife would
"publicly defy the U.S. Government to arrest him as a felon in violation of
immigration laws." 171
In August 1982, after People magazine featured a
border crossing by Corbett of a Salvadoran family and their reception at Southside
Presbyterian Church, the INS asked the United States Attorney's Office in
Phoenix for prosecution advice. 172
In September, US. News & World Report featured a story on the Sanctuary
activities of many churches, including Southside, and in December, CBS's 60
Minutes ran a segment describing Corbett as "a smuggler who had broken the law
many times by smuggling and transporting Guatemalans and Salvadorans," 173
and identifying Southside Presbyterian Church as "one of several churches that
provide sanctuary to illegal aliens." 174 Three days later, INS Western Region
ordered an investigation and prosecution consultation with the United States
Attorney's Office. 175 In December, a Tucson newspaper stated, with such bite
that the Government reiterated it in its appellate brief, that:
For nearly a year, they have publicly flouted the law without reprisal .... [sic]
[They] have been publicized in the national media, where ringleaders detail their
acts with impunity, almost daring officialdom to respond .... [sic]
Since then it has grown to include hundreds of people and dozens of churches
in the United States and Mexico. 176

The appearance of escalation among churches in providing sanctuary
prompted the regional INS officials to adopt a more aggressive investigation and
to seek approval from the INS central office to infiltrate the Sanctuary Movement
with an informant. 177 Before the Ninth Circuit, the Government summarized
its view of the precipitating event: "After two years of baiting the INS in the
national media with their 'catch me if you dare' acts of alien smuggling, the

171. Respondents' Brief at 8, United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Nos. 86-1208-1215) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
172. INS was informed that any prosecution would have to be based on facts or
activity independent of the news media. Id. at 11.
173. !d. at 12.
174. !d.
175. !d.
176. !d. at 12-13.
177. !d. at 18. The parties disputed whether this approval was granted. Defendants
contended that Central Office had not approved the undercover operation commenced on
March 26, 1984. The Government insisted that the Central Office had approved the
informant, by telephone, while conceding that there had been no approval by a joint JusticeINS committee as required under the new undercover guidelines effective on March 19, 1984,
because "no mechanism was available to implement them." !d. at 18-19.
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defendants finally succeeded in finding themselves on trial for the very
criminal acts they had so provocatively professed to the nation's media."l7s
In 1984, Phil Conger, director of the TEC, was the first arrestee. The
case was dismissed for Fourth Amendment violations regarding the search
of his car. 179 However, there were papers in his backpack that listed
addresses for members of Sanctuary networks all around the country and a
lengthy memorandum written by Corbett two months earlier describing in
detail "religious communities' refugee defense activities" from deep il!.
Mexico throughout the United States to Canada. 18° Conger's papers
persuaded prosecutor Don Reno 181 that religion was merely a facade for
creating a nationwide network in order to violate the law and import people
who would speak publicly, and who were, in Reno's view, "real hard-core
Marxists" and liberation theologists. 182
Just days after Conger's arrest, new undercover guidelines for the INS
went into effect, 183 and subsequently, the regional INS office approved
recordings of telephone calls, and equipping the informant Jesus Cruz to
secretly tape conversations. 184
The request for approval described a
highly political antiwar movement, smuggling aliens for use in a propaganda
campaign against United States policies in Central America. To his
superiors in Washington, INS investigator Rayburn stressed the Sanctuary

178. !d. at 85.
179. Conger was indicted in May 1984, for transporting four Salvadorans, and the
indictment was dismissed following a pretrial hearing in which the stop was successfully
challenged. United States v. Conger, CR 84-106, TCU-ACM (1984); see also Respondents'
Brief, supra note 171, at I 0 n.6.
180. Jim Corbett, Some Proposals for Integrating Smuggling, Refuge, Relay, Sanctuary
and Bailbond Networks, in Borders and Crossings, supra note 77 (on file with the Tennessee
Law Review).
181. Reno, a former criminal defense attorney, was hired in January 1984 as the first
special assistant U.S. attorney in the country whose assignment was to handle interstate aliensmuggling cases only for the INS. In his first few months on the job, he and investigator
Rayburn got an indictment and conviction against one of the biggest farmers in Idaho for
twenty counts of labor violations and brought an alien-smuggling case in Florida that used
four undercover agents. CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 146.
182. !d. at 148 (citing Crittenden's interviews with Donald M. Reno, in Phoenix, Ariz.
(Nov. 1986)).
183. The new Undercover Guidelines Review Committee provided a Washington-level
consideration of sensitive investigations to prevent serious and embarrassing abuses.
Sensitive investigations included those involving "~ensitive techniques," that is, eavesdropping, for more than six months, or whose target was a foreign government, or encroached
on attorney-clie~t privilege, or involved religious organizations, such as this one. CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 139.
184. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 132 (discussing the testimony of James Rayburn,
May 23-24, 1985 in Aguilar).
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Movement's claim of forty-five public Sanctuaries and "the public endorsement and support of over 600 'co-conspiring' congregations and religious
organizations," and Sanctuary organizing committees "across the entire
length and breadth of the U.S.A." 185 After summarizing the belief among
Sanctuary workers that giving sanctuary to political refugees was justified
by law and treaty, Rayburn nonetheless concluded that, "[t]he movement,
which may have initially expressed humanitarian motives, has slowly
evolved to sanction a more lawless and political stance." 186 This interpretation was constructed significantly from quotations from Basta!, the
newsletter of the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America. 187
During the nine-month undercover operation, Cruz and INS agents made
ninety-one audio tapes of recorded meetings, including worship services of
several congregations active in providing Sanctuary. 188

185. /d. at 140 (quoting Undercover Operation Request from James A. Rayburn, INS
Phoenix, to INS Central Office, Washington, D.C., April24, 1984).
186. /d. at 141.
187. For example:
Sanctuary offers a concrete and direct way to challenge the inhuman policy of the
United States government in Central America and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service .
. . . We think a mass movement of resistance in the United States using direct action
is best.
If we allow the court of law or lawyers to direct the sanctuary movement, we will be
letting United States law dictate the parameters of our work and the limits of our
consctence.
/d. Corbett's writings were quoted, as were the Tucson Counseling Guidelines which set
forth the screening process used for refugees considering public Sanctuary. Rayburn
represented that the Sanctuary Movement was recruiting on the Mexico/Guatemala border,
and that those chosen for Sanctuary under the guidelines tend to be "young, middle-class,
well-educated, well-spoken, with values/beliefs inclined toward the 'left.'" /d. at 145. The
operation was approved for a period of three months. /d.
188. These were the Southside Presbyterian Church, the Camelback Presbyterian
Church, Alzona Lutheran Church, Risen Savior, and Emerson Unitarian Church. Appellants'
Opening Brief at 18, United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 86-12081215).
A half-dozen tapes recorded the regular Monday night meetings of the Tucson
Ecumenical Council Task Force on Central America (TEC) held at Southside Church, in
which Sanctuary volunteers discussed what they could and would do to assist Central
American refugees at "high risk." Tape Nos. 54, 61, 83, 89 from Operation Sojourner
Investigation (transcripts on file with the Tennessee Law Review). Of particular importance
to the government were the decisions to assist particular Central Americans to cross safely
from Mexico into the United States. The taped conversations show the regular participants
evaluating the refugee status and degree of risk of each person seeking this assistance from
the Tucson network. See, e.g., Tape from Operation Sojourner Investigation ofTEC Meeting
(Aug. 20, 1984) (author's notes from transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review)
(declining to aid three Hondurans in Nogales, Mexico, who were not high risk); Tape No.
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Many m Washington, D.C., did not share Reno's and Rayburn's
enthusiasm for prosecuting the Sanctuary workers. The Department of
Justice questioned the utility of the Sojourner Operation, its length, and its
timing, just before the presidential election. The week after Reagan's
reelection in November 1984, Reno and the investigation's chief met in
Washington, D.C., with the INS Commissioner and other top officials, who
continued to press for other ways to proceed besides criminal prosecutionperhaps by an injunction or some civil proceeding. Reno, who wanted
search warrants against the churches, argued vigorously against skeptics who
viewed the nine month undercover operation as having found nothing more
than alien smuggling. In the final indictment review in the United States
attorney's office in Phoenix, all high-ranking members of the Justice
Department in Phoenix and Tucson voted against the indictment, except for
Reno and Phoenix's United States Attorney McDonald.
McDonald
approved the indictment. 189 On January 10, 1985, a grand jury returned
indictments against sixteen people.
Believing that they were dealing with Communist collaborators, the
investigators overread the snippets of evidence that served this storyline.
The Government videotape of the search of Sister Nicgorski's Phoenix
apartment captured a frightened Salvadoran woman who was staying with
Nicgorski, who had told the nun that two of her brothers had been killed by
death squads and her husband shot by a national guardsman. The government agents spent four hours examining Nicgorski's extensive files on the
Sanctuary network. During this time, the camera turned again and again to
a large poster in the living room that read, "Dump Reagan in 1984." Of the
dozens of items removed by the agents from the apartment were a notebook
on liberation theology and forty-four photographs, one of which showed
Nicgorski with Nicaragua's interior minister, Tomas Borge, taken while she

89 from Operation Sojourner Investigation of TEC Meeting (Nov. 26, 1984) (transcript on
file with the Tennessee Law Review) (assigning Fr. Quinones to screen Salvadoran groups
once they arrive at border).
They also reveal Conger directing government informant Cruz, posing as a Sanctuary
volunteer, not to help non political refugees to enter the United States. E.g., Tape from
Operation Sojourner Investigation of phone call (May 18, 1984) (Conger to Cruz: "But you
will have to say no, right?" Cruz: "I want to be volunteer with you." Conger: "Yes, yes.
Then it is best if you don't [help a man find a paid coyote.]") (author's notes from transcript
on file with the Tennessee Law Review); Tape from Operation Sojourner Investigation of
TEC Meeting (Aug. 20, 1984) (Conger: "If someone falls with refugees that aren't truly
political refugees that is going to hurt all of us .... [I]f we, the church mix with people like
that and fall, it's going to go out nationwide that we are only helping people that only want
to come be with their family, and we aren't helping them for that reason.").
The independent activities of several other U.S. congregations to bring Central
Americans out of Mexico is also indicated in passim, whose actions were not under the
direction of TEC, and whose participants were never prosecuted.
189. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 189-92.
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was on a tour with a group of nuns. Prosecutor Reno later described this
photo to the press as showing the nun "with Communist guerrillas down in
Central America." 190
Despite this enthusiastic overreading, none of the seized materials
indicated any connection between the nun and any political organizations or
foreign governments, nor contradicted her self-presentation as an activist nun
who believed that God commanded her to love and serve the poor.
Nonetheless, the search and seizure reinforced INS investigators' perception
that they had nailed a tough and devoted Marxist. 191 Nicgorski's perception of the event was quite different; she saw her government determined to
use every means, including egregious invasions of privacy, to stop the
Sanctuary Movement. For her and others who had worked in Central
America, her Government's agents were approaching the control tactics
employed by repressive governments in Central America. 192
The prosecution's trial strategy was to manipulate the rhetorical framing
of the issue to prevent the defendants from reminding the jury of the
national self-image of the United States as the last haven of the oppressed
and to ignore the independent religious thinking that led the Pilgrims to
begin a new nation. The prosecution employed a strategy that excluded all
issues about religious freedom and motivation, refugee law, and stories of
Central Americans' forced flight.
To limit what judge and jury would see of the true contest between the
Government and the Sanctuary Movement, the prosecutor filed a sweeping
motion in limine to preclude the introduction of evidence on issues collateral
to his theory of a conspiracy to "smuggle aliens." Key to undermining the
defendants' legal understanding, the motion sought to exclude defense
arguments that the Refugee Act of 1980 or any international treaty confers
refugee status on any of the undocumented people named in the indictment;
that defendants' conduct was justified by their religious faith; that defendants had any good motives or beliefs that negated criminal intent; and that
necessity compelled defendants to act as they did. 193

190. !d. at 200. Substantially similar accounts were given by Sanctuary defendants
who had viewed the videotape. Author's Interviews with Sanctuary Defendant Subject Nos.
01,23,38.
191. !d. at 201.
192. Author's Interview with Sister Nicgorski (June 1992) (on file with author). One
reaction at the time was to show the government that the sanctuary movement would not be
deterred. Two days after the indictment, one of the unindicted co-conspirators led a
Guatemalan family of four over the border and across the desert. The family recounted that
a year before, they had allowed the older two daughters to visit their grandfather; when the
mother returned for them, government agents were hosing out the garage, and insisted that
the family did not live there anymore. The grandparents, the two children, and an aunt were
never heard from again, according to the Sanctuary worker who helped the family.
CRIITENDEN, supra note 7, at 201 (citing Crittenden's interview, 1986).
193. In an interview with one reporter, Reno said he drafted the motion by listing
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The motion also sought to strictly curb the courtroom discourse, by
asking the judge to bar any reference to the aliens aided by defendants as
"refugees" or "asylees," 194 to any "alleged episodes, stories or tales of civil
strife, war, or terrorism that may have occurred or are occurring" in
countries of Central America, or to the numbers of Central Americans who
applied for asylum. The motion in limine further sought to prohibit mention
or evidence that any policies of the United States toward any Central
American country is "immoral or in violation of any international law," or
of policies regarding the grant or denial of asylum by the U.S. from any
countries, "either communist-dominated governments or countries undergoing a socialist or communistic revolution." 195 To reinforce his argument,
Reno attached a copy of Basta!, the newsletter of the Chicago Religious
Task Force on Central America, whose articles pledged to turn the trial into
an opportunity to make a political statement and educate Americans about
the abuses occurring in Central America. 196 Defendants filed some fifteen
motions in reply, challenging the stunning breadth of the motion in limine
and seeking dismissal of the indictments.

B. The Judicial Embrace of the Illegality Narrative
I. Procedural Suppression of the Narrative of Legality
The Sanctuary defendants in Aguilar pursued two lines of defense: the
legality of the defendants' acts, and the outrageousness of the government's
conduct toward these religious actors. 197 According to the primary defense

everything he could think of that might possibly exculpate the Sanctuary defendants.
CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 219 (discussing Crittenden's interview with Don Reno (Nov.
1986)).
194. The defense responded with a motion to bar the prosecution from referring to
"illegal aliens." Judge Carroll eventually prohibited both terms, and ruled that each Central
American be called by name. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 271.
195. Government's Motion in Limine, United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.
1989) (Nos. 86-1208-1215); see also CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 220. The motion further
sought exclusion of evidence or argument on the impacts that a guilty verdict for defendants
would have upon Central Americans applying for asylum under the Immigration Act, and of
amnesty or extended voluntary departure for Salvadorans, including those unindicted coconspirators in the indictment. !d.
196. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 220.
197. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 34, 305-09 (United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d
709 (I 989) (Nos. 87-1771, 87-2275) [hereinafter Appellarits' Opening Brief]. An earlier
defense motion included the defense of necessity, asserting that the defendants' acts were
justified, and thus not illegal, because the defendants believed their Sanctuary actions were
necessary to prevent the more serious danger of forced deportation. Id. at 233 (citing
Defendants' Opposition to Motion to Exclude Necessity Defense); CRITTENDEN, supra note
7, at 221.
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of legality, the Central Americans whom the defendants were accused of
transporting and harboring, were legally entitled to status as political
refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980 and the 1967 U.N. Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States was
bound. 198 The defendants argued that they were complying with the
governing law, whereas the INS' deportations, not the defendants actions,
violated U.S. and international law. Under this theory, the defendants
. moved immediately to dismiss the indictments on the ground that the acts
stated in the indictment were in fact legal.
The defense also moved to dismiss the indictments on grounds of the
Government's outrageous conduct of its undercover investigation since the
Government was dependent upon agents and informants with substantial
records of dishonesty, double-dealing, and disregard for investigative
guidelines. 199 After a pretrial hearing, this motion was denied based on
a finding that the Government's infiltration of churches was "not acceptable," yet was not "outrageous Government conduct," and thus, was not a
violation of the Due Process Clause "or other violation that would cause the
indictment to be dismissed. " 200
The defendants' last effort to have the case thrown out before trial was
based on selective prosecution. 201 This argument was also rebuffed,
despite considerable evidence that cases involving smuggling were not
prosecuted in Arizona unless they entailed financial exploitation of undocumented persons and that the government declined to prosecute employers

In another motion to dismiss, based on the First Amendment's guarantee of the right of
free exercise of religion, the defendants argued that they were following their sincere
religious belief in the Biblical directive to take in strangers, and that this religious interest
outweighed the Government's interest in prosecuting Sanctuary workers. Appellants'
Opening Brief, supra, at 257-61.
198. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 197, at 80-81 & n.47. The defense argued
that international law is incorporated into the law of the United States, and that norms of
customary international law regarding refugees prohibit the forced return of refugees to their
countries if they faced danger of persecution. The defendants believed that the people they
aided were fleeing such circumstances and that the Geneva Conventions and other
international laws required them to act. CRITIENDEN, supra 7, at 221.
199. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 197, at 324; see CRITIENDEN, supra note
7, at 222-24. One agent apparently pimped for migrant farmworkers while on the
government's payroll. Another agent, Jesus Cruz, had a long record of arrests for mercenary
alien smuggling, and aided the illegal sale of firearms in violation of federal gun laws while
a government agent. Furthermore, the chief investigator for the INS, James Rayburn, who
directed the agents, demonstrated an ideological ax to grind. CRITIENDEN, supra note7, at
224.
200. See Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 197, at 309 (quoting Pretrial
Reporters' Transcript at 1097); see also CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 228-29.
201. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 197, at 331-32.
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even though it knew such employers went to Mexico to induce illegal
entry.202
The court denied all the key defense motions: It refused to dismiss
under international law, ruled that the defense could not offer evidence of
violence in Central America, and denied that the government's investigative
tactics violated the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.2o3
The defendants wanted the jury to hear evidence on whether there were
reasonable legal alternatives to the defendants' actions: Why did they not
encourage Central Americans to apply for asylum at the border or to apply
at the nearest INS office as soon as they entered the country, either of which
would shield the refugees from deportation throughout the long appeals process?204 The defendants wanted to answer these questions with evidence
of the arrest of applicants and the detention of families in penal centers with
little access to legal assistance. 205 The defendants also wanted to demonstrate the 2% success rate for Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum applicants,
and the refugees' fears that if they did tum themselves in to immigration
officials, the INS might convey information to refugees' governments, an act
that would endanger them and their relatives who remained behind. 206
At the hearing on the availability of the necessity defense, the court
challenged defense counsel to explain why there had not been more lawsuits

202. !d. at 340, 345 (discussing testimony of INS Supervising Agent, Jim Rayburn,
and United States Attorney, Stephen McNamee).
203. !d. at 33, 237, 309; see also CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 229-30.
204. CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 230-31. Defendants made an offer of proof on
three contentions: (I) Salvadorans and Guatemalans were prevented from applying for asylum
at the Mexican border because of INS regulations; (2) Mexican immigration authorities
arrested and summarily deported Central Americans; and (3) illegal status in Mexico rendered
Central Americans vulnerable to robbery and rape. See Appellants' Opening Brief, supra
note 197, at 223-38.
205. CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 231.
206. !d. at 231, 366 (discussing reports that deportees were tortured and murdered
upon return to the countries from which they fled); see also HELSINKI WATCH, DETAINED,
DENIED, DEPORTED: ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 55-57 (1989).
A State Department study of the fate of deportees found that of 482 deportees, only 38%
were confirmed to be in no danger, while the fate of the other 62% was unclear. U.S. DEP'T
ST., SURVEY OF 482 DEPORTED SALVADORANS AND SALVADORAN MONITORING SURVEY
METHODOLOGY, Washington, D.C. (1982); see also AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE
FATES OF SALVADORANS EXPELLED FROM THE UNITED STATES (Sept. 5, 1984) (reporting
112 likely cases of persecution, including 52 political murders, 47 disappearances, and 13
unlawful political arrests).
Two years after the Aguilar trial, the Ninth Circuit took judicial notice of reports that
persons deported to El Salvador "have been tortured and have been killed." Lazo-Majano
v. INS, 873 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
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challenging INS procedures at its detention centers and at the border. 207
The defense counsel explained that several such cases had been filed, but
had not yet been resolved? 08 The court advised the prosecutor to encourage INS to comply with its own procedures. 209 Nonetheless, the court
ruled that there was no basis for a defense of necessity, duress, or futility.210 One month later, the court rejected the claim that Sanctuary was a
religious ministry exempt from prosecution under the Free Exercise of
Religion Clause. 211 Only a single ruling favored the defense: There could
be testimony that the defendants lacked the specific intent to violate U.S.
immigration laws. 212
So framed, the juridical contest was over well before the case came to
trial. 213 The unprecedented scope and success of the prosecution's motion
in limine effectively muzzled the defendants in court, treating as legally
irrelevant every aspect important to the defendants' case and to defendants'
understanding of their conduct. 214 Denial of the motions prevented each

207. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 231.
208. /d.; see Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 385-87 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
(granting preliminary injunction to class of Salvadorans and directing the INS to halt its
summary removal of Salvadorans from the United States), aff'd sub nom. Orantes-Hernandez
v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding a finding that since the early 1980s,
the INS "engage[d) in a broad systematic process of illegality").
209. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 231. The prosecutor countered that he did not
represent INS, only "the Government," for which he was reprimanded. !d. at 232.
210. !d.
211. !d.; see also Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 197, at 258.
212. See id. at 55-58. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 232. In other words, a good faith
misunderstanding of the law was a valid defense, although "mistake of law" was not.
Defendants could then argue that they did not intend to break the law because they believed
they could present refugees to an INS office at some reasonable, but later, time. Appellants'
Opening Brief, supra note 197, at 55-58.
213. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 232.
214. See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine-Tria/ Without Jury: A
Government's Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5 (1986)
[hereinafter Colbert, The Motion in Limine]. The purpose of a motion in limine is to obtain
a pretrial evidentiary ruling precluding the opposing party from using a particular item of
evidence at trial. !d. at 10. In a criminal case, the motion in limine was originally intended
to protect an accused's right to a fair trial by excluding prejudicial evidence from the jury's
consideration. /d. at 22. When motions in limine are used by the prosecution to exclude
entire defenses, as in Aguilar, the effect is to force the defense to reveal its trial strategies
and to prove the relevancy of its defenses to the trial court, long before the government has
made its case and before the defense could challenge the government's case through crossexamination and presenting its own witnesses. !d. at 23-24, 54. The government's use of
the motion in limine jeopardizes the accused's fundamental right to remain silent, to be free
from self-incrimination, and to insist that the prosecution assume its full burden of proving
guilt. /d. at 53-54.
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defendant from giving testimony to the jury/ 15 just as it precluded the
jury from serving its appointed role as fact-finder. 216 The prosecution, in
precluding the democratic possibility of trial, impaired the efforts of these
civil initiative practitioners to "engag[ e] and respect[] the procedure that was
[in] place. " 217
Despite the legal winnowing and nearly complete adverse rulings, the
facts admitted at trial made the defendants hopeful of an acquittal. 218 The
Government's case, which seemed so solid, began to disintegrate when the
trial began. 219 The Government's case turned on its star witness, agent
Cruz, who had attended the Monday night meetings at Southside Church
where requests and plans for Sanctuary assistance were discussed. 220 On
cross-examination, Cruz appeared to be a duplicitous betrayer, smuggler, and
gunrunner willing to do anything for money. 221 Agent Cruz's comprehension of English was weak, a startling contrast to his astonishing recall of
incriminating details that he displayed when testifying in Spanish. 222 This
cast doubt on the veracity of his reports of Sanctuary meetings that he
attended which were conducted in English. 223
The Government, at the risk of failing to make its case in chief/24
called three Sanctuary members, each of whom would have been able to
corroborate Cruz's testimony. 225 All three Sanctuary witnesses moved to
quash the subpoenas as a violation of their First Amendment right to
exercise freedom of religion. 226 The court declined to quash the subpoe-

215. As one Tucson defendant later explained, "If we testified we were doing the
public information thing through our testimony, but [then] we were going to go down the
tubes .... [because we'd] admit we did what we did, and more .... [W]e would have just
laid it all out .... " Author's Interview with Sanctuary Defendant Subject No. 47.
After the motions in limine were granted virtually in toto, defendant Fife thought
testimony would serve a purpose only if the defense politicized the trial in the tradition of
the Chicago 7 defendants. Author's Interview with Rev. Fife (June 28, 1992) (redacted
transcript on file with the Tennessee Law Review).
216. See Colbert, The Motion in Limine, supra note 214, at 54.
217. Author's Interview with Jim Corbett, supra note 80.
218. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 270.
219. /d. at 270 (discussing the devastating effect the testimony of Agent Cruz had on
his own credibility).
220. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 668-71 (discussing the role of Agent Cruz in infiltrating
the Movement).
221. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 270.
222. /d.
223. !d.
224. !d. at 280 (discussing Agent Cruz's perjury).
225. !d. at 305.
226. !d. at 305-06.
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nas. 227 After all three refused to testify, they were sentenced to house
arrest until the defense rested one month later.m
Reno then sought to admit taped portions of the Monday night
conversations. 229 The defense countered by urging that the tapes be
admitted in their entirety, as the surest way for the trier of fact to hear the
concerns and motives of the Sanctuary defendants. 230 Reno objected, and
the court refused to admit the tape_s in their entirety, which resulted in
studied nitpicking over which snippets of tape to admit into evidence. 231
The Government also called as witnesses several Central Americans
named as unindicted conspirators. 232 Many of these witnesses were classic
refugees, and the defense sought to have the jury hear their entire testimony.233 The prosecution objected to this evidence· as "irrelevant and
prejudicial," and the court agreed. 234 Although offers of proof were made,
the jury heard only the small portion of the refugees' testimony detailing the
actual border crossing. 235 After the court rejected all but two of the 126
jury instructions proposed by the defense, 236 the jury convicted eight of the
eleven defendants on multiple felonies. 237

227. !d. at 306.
228. !d. at 306-07.
229. !d. at 307.
230. !d.
231. See id. The court allowed only portions of the tape into evidence. !d. at 308.
232. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 272.
233. !d.
234. !d.
235. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 273. As an example, the Gomez's family
story, not heard by the jury, began with his comfortable job as a factory manager and a union
leader in El Salvador. His wife worked for an American company and they owned two
houses and a car. In June, 1983, Gomez was arrested, beaten, accused of being a guerrilla
and a subversive, and forced to sign a blank confession. Gomez left El Salvador, and went
to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in Mexico City, which
certified him as a refugee.
The UNHCR named five countries, including the United States, where he might seek
asylum. The officer approached the American consulate for him. Gomez was apprised of
the regional quotas in effect for refugees applying to the United States from outside the
country, and of the United States preference for Cuban applicants. The jury, however, heard
only the Gomez story beginning with his stay with Soccorro Aguilar in her Nogales, Mexico,
home immediately prior to his crossing into the United States. !d. at 273-76.
236. !d. at 3 16.
237. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 188, at 24-26. Aguilar was convicted of
bringing in a 13-year-old girl by walking ahead of her through the Port of Entry. Quinones
and Conger were convicted of aiding and abetting the illegal entry of two Salvadoran men,
by pointing out holes in the international fence and the steeple of Clark's church on the
United States side. !d.
Conger, Fife, and Nicgorski were convicted of aiding and abetting illegal transportation.
Nicgorski and Fife were convicted of aiding and abetting illegal transportation. Clark and
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2. Judicial Narration
The federal courts hearing the Sanctuary cases spoke only the narrative
of legalism. This result is not surprising since judges are empowered to
write the authoritative text of what transpired in their courtroom. Judges
write in two personas: as functionaries in a system, and as declarers of
social norms. In the judicial opinions, the judges present the Sanctuary
prosecutions as if they arose ab initio, with few of the contours, and fewer
of the "basic facts," which my account provides. The effect is the silencing
of these other narratives, which are overwritten with rhetorically denigrating
flourish by judicial hands.
a. The Texas Sanctuary Precedents
By the time the Aguilar appeal reached the Ninth Circuit, only a handful
of prosecutions of Sanctuary workers had produced published opinions. 238
In one such case, Stacey Lynn Merkt and a nun were arrested while driving
three Salvadorans from the Brownsville, Texas area to the INS district office
in San Antonio to file for asylum. 239 A jury found her guilty on three
counts, sentencing her to ninety days in prison in June 1984, which was then
converted to two years' supervised probation. 240
On appeal, in June, 1985, Merkt challenged the jury instructions on the
requisite knowledge and intent for an alien's violation of the immigration
laws under 8 U.S.C. section 1324(a)(2), and on the government's "nearest
Merkt's conviction was reversed on all three
office" instruction. 241
counts. 242 The court ruled that the jury instruction effectively removed
the essential elements of intent from the jury's consideration. 243 Furthermore, the court ruled that "if the jury should find as a fact that Merkt
intended to present the aliens to the proper officials so that they could seek
legal status in this country, it should find that she did not have the requisite

Nicgorski were each convicted of one count of harboring. LeWin was convicted of
transporting a family from Phoenix to Albuquerque. Hutchison, Father Quinones, Aguilar,
Reverend Fife, Sister Nicgorski, and Philip Conger were all convicted of conspiracy, under
18 U.S.C. § 371, to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a). !d.; see also CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at
323.
238. See. e.g., United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d at 269-70.
239. !d. at 269-70. Merkt alleged that the undocumented people she had been
transporting were political refugees under the Refugee Act of 1980; and that the nearest INS
office was violating U.S. law by immediately detaining and deporting aliens who presented
themselves in order to seek asylum. !d. at 269.
240. ld. at 269-70.
241. !d. at 275.
242. !d. at 268.
243. ld. at 272.
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criminal intent necessary for a conviction . . . " 244 Merkt raised no
religion-related defense in this case, although several amici did. 245
In December, 1984, while Merkt's first case was pending, she was again
indicted, along with Casa Romero's director, Jack Elder, for two counts of
transportation and one count of conspiracy for driving three Salvadorans to
a bus station in March, 1984. 246 The district court's opinion is the only
arguably empathetic judicial opinion that addresses the religious basis for the
actions of the Sanctuary workers. 247 The district court recognized a
compelling free exercise of religion interest in the Sanctuary workers,
finding that Elder met his initial burden of showing that religious beliefs
motivated his conduct. 248 The district court opened its opinion by noting
that "courts have recognized that the exercise of religious freedom can
sometimes excuse criminal conduct." 249 Yet, in the next breath, the court
reiterated the doctrine that the First Amendment absolutely protects belief,
but not action. 250 The "perceived mandates of religious practice" must
yield to the "appropriate analysis" of the "prohibitions of a criminal statute."251

244. /d. Here is a discrete instance in which the interpretation of law by a citizen was
crisply articulated at trial and eventually adopted by the reviewing court. The district court
rejected Merkt's arguments and ruled that her belief that the aliens genuinely qualified for
political asylum was no defense. /d. at 270. The court of appeals' ruling on the jury
instructions, on the other hand, made willful transportation "'in furtherance' of the alien's
illegal presence" a prerequisite for conviction under the statute. /d. at 272. On the other
issues presented, the Court held for the Government. /d. at 275. The government did not
retry the case.
245. /d. at 268. Several amicus briefs, including the National Council of Churches and
the Unitarian Universalist Association, did raise religion-related defenses, which were ignored
by the court. /d.
246. United States v. Elder, 601 F. Supp. 1574, 1676 (S.D. Tex. 1985). Merkt was.
also arrested for violation of probation. /d.
247. /d. Although Judge Head heard Elder's motions to dismiss based on freedom of
religion, domestic and international refugee law, selective prosecution, and estoppel, as well
as a motion to suppress evidence, Judge Head noted that only the religion and refugee law
questions were "sufficiently unique to merit a written opinion." /d. at 1576.
248. /d. at 1577. Since the Sanctuary prosecutions preceded Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, the analysis for the application of Free Exercise doctrine was simpler:
the courts need only apply the three-part compelling state interest test fashioned in Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that for conduct to be protected
under the Free Exercise Clause, (a) it must result from a sincere religious belief, (b) which
is burdened or inhibited by the government action or regulation, and (c) the government
interest must be less than compelling. Jd. at 402-03. Even where the governmental interest
is deemed compelling, the state must show that its chosen means are the least restrictive on
the impacted religious practice. /d.
249. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1577 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
250. /d. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940)).
251. /d.
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Elder presented the testimony of clergymen of several Protestant
denominations, as well as the testimony of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Brownsville, nearest to Casa Romero. 252 The clergy explained that
"meeting material human needs represents an essential aspect of Christianity,
and that each individual remains free to fulfill this obligation according to
the directives of his or her own conscience."253 Providing sanctuary,
according to the clergy, is an appropriate expression of this obligation, even
though no directive of the Roman Catholic or other church requires it. 254
Elder also filed numerous statements by witnesses to civil strife and
atrocities in El Salvador. 255
The court specifically refrained from finding any facts concerning the
described horrors, explaining that it need only find that Elder believed the
reports to be true. 256 The court also took pains to reassure readers that it
"need not make any foreign policy judgments" and that "other members of
the Roman Catholic faith may oppose Elder's activist response to the
situation in Central America. " 257
Nonetheless, the district court found that the Government justified its
limitation of Elder's religious conduct, in the least intrusive way, by
showing "an overriding interest in protecting a congressionally-sanctioned
immigration and naturalization system designed to maintain the integrity of
this Nation's borders."258 The court cited authority for the proposition that
the judiciary has a particularly limited role in such matters. 259 By characterizing immigration control as a national security interest, the court elevated
the importance of judicial deference to the executive and legislative
branches, and thereby mitigated its function to protect individual interests
under constitutional guarantee. Because border control is "inherent in
sovereignty" and "vital to the welfare and security of the people," 260
Elder's breach of national security by driving to a bus station became
"Elder's do-it-yourself immigration policy," "which while charitable, gives
away what is not his to give away." 261
The court's account of the asylum application procedure reinforces this
deferential stance. The procedure, as recounted by the court, sounds
plausibly fair at every turn: Would-be asylum applicants may make their
applications even during exclusion or deportation hearings; those denied

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 1578.
!d.
!d.
!d. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1909)).
!d.
!d.
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asylum by an immigration judge may appeal within the INS; and petitioners
who are denied asylum have recourse to all levels of the federal courts for
review of the denial. 262 In contrast to the neat legal order prevailing in
this judicial district, the practical knowledge gained by Sanctuary workers,
including Merkt and Elder, in the borderlands, painted a not-so-rosy picture
of the INS and their procedures for repatriating refugees. Despite their
formal procedures, the INS, throughout the Southwest, rendered these
provisions meaningless by practices of detention, disinformation, and
coercion until refugees signed "voluntary departure agreements" that acted
as formal consents to immediate deportation. 263 Occasionally, federal
courts have found as fact many of the particular INS violations of U.S. law
known by Sanctuary defendants. 264

262. /d. at 1579-80 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(a)); see Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
263. See, e.g., Orantes-Hemandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1511-14 (C.D. Cal.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Orantes-Hemandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1990)
(entering a permanent injunction of INS practices of summary deportation of Salvadorans and
attendant violations of due process rights).
264. !d. The INS's heavy-handed practices led to the prolonged incarceration of
thousands, and to adjudicated violations of the constitutional and statutory rights of detainees.
See, e.g., Louis v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 849 (1984) (holding that INS detention program violated
equal protection clause); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that
INS violated due process clause by not advising aliens of their right to apply for political
asylum), appeal dismissed, 692 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982). In the early 1980s, lower federal
courts demonstrated a new willingness to grant classwide relief to enjoin INS's detention
policies. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (enjoining mass
deportation of detained, undocumented Haitians together with mass processing and denial of
asylum claims); Orantes-Hemandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (enjoining
mass detention, deportation, and coerced voluntary departures of Salvadorans); FemandezRoque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (enjoining prolonged detention of
excludable Cubans pending deportation), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (lith Cir. 1984). For
arguments that most INS detainees are asylum seekers, see T. ALEINKOFF & D. MARTIN,
IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY 464-65 ( 1985).
A decade -ago, Peter Schuck argued persuasively that the INS practices "seared the
judicial conscience as few events since the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s."
Schuck, supra note !50, at 68-69. But the persistent influx of people fleeing the severe
privations of Cuba since 1980 appear to have eroded judicial oversight of the INS, as the
subsequent history of similar cases suggests. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 953
F.2d 1498, 1515 (I Ith Cir. 1992) (reversing district court decision enjoining forcible
repatriation of a class of Haitians in absence of procedural safeguards for their asylum
claims); Committee of Central American Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1986)
(affirming denial of an injunction to prohibit transfer of members of the class of detained
aliens to remote detention center, as neither an interference with the right to counsel nor a
denial of due process rights to apply for asylum or to be advised of right of counsel); Pulma
v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104-05 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding indefinite detention of an alien
after an unsuccessful attempt to deport him).
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cast Merkt and
Elder quite differently than had the district court. 265 The defendants were
presented, not as sincerely religious people whose beliefs required them to
minister to the needs of poor and persecuted by offering "sanctuary in the
Biblical sense,"266 but as stubborn supplicants for a "free-exercise-haven."267 The court assessed the value of Merkt's and Elder's religious
motivations by comparing their beliefs to the beliefs of other Christians
whose beliefs did not morally require their participation in the Movement.268
The court asserted that the immigration law imposed no burden on
appellants' religion because devout Christianity does not "mandate[]
participation in the 'sanctuary movement. '"269 Moreover, the court
suggested that the appellants could have assisted Salvadorans in several legal
ways: as missionaries or by preparing petitions for legal entry. 270 Because
"[t]hey chose confrontational, illegal means to practice their religious
views-the 'burden' was voluntarily assumed [by the appellants] and not
imposed on them by the government. " 271 Besides, noted the court, there
were many persons worthy of such Christian charity in the United States
that the appellants could aid without entanglement in federal foreign
policy. 272 Furthermore, the court noted that the uniform enforcement of
border control laws was a compelling state interest and that federal courts
lacked the institutional competence to interfere. 273 Finally, the court

265. Compare United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 946 (1986) with Elder, 601 F. Supp at 1576. In January 1985, a jury found Elder guilty
of transportation and conspiracy charges despite Elder's religious motivation defense. BAU,
supra note 7, at 83. Elder also claimed that his arrest was the product of selective enforcement because other persons who committed the same offense, but for different reasons-namely coyotes and employers of illegal aliens-were not arrested. This defense was
also rejected. !d.; see supra text accompanying notes 197-217.
At Merkt's separate trial in February 1985, before a different judge, a religious
motivation defense was proffered but excluded. BAU, supra note 7, at 83. The jury found
Merkt not guilty of unlawful transportation of an illegal alien, but guilty of conspiracy. She
was ordered to serve 179 days of an 18-month sentence, to disassociate from Casa Romero,
and not to speak publicly about Sanctuary pending an appeal. /d.
266. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1576.
267. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 954. The court noted that "ordered liberty precludes allowing
every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole
has important interests." /d. at 955 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230).
268. /d. at 956.
269. /d.
270. /d.
271. /d.
272. /d. at 957.
273. /d. at 956. The court also rejected an argument that the Government's evident
lack of success in enforcing border laws removes border control from the category of
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reasoned that no less restrictive means was called for to accommodate the
appellants' beliefs. 274 Thus, the court concluded that "Appellants"do-ityourself' immigration policy, even if grounded in sincerely held religious
conviction, is irreconcilably, voluntarily, and knowingly at war with the duly
legislated border control policy."275
b. The Tucson Prosecution
On the appeal of Agui/ar, 276 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, like the Fifth Circuit, was dismissive of the Sanctuary workers'
religious conscience argument and hostile to the legal interpretations
engendered by their interpretive understanding. 277 As at trial, the judicial
perspective focused on the border crossing from Mexico into Arizona. 278
This focus foreshortened time, and stripped away, neatly and completely, all
background and context for the Sanctuary workers' conduct. 279

compelling state interest. !d.
274. !d. at 956-57. Appellants had argued that more carefully tailored governmental
measures might include deportation of the defendants, or confiscation of vehicles used to
transport undocumented persons, rather than criminalizing the appellants' work. The court
rejected these suggestions as trivial. !d. at 957.
275. !d. Additional charges were brought against Elder and Merkt in December 1984,
just before the Arizona indictment. They were indicted for conspiracy and transporting, and
Elder was indicted on one count of bringing in refugees. BAU, supra note 7, at 82. This time
Elder was not allowed to present evidence on religious motivations or evidence concerning
United States refugee law. Elder was convicted on all six counts in March 1985. Again, the
court offered Elder two years' probation on the condition that he quit Casa Romero and not
speak publicly about the Sanctuary movement. !d. Elder refused, and was sentenced to six
concurrent one-year terms, which were reduced to 150 days in a halfway house. !d. This
conviction was not appealed, and Elder reported in April, 1985. !d. Merkt was convicted
of conspiracy, and the judge revoked her parole. !d. at 82-83.
276. 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1989).
277. The Sanctuary workers put forth six arguments: (I) the defendants committed no
crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) because the Central Americans they helped were entitled to
enter and reside as "refugees" under the Refugee Act of 1980, and thus, were lawfully in the
country; (2) even if they were mistaken in their interpretation of the Act, they acted on an
honest belief, which was a good defense to the knowledge element of§ 1324(a) (under the
rule of Liparota v. United States, 4 71 U.S. 419 (1985), a mistake of law defense exists where
the legislature has included knowledge of a legal status within the definition of the crime
charged); (3) the Government's investigation tactics negated substantive elements of
§ 1324(a) and precluded the conviction of Sanctuary workers; (4) Sanctuary workers' conduct
was protected either under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, or under a more
specific humanitarian exception to the prohibitions of § 1324(a); (5) their conduct was
justified by "necessity"; (6) the defendants' actions did not constitute harboring as used in
§1324(a). See generally Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 197.
278. See id. at 666-71.
279. See generally Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal
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In the preamble to the opinion, the court discussed the only conviction
of the Sanctuary workers that it deemed legally significant: the fact that the
Sanctuary workers "were convicted of masterminding and running a modemday underground railroad that smuggled Central American natives across the
Mexican border . . . ." 280 The moral dimension of the defendants' claims
was diminished by the court's depiction of defendants as liars, who
contended that they assisted bona fide political refugees legally in the United
States, but who had only "disdain for federal immigration law" because they
"counseled the aliens to avoid American immigration authorities at all costs
and to lie to them if apprehended." 281
This narrative failed to show any of the precipitating persecution of the
Central American witnesses or of the illegal, coercive deportations by the
INS. 282 The Sanctuary defendants explained that they advised a policy
deliberate avoidance because the INS failed "to approve the meritorious
political asylum applications" made at official ports of entry, but this
explanation was rejected without substantive consideration because the
defendants also offered a mistake of law defense. 283 The court reconstructed the Sanctuary workers' views to show that presentment was not
necessary, and then dismissed the Sanctuary workers beliefs as "profess[ed]
naivete and ignorance" about presentment in light of the Sanctuary workers'
detailed knowledge of the INS' procedures for dealing with asylum
applications. 284 The court noted that this contradiction created a "patent
tension" that "permeate[d] this entire case."285 In this twisted way, the
court acknowledged that the defendants knew facts, which the court would
not admit into its juridical stance.
The court began, not with the concerns voiced in Elder and Merkt of
breached borders, impaired national security, or contested laws, but with an
angry denunciation of the Appellants who "sought and received extensive
media coverage of their efforts on behalf of Central American aliens." 286
The court implied that the Appellants had gotten what they deserved by
stating that "the INS accepted appellants' challenge to investigate their alien
smuggling and harboring activities." 287

Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1981) (discussing the use of time-framing as an
unconscious, interpretive method of shaping the way a fact pattern is viewed in judging).
280. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 666.
281. /d. at 667 (discussing an instance in which Father Clark instructed Salvadorans
not to identify their nationality if stopped).
282. See supra notes 263-64.
283. !d.
284. /d.
285. /d.
286. !d. at 668.
287. !d.
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The court then predicated its summary of the Government's undercover
investigation by reiterating the news stories that incensed the Government.288 It cited the Southside Church's declaration of public Sanctuary,
and media coverage highlighted in the Government's brief, as if equally
damnable and equally attributable to the defendants. 289
The court's opinion provides no sympathetic context for the Central
Americans' flight from persecution at home and in Mexico, nor background
about the Sanctuary defendants or their motives, unlike that provided in
Elder's first trial. 290 Nor does the opinion hint at the contemporaneous
national movement to provide sanctuary, nor reference the politicized
character of the asylum determinations or the unlawful detention practices
of the INS.
Instead, the opinion details the "considerable contributions" to the
Sanctuary work by the government informants and their participation in
three discussions at Southside Church, which formed the basis for the indictment. 291 The shocking breadth of the motion in limine292 was obscured
by the court's characterization that the motion "essentially" sought to
exclude evidence of the belief that the Refugee Act of 1980 made entry
lawful. 293 The court did not analyze the justice or injustice of its use.
Having framed the questions as arising out of deceitful, self-aggrandizing publicity-grabbing by the appellants, the court was ready to eradicate at
law the counter-nomos294 of the Sanctuary workers' assertions of human
rights and religious response, embraced by so many across the country. The
court's trump card was its emphasis on an orderly trial process. The court
stated that the "[a]ppellants' attempt to admit evidence concerning their
understanding of section 1324 ... cuts to the heart of the concern about
trial management. "295 According to the court, the Sanctuary workers'
reading of the Refugee Act of 1980 was neither genuine nor pertinent; it
was "intended to provide a series of minitrials" as to each Central
American's well-founded fear ofpersecution. 296 The defendants' approach
was an effort to "overwhelm the trial judge with a barrage of evidence that
would have included graphic descriptions of horrifying torture and human

288. /d.; see also Respondent's Brief, supra note 171, at 8.
289. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 668.
290. Compare Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956 with Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 709.
291. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 668-71.
292. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
293. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 671.
294. Nomos is a legal world conceived purely as legal meaning. See Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 10
(1983).
295. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 673 (discussing the court's fear of hearing several
"minitrials").
296. /d.
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rights abuses in Central America." 297 To have permitted such evidence,
stated the court, would have amounted to "a rule which would allow
defendants to put Reagan Administration foreign policy on trial. " 298
Allowing such a defense, stated the court, would be "foolish" because of the
expenditure of judicial resources and because it "would have placed an
intolerably difficult burden on the government-to refute appellants' claim
of their mistaken understanding of the law."299 In addition, the court
sneered at the "purported religious interest"300 animating Sanctuary actions
"after purportedly finding that the proper legal channels were futile." 301
The Aguilar court was peculiarly sloppy with the language and history
of the harboring statute. It found no distinctions between harboring to
further the exploitation of coyotismo and the evasion of the unconstitutional
deportation practices of the INS to protect refugees. 302
IV. NARRATIVES OF LEGALITY
The exterior judicial narrative of conspiracies by misguided actors to
violate the social order and to breach the borders shrouds and silences another story: the narrative of a conscientious, ecumenical movement among
people who constructed a community faith and practiced what they believed
to be justice. In this section, the elements and methods of the government

297. /d.
298. !d.
299. !d.
300. !d. at 696 (emphasis added).
301. !d. at 693 (emphasis added). By 1989, the Movement's factual, moral, and legal
contentions that the procedures and standards for determining the asylum claims of Central
Americans were egregiously flawed were succeeding in federal courts in California. See
supra notes 263-64. The case of American Baptist Church v. Meese, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.
Cal. 1991 ), first filed in 1987, presented the issue of discriminatory application of the
immigration laws. In March, 1989, the district court observed that the Executive's alleged
chronic failure to exclude nationality in its asylum decisions, uncontradicted by the
government, permitted the Salvadoran's Equal Protection claims to go forward. American
Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756-774 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
302. Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 689-90; see Loken & Bambino, supra note 19 (arguing from
legislative history that "intent to evade detection" is almost certainly directed at people
harboring in order to exploit refugees). Some judicial effort has been made by federal courts
to distinguish humanitarian aid and coyotismo under the Act. See, e.g., United States v.
Salinas-Calderon, 585 F. Supp. 599, 602 (D. Kan. 1984).
Further, in 1987, the Supreme Court essentially vindicated the Sanctuary defendants'
interpretation of "refugee." See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421 (1987) (affirming that the "plain language" of the 1980 Refugee Act indicated
Congress intended a more generous standard of proof for asylum-seekers than the INS had
been applying).
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officials' account of Sanctuary, and Sanctuary's self-description of Sanctuary
as civil initiative, are each detailed.

A. Legalism 's Account: Breach of Laws
The government responded, albeit belatedly, to the Movement by
arresting and prosecuting Sanctuary workers for harboring and transporting
"illegal aliens" in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 303 By
invoking the familiar criminal procedure, the Government simultaneously
invoked cultural meanings of "law," and the particularly strong cultural
meaning of law-breaking.
The United States is a country preoccupied with legalistic measures of
responsibility to the rights of others. The American legal culture is
peppered with illustrations of a schizoid attachment to the articulation of
legal standards, but also to the manipulability of their content. Legalism is
unmasked when the political understandings embedded in semantics are
exposed as illegitimate or obsolete. "Refugee" and "persecution" are among
those terms that are vague and manipulable, yet critical to the recognition
of persons' rights. 304
Expeditious application of the immigration laws to deport Central
Americans upon arrival was supported by U.S. government explanations that
the Central Americans were really economic refugees coming north to take
jobs from Americans. 305 The Reagan Administration argued that U.S.
support for Jose Napoleon Duarte's government in El Salvador, like its
support for the contras in Nicaragua, was necessary to forestall Cuban and
Soviet influence, and promoted, rather than limited, human rights. 306 The
Administration appealed for reliance on governmental expertise concerning
the facts of Latin American conditions, and it implicitly reminded citizens

303. COUTIN, supra note 7, at 35.
304. See Pirie, supra note 18, at 393 (discussing the similarity between the INS and
judicial interpretations of the definition of "refugee" so as to deny asylum to Central
Americans).
305. See Ass't Sec'y of State Elliott Abrams, Statement Before the Subcommittee on
Rules of the House Committee on Rules (June 20, 1984), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1984, at
5-6 (attributing Salvadoran migration to the overpopulation and poverty of El Salvador);
Sharon Stephan, U.S. Policy Towards Undocumented Salvadorans, Congressional Research
Service No. MB82223, at 2 (Mar. 15, 1985) (summarizing the Government's position that
the primary motivation for Salvadoran migration to the United States is economic).
306. See President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation, Mar. 16, 1986, in DEP'T ST.
BULL., (May 1986), at 28-32; President Ronald Reagan, Address to Congress, Mar. 14, 1985,
in DEP'T ST. BULL., (May 1986), at 32-33 (explaining that the first reality which must define
American policies in the 1980s is Soviet expansionism and exploitation of regional conflicts,
which have resulted in a "staggering human toll" in Vietnam, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Cuba,
Africa, and "the effort to use communist Nicaragua as a base from which to extinguish
democracy in El Salvador and beyond").
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of the complete separation of church and state. 307 In a legal order that
depends to a great degree on the elitist preservation of the means by which
legal meaning is assigned, keeping citizens factually ignorant promotes a
lack of confidence in the citizens' own powers of analysis, and furthers the
appearance of consent, obedience, and acquiescence on the part of the
citizens. 308
Churches have long participated in the regime of legalism, occupying
the assigned role of charitable institutions, without a legitimate role in
political protest. Even along the border at the time the Movement arose,
there was a longstanding local practice of acquiescence to INS rule. 309
Many Sanctuary workers and several of the Tucson defendants had worked
for years in border ministries, providing church-based social services and
charitable visits to INS detention sites and Mexican jails. 310 In the
borderlands, arrest and detention of Hispanics (including American citizens),
and deportation of Mexicans and Central Americans, were quite routine.
But the faultline within the generally accommodated law of deportation was
its exception for people facing persecution: INS procedures would designate
most Mexicans as economic migrants and deport them, yet provide safe
haven for the truly persecuted. 311 So the church workers believed. The
legalism on which church acquiescence stood was shaken and transformed
by citizens' experiences in 1981 and 1982, when legalism's terms and logic
were negated by government policy and agency practice. 312
The very vagueness of the Refugee Act of 1980 requires its interpretation, yet that interpretive process is formally preserved to a complex legal
bureaucracy. Although the Act was intended to depoliticize U.S. refugee
and deportation policy by providing for the adjudication of individual
asylum cases under the humanitarian legal standard of "well-founded fear
of persecution,"313 its administration as an arm of legalism soon splintered.

307. See PIRIE, supra note 18, at 404.
308. See NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING CONSENT 1-35 ( 1986); see a/so MICHAEL
J. PARENTI, INVENTING REALITY: THE POLITICS OF THE MASS MEDIA (1986) (arguing that
news media distort and misrepresent important aspects of political and social life through
implicit systems of ideological control, including deferential treatment of official news); W.
RUSSELL NEUMAN ET AL., COMMON KNOWLEDGE: NEWS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
POLITICAL MEANING (1992) (discussing an active, meaning-constructing audience of mass
media who seek to integrate news reports with what they already know and finding that
individuals with less prior knowledge about a subject depend significantly on the style and
structure of news presentation when formulating an opinion).
309. PIRIE, supra note 18, at 396-97.
310. !d. at 396.
311. !d. at 396-97.
312. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 12-19.
313. H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1979). Congress' intent was to
"conform the language of [the deportation withholding] section [of the INS] to the
Convention [on the Status of Refugees] ... so that the U.S. statutory law clearly reflects our

HeinOnline -- 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 968 1994-1995

1995]

RELIGIOUS OUTLAWS

969

This division exposed the Administration's ambivalence about the use of
legalism to recognize and to defend the rights of vulnerable people. To
receive asylum, a refugee must meet two key elements of the legal test: one;
a "well-founded fear," two, "of persecution." 314 These terms are vague
vessels ready to be filled by Cold War perspectives where victims of
previous torture and death threats remain unlikely to receive asylum, while
stars and athletes from communist countries receive asylum. 315
Great hardships have resulted from INS and judicial interpretations that
require asylum applicants to prove that they face different and greater
dangers than do other people in their region. Distinguishing between
individualized persecution and the more generalized ravages of civil war
may seem appropriate in the abstract. In practice, however, people fleeing
combat zones have a more difficult burden to demonstrate circumstances
warranting protection than do people fleeing nonwar zones like Cuba.
Legalism also circumscribes the information which is deemed authoritative by the officials to whom interpretation of the Refugee Act is formally
committed. The principal information sources for INS judges are, not
surprisingly, the official ones: advisory opinions issued by the State
Department in each asylum case and the annual country reports also issued
by the State Department. During the 1980s, both of these sources denied
the existence of extensive and politically motivated human rights abuses in
El Salvador and neighboring nations. 316 Use of politicized "facts" was
compounded by adjudicators' preference for documenting the applicants'
bases for fear of persecution, despite the unlikelihood that targets of
persecution would possess such existing documents or coolly consider how
to obtain such evidence prior to flight. 317
The fact-finding of the official process is further constrained by
bureaucratic mindsets. Because INS judges tend to view refugees as
similarly situated, the members of large groups whom INS judges must
"process" but about whom they know little, the judges often fit new

legal obligations under international agreements." !d.; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
at 436-37.
314. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (defining "refugee").
315. Sophie H. Pirie, Note, The Need for a Codified Definition of "Persecution" in
United States Refugee Law, 39 STAN. L. REV. 187, 203 (1986).
316. Organizations such as Amnesty International, with a strong reputation for political
neutrality and objective fact-finding, reported extensive, contrary evidence. AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA, REASONABLE FEAR: HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. REFUGEE POLICY
( 1990) (documenting evidence of INS and State Department bias against Salvadoran,
Guatemalan, and Haitian asylum seekers).
317. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian and
Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135, 137-38 (1993) (citing cases in
which immigration judges declined to find "persecution" because applicants had fled prior
to their arrest).
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applicants' claims into the patterns set by previous cases. 318 This process
does not allow hearing each story as a narration of individualized persecution. The process for hearing applicants' claims merges the familiar tales
of the "normal" dangers of civil war from which ordinary people naturally
will flee, into refugees' concerns for getting a livelihood. Thus, the
refugees' reasons for seeking asylum appear to be merely "economic," not
fears of political persecution. 319 Immigration judges who rely on their
own conceptions of conditions in the applicant's home country may be
expected to evaluate the applicant's "credibility" on whether the testimony
coheres with the judge's conception. 320
One certain result of such a confluence is that the United States has
sacrificed Central Americans to the fates that awaited them on deportation
in exchange for foreign policy objectives. But this sacrifice devalues the
idea that refugees ought not be repatriated when they are truly threatened.
This devaluation comes at a cost to the legalism that, we are told, govern
the humanitarian duties that we have adopted toward persecuted people:
refugees' rights to fair procedures for deciding claims for asylum. Federal
courts can, and do, sometimes recite that "foreign policy [is] not relevant"
to the determination of asylum applications. 321 Such recitals reinforce the
claims of the state to submit to a regime of legalism.
B. Civil Initiative: To Uphold the Law
It is tempting, as it certainly was to the press, to find in the Sanctuary
story a revived form of the democratic practice of civil disobedience. Yet,
this is an obfuscating mistake. The classic concept of civil disobedience
entails open acts in violation of an offensive law, accompanied by a
willingness to accept the official consequences. 322 The Sanctuary members with whom I spoke were religious people responding concretely to
desperate persons with evident immediate humanitarian need. 323 General-

318. Id. See also Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States:
A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory
Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 433, 446-51 (1992).
319. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 23 (discussing historical reasons for migration to
the United States from Central America).
320. See Matter of Paniegua-Vides (BIA 1983), reprinted in SALVADORAN AND
GUATEMALAN ASYLUM CASES-A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 23019 (B. Ong Hing et al. eds.,
1985) (immigration judge found witness not credible because "[h]e paints a picture of
conditions in El Salvador that are so bad it is not believable").
321. See, e.g., American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D.
Cal. 1991).
322. See Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for
Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723 (1991); CARL COHEN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
CONSCIENCE, TACTICS, AND THE LAW 139-40 (1971).
323. See, e.g., CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 5-12 (discussing the religious background
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ly, the Sanctuary members did not think about their own actions as
"breaking the law," and it is awkward to frame the inactions of feeding,
housing, clothing, and . ferrying refugees to lawyers and medical clinics
within the framework of civil disobedience. Knowledge and experience led
Sanctuary defendants to take a series of steps that appeared necessary to
provide safety and humanitarian aid to hunted people: first, to aid Central
Americans detained in American and Mexican jails, and second, to aid
refugees in avoiding detention.
I. Distinguishing Civil Initiative from Civil Disobedience
The simplest justification for disobedience of particular rules is that the
rules implicate one in immoral actions or coerce one to violate one's own
beliefs. 324 Disobedience might also be undertaken to expose and rearrange
the premises of the legal system that harms a class of people. As Martin
Luther King, Jr. taught: disobedience may be an expression of respect for
the system, an act of hope in persuading others, or an act of love for
enemies. 325 None of these rationales was claimed directly as a purpose or
rationale for the Movement by any Sanctuary members with whom I have
spoken. Yet, the Movement-the aggregate of the named defendants and
unnamed and unnumbered participants--did challenge premises about what
is "law." The Sanctuary members claimed that they act to serve the
law. 326 They also claimed that the U.S. government was the outlaw,
acting in violation of national and international provisions of asylum and
non-return to civil strife. 327
A variant justification for civil disobedience does comport with the later
thinking of some central figures in the Tucson Sanctuary Movement. This
variant is the idea that government must earn the people's consent over and
over again to sustain democracy. The exercise of consent, however, carries
with it the option to withdraw or refuse consent. From this perspective, it
is possible to tell the story of the Movement as a heroic epic, challenging
entrenched policies and policymakers with a contrary normative understanding, and enabling citizens to insist on changing those policies of exclusion.

of Rev. John Fife).
324. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW 114 (1988). Civil
disobedience can be construed as adherence to competing, more compelling, or prior norms,
such as religious beliefs, that make the disobedience of law obligatory and not merely
justifiable. /d.
325. MARTIN L. KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY
102-03 (1958).
326. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 234.
327. James A. Corbett, Sanctuary. Basic Rights and Humanity's Fault Lines, Address
before Western Social Science Association (Apr. 23, 1987) (on file with author) [hereinafter

Fault Lines].
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If this is a fair depiction, then the Movement is an empowering story of
respect for law that should stand alongside the counter-depiction rendered
by the legal system's narrative.
Among the Tucson Sanctuary network, the term "civil initiative" was
used to describe the loosely concerted efforts of innumerable Sanctuary
workers and the national network of declared Sanctuary churches, rather
than disobedience. 328 In so doing, Sanctuary workers claimed justification
under Nuremberg principles, and viewed their acts as legally justifiable acts
designed to implement principles of international law when the government
persists in committing acts that violate those principles. 329 Civil disobedience is commonly conceived as opposing unjust laws. 330 By contrast, the
Tucson initiative was organized to implement positive law that mandates
protection of human rights. 331
A second distinction between civil initiative and civil disobedience is
civil initiative's notions of accountability to the legal order. 332 To Corbett,
"[ m ]uch that would be appropriate as civil disobedience to nullify unjust
laws tends to destroy the very laws that civil initiative strives to [p ]reserve."333 We might compare the Movement's adherence to its interpretation of the law with Gandhi's campaigns of civil disobedience, designed to
overthrow the British legal order in India, or American draft resistance in
the Vietnam War era, designed to overturn military service laws. By
contrast, civil initiative means doing justice, not as vigilantism, but in the
narrower sense of assuming governmental functions on an emergency
basis. 334 Thus, when the "INS is violating refugees' rights to safe haven
and the laws that delineate the extent of protection of refugees, civil
initiative will involve deciding who enters and who stays in the United
States" in compliance with those laws. 335
Practitioners of civil disobedience have typically breached a particular
positive law to demonstrate its injustice, pled guilty, and then accepted
punishment as a demonstration of their good faith and moral commitment
to the larger system of law. 336 Civil initiative, on the other hand, is
328. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 203.
329. Corbett, supra note 327. Note the contemporary literature on "civil resistance"
and strategies of civil resisters. I suggest that plowshares may be resisters, but sanctuary in
the borderlands is indelibly stamped with the healing concerns of the best of religious
traditions everywhere, like the rescuing of Jews from Nazism.
330. See COHEN, supra note 322; Minow, supra note 322.
331. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 662.
332. See Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
333. /d.
334. !d.
335. /d.
336. Some analysts would further distinguish practices of"civil resistance," involving
noncriminal activities designed to prevent ongoing wrongful activities by government. See,
e.g., FRANCIS A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, 16-
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affirmative action to protect good laws. 337 It is the enactment of a legal
reality, obscured by statist legalism, that societies and communities retain
the power and responsibility to do justice under law, especially when the
state betrays its trust to do so. 338 Because civil initiative requires accountability to the legal order, beyond the readiness to be punished for an
admitted breach of law, civil initiative imposes an obligation of vigorous
legal defense of good law. 339 Otherwise, the trial process becomes the
occasion for government to disestablish the rights which good law
exercises. 340
The most significant divergence between civil initiative and civil
disobedience is the element of taking unlawful action. Civil disobedients
occupy a stance of petition, in which their disobedient conduct has important
demonstrative and tactical dimensions so as to engage their fellow citizens
and their govemment. 341 The practical effect of the civil initiative understanding, however, is to lay on its adherents the obligations to constitute the
remedy to the injustice. 342 · Civil initiative '"necessarily proceeds from a
deliberative community that acts on its shared commitment to uphold the
law. Disobedience may be enacted individually, as well as in communities.
While civil disobedients may declare, alone or in concert, that "my
conscience prevents me from following this unjust law," civil initiative is
constitutive action in which a community acts on a shared understanding
that "our faith requires us to uphold principles of just law." Civil disobedience tells stories of demonstrative acts. 343 Civil initiative proceeds from
a restorative vision of justice that implements the just law. 344

18 (1987). Civil resisters tend to plead not guilty, and at trial they attempt to offer an
international law defense based on Nuremberg principles. /d. at 272-73.
337. See Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
338. /d.
339. /d.
340. Although significant demarcations are possible between civil initiative and civil
disobedience, they do share some defining characteristics. Both are deliberate undertakings
made in protest against some publicly conducted harm; conscientious acts done in the honest
belief that the conduct is right; and generally public acts since the actors ordinarily see
themselves as acting in the public service to correct a civic injustice.
341. See COHEN, supra note 322, at 60-65.
342. See Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
343. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 322. This characterization is shaped, however, by
a minority of society-judges and academics-who tend to analyze instances of civil
disobedience as conflicts between individual conscience and the state. Many more
Americans know of mobilizations by conscientious masses as important aspects of the Civil
Rights Movement, of opposition to war and conscription, and of opposition to abortion. See
Charles R. DiSalvo, Abortion and Consensus: The Futility of Speech, the Power of
Disobedience, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 219 (1991).
344. See Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.

HeinOnline -- 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 973 1994-1995

974

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:899

This central distinction sheds light on the status of citizen interpretation
of laws within "statist liberalism," which undergirds both the government
actors' narratives of illegality and the media depictions of disobedients. At
the center of statist liberalism is the sovereign state, which issues directives
from the top down, within a scheme of rights the purpose of which is to
secure social order. 345 The state's interpretations of these rights are the
sole authoritative ones, and they impose obligations with which individuals
must comply. 346 "The state aims primarily at the protection of its citizens,
not at their participation, though . . . rights of participation may be among
those protected." 347
On the other hand, "communitarian liberalism" retains the importance
of rights and the rule of law, but also redirects the focus of the legal order.
It deems primary the relationship among citizens rather than the relationship
of citizens to the state; it treats justice, not order, as the paramount legal
value. 348 Moreover, it permits alternative interpretations of the law that
percolate through society and does not insistently privilege only official
interpretations. 349 In downplaying the authority of the state, it attaches
relatively little significance to national sovereignty, and treats human rights
as equally important as state-created rights. 350
In the Sanctuary cases, the Government did not tolerate this
"communitarian liberalist" view; it repeatedly tried to undercut the power of
the Sanctuary initiative by casting aspersions on its motivations. 351 One
tactic was to characterize the Movement as "political," both to erode its
claim of being religiously compelled and to castigate it for failing to follow
the official line in the Central American conflicts. 352 While some branches of the Movement would accede, the Tucson Sanctuary Covenant never
did; the Covenant persisted to allocate its aid to help refugees according to
their need for protection, not to advance partisan purposes. 353

345. See id.
346. See Corbett, Address in Austin, supra note 168.
347. See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 32 (1994).
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. See Robin L. West, Narrative, Responsibility and Death, I MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 161, 172 (1990). Rights remain significant, for "[ r]ights ensure us space to
create chaos, disorder, randomness, change, from which we might fashion a new order. They
guarantee a realm of freedom from the social need to conserve the meanings of the past, so
that new meanings may emerge." !d.
351. See, e.g., Merkt, 794 F.2d at 964 (discussing the lack of merit of the Sanctuary
workers' international law defense).
352. See, e.g., Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 673 (discussing the concern that some defendants
would put United States foreign policy on trial).
353. See Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327 (contrasting the bases of the Movement
with the government's use of Carl Schmitt's friend-enemy antithesis).
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In the United States, we think of the state as the political form in which
civil association dwells. Life on the border, however, caused a number of
ordinary citizens to discover sharp inconsistency between the principles that
constitute our civil society and the routine practices of the U.S. government. 354 As in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 355 the issue is whether basic
rights to life, liberty, and dignity are established by one's humanity or by
one's citizenship. 356 A serious consequence of subordinating human rights
to the government's definition of the national interest is that it creates an
underclass of people to whom little could happen that would be worse than
capture and return to the situation they had fled. 357 This reality, made
visible by Central American refugees in the 1980s, caused Sanctuary
workers to respond to their plight. The Sanctuary workers acted on a
Nuremberg-like principle that it is never illegal to provide nonviolent
protection of human rights. 358
As the Nuremberg argument is often invoked by passing reference, it is
seldom clear whether Sanctuary workers intend the argument as a legal or
moral defense. 359 The Nuremberg court took the position that "individuals
have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state."360 Because failure to adhere to
these fundamental duties was held punishable by law, it follows that
conscientious performance of those duties should be defensible by law. The

354. !d.
355. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 707 (I 856).
356. Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
357. See id. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 made this subordination worse for undocumented refugees by making them the property of coyotes trafficking
in undocumented labor. One effect was the much greater bite they can take of undocumented
workers' earnings, enough greater that the coyotes are willing to risk being caught and
prosecuted. Workers so subjugated and dependent live as slaves, that is, individuals within
the body politic who are not protected from arbitrary detention, assault, and exploitation. !d.
358. !d.
359. See Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 197, at 223-56. On appeal, Sanctuary
defendants made no explicit reference to Nuremberg principles. They did argue that the trial
court committed reversible error in refusing to permit a necessity defense. !d.
360. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946). Those who prosecuted individual
rescuers of Jews and other victims of Nazi genocide were guilty themselves of war crimes.
See The Justice Trial, 4 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. I, 49 (United Nations War Crimes
Comm 'n. Amer. Mil. Trib. Nuremberg, Germany, 1947); Matthew Lippmann, Nuremberg and
American Justice, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 951, 961 (1991) [hereinafter
Lippmann, Nuremberg and American Justice).
Some have seen in this Nuremberg privilege a ready extension of an Anglo-American
common law rule that one may intervene to halt the commission of a crime, even to employ
deadly force to prevent the commission of a crime likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury. Arthur W. Campbell, The Nuremberg Defense to Charges of Domestic Crime: A NonTraditional Approach for Nuclear-Arms Protestors, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 93, 114 (1986).

HeinOnline -- 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 975 1994-1995

976

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:899

Sanctuary civil initiative embraced the view that inherent in the Nuremberg
principles is the legal privilege of ordinary citizens, under international law,
to act in nonviolent ways to halt the commission of war crimes. 361
The necessary follow-up question is how to integrate such extragovernmental civil initiative into existing legal systems. In Corbett's view,
this integration is possible where doers of civil initiative hold themselves
and their practice accountable to the rule of law. 362 How this was accomplished in the Tucson network is discussed in the next section.
2. Defining Civil Initiative
Corbett's image of civil initiative contrasts that of a statist conception
of citizenry and government that places the state and its authority at the
center of social order. 363 From a statist perspective, the state's coercive
powers are appreciated as necessary to hold civil society together. 364
There is no necessity for "civil initiative" to maintain or extend the rule of
law because the sovereign state maintains civil order. 365 The state's insistence that civil initiative is always unnecessary leads to the state's view that
conduct in compliance with the laws that officials are violating must be
criminal behavior, or at best, civil disobedience.
To Tucson Sanctuary members, such a statist perspective ignores the
fact that the state itself is a primary threat to the rule of law. 366 State
coercive power ultimately rests on the power-and constructed legal rightto imprison and kill. 367 Nonetheless, mighty as those powers may be, the
bulk of them are effective only when a considerable degree of social
cohesion is the norm. 368 A state maintains a legal order only so long as
the citizenry discipline themselves to obey. 369
What exists as a check to prevent civil initiative from becoming dogooder vigilantism? Corbett concedes that civil initiative is a counterassertion of wills: it substitutes the will of persons complying with human
rights laws for the will of those designated by the government to decide who
enters and who stays in the United States. 370 Against the concern that this
substitution of wills could subject society to the inconstant, unpredictable,

361. Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
362. /d.
363. /d.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See text accompanying notes 324-27.
367. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
368. Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
369. /d. This theme is repeated directly in American jurisprudence. See, e.g., United
States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 910-11 (D. Mass. 1969).
370. Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
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and arbitrary will of anyone who decides that refugees' rights are being
violated, Corbett argues that civil initiative requires "rigorous efforts to
establish full accountability."371 "The accountability of civil initiative is
to the rule of law rather than to government officials."372
Corbett reasons that when the state systematically violates human rights
laws, a community must take on administrative functions that are the regular
province of the government. 373 Civil initiative is an emergency exercise
of governmental function. 374 Its participants must take special care to
preserve the laws at issue-the laws that the civil initiative is defending. 375
Civil initiative's essential attributes are that it is: nonviolent, in that it neither
evades nor seizes police powers; truthful, in that it is open and subject to
public examination; "catholic" rather than factional, protecting any who are
being violated regardless of victims' ideological positions or utility to
others' politics; dialogic, in the sense of addressing government officials as
persons, not merely as functionaries or opponents; and germane, in that it
pertains to victims' needs for protection. 376 Thus, media coverage and
public opinion play less important roles where the concern is to do justice
rather than to petition others to do it.
This construction of civil initiative is readily distinguishable from the
arguments proffered by John Locke and Thomas Jefferson in which citizens
retain the right to revolt which they may exercise when government fails
them. 377 For Sanctuary workers, a notion of civil initiative that would
lead to the shattering of civil society would fail to respond to the initiating
cause, which is the protection of human lives and liberty. Because civil
initiative seeks to extend the rule of law rather than dismantle it, the right
to revolt and the right to lobby are equal means of evading the responsibility
to protect the violated. 378 Neither the overthrow of constitutional government, nor the passage of more laws is responsive when the life and liberty
of human beings is at stake, and government officials fail to heed the law
to protect them. 379

371. /d.
372. /d.; see COUTIN, supra note 7, at 34-35 (describing the process of accountability
of participants to the whole).
373. Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
374. /d.
375. /d.
376. CORBETI, THE SANCTUARY CHURCH, supra note 101, at 23-24 (1986). Corbett
adds that civil initiative must be volunteer-based and that no new bureaucracy should be
formed to oppose the return of these functions to the constitutionally designated government.
Further, civil initiative must be community-centered in order to incorporate, yet reach beyond,
individual acts of conscience. /d. at 24.
377. Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327.
378. /d.
379. Whether Operation Rescue or similar groups can fairly be characterized as a
comparable "civil initiative," justifying the same claim of citizen interpretation as the Tucson
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In their initial, serendipitous responses to refugees, Corbett and other
individuals found themselves readily a part of the "recombinant church,"
literally spending much of their time with priests, rabbis, nuns, pastors, and
lay workers in churches, convents, and synagogues, all across the borderlands.380 These alliances were formed despite the varied formal ties to
religious communities. 381 Had the Sanctuary workers been acting merely
as scattered individuals outside the church, each would have been making
fleeting gestures of charity, rather than community protection from the
forces arrayed to return people to the terrors from which they fled. Instead,
inspired by what they learned, the Sanctuary workers covenanted to do
justice through community cohesion, rather than state coercion. 382 While
individuals may resist government disobedience to law, it requires a
community to do justice, to forge the basic agreements that endure through

Sanctuary initiative, is beyond the scope of this Article. Whether Operation Rescue or
similar groups can fairly be characterized as a comparable "civil initiative," justifying the
same claim of citizen interpretation as the Tucson Sanctuary initiative, is beyond the scope
of this article. It is not self-evident which if any of these function as a spiritual community
which together discerned that it should act collectively to provide a government function of
protection in the emergency circumstance where the government does not. Even assuming
this for the same of argument, the distinctions outweigh the parallels with the Sanctuary
Movement. They are closest in their aims, in what each aims to protect "others" in whom
it vests full humanity (the fetus in the case of religious anti-abortion activists, refugees in the
case of Sanctuary), from violence and death (abortion, and return to the violence an
persecution they fled). Two significant distinctions appear more striking. First, the unlawful
acts each undertakes. Religious abortion rescuers forcefully interfere with the human and
constitutional rights of other specific persons who would undergo abortions. Certainly,
rescuers who resort to murder and indiscriminate bombings and shootings of abortion clinics
and workers, and the threat of the same which inflicts injury, death, and fear, do not parallel
the Sanctuary initiative's non-violent evasion of deportation. The use of violence eschews
dialog, and rends good social order.
Second, the societal accountability entailed in legal interpretation appears absent in the
case of abortion rescuers. The Sanctuary initiative sought to uphold principles of human
rights for the protection of refugees, expressed in positive law, but also produced by a long
human history of refugee protection, nourished by religious communities for aeons.
Presumably, had the United States not reflected these human rights principles in its own
positive law, much of the Sanctuary Movement's sense of accountability to law would remain
intact. While there are similar histories of community norm and legal articulation concerning
the taking of human life, and the killing of innocents, the abortion rescuers do not appear to
have a similar history of legal articulation upon which to draw concerning the unborn.
380. See id.
381. See supra part II. (discussing the religious means by which the Aguilar defendants
got into this work).
382. See CORBEIT, THE SANCTUARY CHURCH, supra note 101, at 14. In Corbett's
view, individual actions can be incorporated into a sustained work of community and a
persisting effort to establish and protect human rights only through an institutional foundation
within civil society as substantial as that of "the church." !d.
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generations and extend beyond individuals, and to sustain the commitment
to uphold such covenants. Neither the state nor partisan politics can ever
supplant the power of such community covenants383 because of the
essential difference between the power of such covenants when created by
the social principle of community cohesion and the state's powers of
coercion and domination over which political groups contend. "The choice
is between the rule of love and the rule of violence," but not for or against
the rule of law. 384
3. Engagement Beyond Petitions to Government
This discussion has been about a nonviolent, law-respecting, humanrights-regarding engagement by citizen communities with the multivalent
tiers for constituting legal meaning in society. This is how participants in
the Tucson region of the Movement generally regarded their acts. It would
be a loss to toss aside the Movement's remarkable achievements or to lose
them in tired, narrow categories of religion, politics, or fringe dissent.
Despite contrary judicial description, the Movement did endeavor to use the
legal system. Sanctuary workers did not, however, confine their sense of
responsibility as citizens to a state-centered conception limited to petitioning
the government to do justice.
The prosecution of Sanctuary workers was only one form of judicial
consideration of the issues presented by the Movement. One theme,
sounded by courts in the Sanctuary trials and appeals, was that the
defendants should have worked within the system of laws, rather than take
it upon themselves to determine the obligations of the United States to
asylum seekers. 385 In fact, the Movement took the Government to court
on several occasions. 386
INS practices of detention, misrepresentation, and coercion of refugees
were the subject of lawsuits. 387 In Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, the INS
was directed to halt its pattern and practice of summarily removing
Salvadorans from the United States. 388 A permanent injunction was
entered after the parties failed to reach settlement. 389 The INS, however,
successfully defended its practice of transferring detained aliens to remote

383. !d. ("Hypnotized by the modern state's destructive powers, we often ignore our
own empowerment and choose instead to be moralizing bystanders, but no amount of
preaching at a superpower will convert it into a Covenant people.").
384. See id. at 27.
385. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1578; Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956.
386. See, e.g., supra note 264.
387. See id.
388. !d. at 385.
389. !d.
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detention centers as neither an interference with the right to counsel nor a
denial of Due Process rights. 390
In American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 391 churches and refugee
service organizations challenged INS application of asylum laws and
customary international law to the grant of temporary refuge. 392 Plaintiffs
included mainline national religious organizations that argued that the
government's prosecutions of religious Sanctuary workers under the
harboring statute unconstitutionally interferes with the First Amendment
right to Free Exercise of Religion. 393 Although the free exercise of
religion and selective prosecution questions were dismissed, 394 the district
court recommended that the surviving litigants meet. 395 In January 1991,
a stipulated settlement was approved by the court, defining a class of
Salvadorans and Guatemalans who would be granted de novo asylum
adjudication. 396
Sanctuary proponents also made efforts to persuade Congress to respond
to the flood of Central American refugees, to curb the atrocities in their
home countries, and to amend the immigration laws and enforcement
practices. 397 Several Sanctuary defendants, among others, participated in
these efforts. 398 In 1990, the immigration laws were amended to allow
the Attorney General of the United States to designate "temporary protected
status" to classes of foreign nationals. 399

390. Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 795
F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.), amended by 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming denial of
injunction prohibiting the transfer of detainees by INS).
391. 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
392. /d. at 759.
393. /d.
394. /d. at 763, 766 (granting government motions to dismiss for lack of standing to
bring a claim for violating the right to free exercise of religion and failure to state a claim).
The court did deny the Government's motion for summary judgment concerning standing of
the organizations themselves to assert free exercise claims and claim of selective enforcement. See American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 666 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
395. American Baptist Churches, 712 F. Supp. at 775.
396. American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991 ).
397. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 299 (discussing a letter the Salvadoran
Archbishop sent to Congress endorsing passage of the Moakley-DeConcini Bill, S. 377).
398. Hearings were held in April 1985 on the Moakley-DeConcini bill, S. 377, which
aimed to suspend deportations of Salvadorans. Hearing on S. 377 Before Subcomm. on
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., I st Sess.
I (Apr. 22, 1985). Several members of Congress urged the Attorney General to do the same.
In November 1986, Congress amended the criminal harboring statute as part of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Provision for temporary safe haven was
eventually made by settlement of the American Baptist Churches litigation. See supra note
152 and accompanying text.
399. See generally T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION
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The Movement's efforts to protect the collective operation of religious
life from government incursion were less successful. When the Tucson trial
of a dozen Sanctuary workers revealed that INS had conducted an undercover investigation in which informants wearing body-bugs attended and
recorded church services and chqrch-sponsored meetings, 400 several
Tucson congregations and national church bodies sued the United States, the
Department of Justice, and the INS, claiming a violation of their First and
Fourth Amendment rights. 401 In The Presbyterian Church v. United
States, the trial court granted the Government's motion to dismiss. 402 Two
years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, inter alia, that the
churches had alleged sufficient injury for standing purposes, 403 and that
sovereign immunity had been waived for the churches' nonmonetary
claims. 404 The case was remanded on the questions of whether the
churches had standing to seek injunctive relief and whether the case had
become moot. 405
On remand, the district court held that the Government's surveillance of
worship activities did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment
and would not, in the future, require a warrant "where an undercover agent
is invited to participate in suspected criminal activities."406 The court also
held that the First Amendment protected plaintiffs' free exercise against
governmental intrusion in the absence of a good faith purpose for the
investigation. 407
In short, a decentralized and loosely affiliated Movement mounted a
full-court press on the political institutions to accomplish acceptance of their
legal interpretations. Despite the characterization of the Movement by the
government as political, and by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
as media-mad, the prosecutions of the Sanctuary workers do not appear to
have been a calculated strategy, or even a very carefully considered

AND NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES: SELECTED STATUTES, REGULATIONS AND

FORMS 851-52 (1991) (explaining the legislative history of these provisions). Salvadorans
who had been in the U.S. since September 19, 1990, were permitted to register for this status.
Unlike asylum, which allows one to stay in the country indefinitely and to apply for
permanent legal residence after one year, the temporary protected status (TPS) approved for
Salvadorans expired on June 30, 1992. At that time those who had TPS became eligible for
"deferred enforced departure," which delayed deportation for another year and authorized the
U.S. president to extend this period. ld.
400. See supra note 188 (describing taped meetings and conversations).
401. See The Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 520 (1989).
402. /d.
403. !d. at 523.
404. !d. at 526.
405. !d. at 529.
406. 752 F. Supp. 1505, 1513 (D. Ariz. 1990).
407. !d. at 1515.
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possibility, to provide a vehicle for publicity and organization for the Movement.4os
V. CITIZEN INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL RESISTANCE

By insisting that undocumented Central Americans were legal refugees,
rather than illegal aliens, Sanctuary workers breached one discourse
conducted in juridical terms by legal institutions when interpreting legal
codes. While juridical terms do not delimit social meaning, the power of
official interpretations may be augmented through many American social
practices. Sanctuary workers observed firsthand the innumerable ways that
the official interpretations ensnared undocumented refugees in a system that
constituted them as "illegal. " 409 This interpretation compels the refugee
at every step of the asylum process to define himself in terms of juridical
status. The daily consequence was to make a refugee's ability to work, to
study, or to obtain medical care contingent on official legal definitions. 410
Sanctuary workers' practices resisted these meaning-accepting social
norms, and so encountered legal meanings defined by government authorities. Assisting Central American refugees in any way customary to church
ministries could be construed as criminal conduct: delivering groceries to a
Salvadoran family could be construed as furthering the presence of aliens;
hiring a Central American to do housework could be categorized as an
unlawful hiring; and driving a Guatemalan from one borderlands town to
another could be criminal transporting, or alien smuggling if the trip crossed
the border.
Although people have been crossing national borders since borders were
first conceived, the immigration discourse featuring "illegal aliens" is a
modem development, arising with the establishment of republics that confer
citizenship as an abstract and legalistic relation, rather than as a status
between subject and monarch. 411 Recognition of citizenship produces its

408. A few Sanctuary workers did consider the prospect of confrontations in court in
ways that invite characterization as political. See GOLDEN & MCCONNELL, supra note 7, at
68-69 (citing Elder's desire for a moral confrontation with the Reagan Administration).
409. See Corbett, Fault Lines, supra note 327 (discussing the unavailability of medical
services for injured refugees).
410. Immigration laws and bureaucracies are woven into daily life. To enroll children
in school, principals asked for social security numbers; employers require job applicants to
present work authorization papers; some charitable organizations began to ask for green cards
prior to dispensing aid. COUTIN, supra note 35, at 97.
In November 1994, California voters approved Proposition 187, a sweeping initiative
that would deny virtually all publicly funded services-including public school and
nonemergency health care-to undocumented people and their children. See, e.g., Robert L.
Jackson, Rights Panel Voices Concern on Prop 187, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1994, at A27.
411. EDWIN HARWOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADOW: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND IMMIGRATION
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opposite, alienage. For much of the United States' history, there were no
"illegal" aliens. Immigration was wide open and "aliens simply arrived on
our shores, found lodging and jobs, and were assimilated by degrees into the
society."412 As nations assumed comparable authority to regulate travel
across their borders, hordes of people displaced by World War I were thrust
into an absurd split in identity: a physical existence severed from any legal
existence. 413 The lack of legal existence meant that these stateless persons
were denied a physical existence, as well. 414 Statelessness was an essential precondition to brutal persecution. 415
Besides the public venues for confronting the immigration discourse,
Sanctuary workers also encountered their own ideas of law, of justice, and
of identity constructed in their shadow. 416 Many Sanctuary workers came
to understand that, while the most definitive statements about juridical status
may be made by government actors, private individuals are also agents of
their own, and others', subjection to this extensive system of legally-directed
social identities. 417
Given this understanding of the necessary connection between government-sponsored definitions and the social construction of identity, any aid
rendered by religious Sanctuary workers to undocumented Central Americans had "political" implications. Thus, their work was easy prey to
obfuscating, pejorative descriptions, such as "political" and bad, instead of
"religious." In this concluding section, I explore why it was so difficult for
the courts to give credence to religiously based civil initiative. What
explains the dismissive treatment given the Sanctuary workers' alternative

LAw ENFORCEMENT 2 ( 1986). The concept of alienage began with the Chinese exclusion
Act of 1882. In succeeding decades, the United States government has established quotas
for immigration from various countries, and criteria for the exclusion of many others, chiefly
Communists, homosexuals, and felons. !d.
412. !d.
413. MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE UNWANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 179 ( 1985) ("Constantly questioned about who they were, what their status was,
and what was their destination, these people could not cross international frontiers, could not
remain where they were, and were often not supposed to be at liberty at all.").
414. !d.
415. !d. at 180. Stateless persons were "outlaws by definition," cut off from civilized
society and completely at the mercy of the police who could expel them. !d.; see also
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 269-87 (1966).
416. CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 234 (discussing a split in ideology between the
Tucson Ecumenical Council and the Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America).
417. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980) (explaining power,
not as the clash of competing interest groups, but as a characteristic inherent to social
structures, including the discourse that shape social life. Faoucault's approval emphasized
the productive character of power to create thoughts, prompt speech, and direct action rather
than its repressive sensoring or limiting character); see also MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1979).
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interpretation of legality that it was so completely and firmly silenced in the
official accounts of our nation's law?

A. The Problem of Recognizing Religious Conscience and Dissent
Together in Law
Two attributes of the Movement make it a compelling study of
religious-civil law dichotomy. First, the Movement is but one part of a
mosaic of contemporary movements of religiously inspired intentional
resistance to the law by citizens. 418 Second, these forms of religiously
based interpretation of law do not fit neatly into the doctrinal pattern
established by the free exercise of religion conflicts from which our
jurisprudence has been formed. The doctrine has developed through cases
involving religious practices observed or prescribed by minority sects. 419
However, none of the contemporary religious-dissent movements fits this
sect-contained mold. In contrast, today's clashes between religious and civic
obligations tum on the intensely personal religious motivation of the participants.420 Although the beliefs upon which the actors are motivated may
be shared by many others, those other participants are not necessarily of the
same sectarian faith. 421 With respect to the Sanctuary workers, the lack

418. Operation Rescue, antinuclear achvtsts and antimilitarists are other such
movements. Many of their participants describe their acts as necessary according to their
religious beliefs. Extensive media coverage brings these organized campaigns of dissent into
most American homes. Even more remarkable is the extent of participation in these
movements by thousands of ordinary, law-abiding Americans, either directly or through
armchair support. The Movement's relief activities often involved whole cities, and some
200 congregations offered space as safe havens for Central American refugees. See Arthur
Helton, Ecumenical. Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy, 21
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493 (1986).
419. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (addressing Amish objections to
payment of Social Security taxes); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, reh 'g denied, 368 U.S.
869 ( 1961) (addressing Jewish observance of Saturday as the Sabbath); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (addressing Mormon teaching of polygamous marriage).
420. The United States has long had the reputation of being more overtly religious
than other Western nations. Surveys indicate that religion in America is pervasive and
important. Over 90% of Americans identify with some conception of God or Supreme
Being. See Ari L. Goldman, Portrait of Religion in U.S. Holds Dozens of Surprises, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1991, at AI (survey of 113,000 people finding religion to be "very
important" to over 55% of the population, with the figure rising to 85% when including those
for whom religion is "fairly important"). The diversity of religious identification is
enormous: one standard source identifies over I ,300 primary religious organizations in the
United States. See 1. G. MELTON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS (2d ed.
1987).
421. I make this case based on my research among Sanctuary workers and upon the
work of others with respect to anti-abortion protesters. My research to date indicates that
Operation Rescue defendants have not argued Free Exercise claims in court.
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of organizational structure has been strikingly significant in the rhetorical
and strategic moves of both the prosecution teams and the courts to silence
the religious-practice character of the Sanctuary defendants' acts. 422
This difference limits the group identity attributed to the defendants.
Sanctuary workers cannot be treated as parallel to a familiar category of
religions, like Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, or Amish, all ofwhom might
be accommodated or otherwise treated as unique religious associations in the
larger social order. Instead, these errant actors, despite being motivated by
their respective religious beliefs, are more readily described in court without
reference to their understandings of religious obligation. This description
is both problematic and important because it suggests that, if followed to its
logical conclusion, Americans have the opportunity for presenting claims of
free exercise of religion only as an adjunct to membership in recognized
sects. 423 If so, this diverges sharply from the consensus achieved in
America by the end of the eighteenth century that government should not
impose upon the belief of the individual. 424
Conscientious dissent may be socially tolerable when the affected group
can be clearly defined. But when the affected group is less defined by a
common trait such as sectarian religion, the social order is threatened. In
the case of Sanctuary prosecutions, the defendants' ran headlong into this
dichotomy because no traditional or authoritative body directed the activities
for which Sanctuary workers were prosecuted. 425 This fact perhaps
accounts for the relative ease with which the government was able to treat
Sanctuary defendants as nonreligious. If this is so, there is a wide gulf
between American legal institutions and the intensely personal, yet
noncanonical, religious experience that is widespread among today's
citizens.

422. See CRITIENDEN, supra note 7, at 201-02. A significant element of the
Movement and its prosecution, particularly the Tucson conspiracy trial which was approved
and directed in part from the Justice Department, is the problem of its characterization as
"religious" or "political" as if these are mutually exclusive. Its political meanings were not
lost on the government prosecutors and federal judges. See supra text accompanying note
187.
423. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 95 (1993) (discussing the success of religions which rest their claims on the
Ten Commandments in Free Exercise challenges).
424. JOHN LOCKE, A LEITER CONCERNING TOLERATION, reprinted in JOHN LOCKE,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough ed., 1956).
425. See Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956. The Supreme Court has not literally restricted the
protection of religious belief to organized religion. It has observed that the Free Exercise
guarantee is not limited to those "responding to the commands of a particular religious
organization," Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 820 (1989), and that
it "is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all the members of a religious sect," Thomas
v. Indiana Employment Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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Courts neutralize a defendant's religious motivations through other
methods, as well. Coupled with the historical tendency of the courts to
exclude dissenters' beliefs from judicial proceedings, there is a strong
preference to classify cases arising out of conscientious nonobedience as
"political," even where the essence of the conflict is religious. 426 Religious claims, treated as such, appear to be cognizable if they permit the
court to remind us of the firmness of separation between church and state.
Cases of conscientious disobedience that arise from religious understanding,
such as refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces, 427 tend to
be characterized as involving political, rather than religious positions.
The judiciary employs resistance of its own to claims arising from
religious consciousness. 428 It is hard for courts to credit real religious
human rights work, given the analytic framework used for religious
motivation in legal settings. This framework partly reflects social conventions for understanding religious experience: it is personal. It is not
appropriate to urge it on other individuals or on the political process because
that would run afoul of majoritarian notions of liberal political order. The
public should not pay for personal religious preferences, hence the separation strand of establishment cases. People conduct their religious business
in church-like settings. Once religious practices, however, have effects in
the public realm, the public deals with it as politics, the effect of which is
not to credit your religiously conscious experience. 429
Religious persons may have a difficult time compartmentalizing because
it denies a central strand of religious experience: to rely on one's faith-based
understandings for one's actions, whether those actions pertain to personal,
public, or political activities. For some people, this occurs at significant
moments, like the receipt of a draft notice. For others, this culminates into
a faith-committed life, exemplified by joining a congregation or in choosing
life work.
The dismissive treatment of religious conscience in the Sanctuary cases
reflects the judicial skepticism in our First Amendment jurisprudence. The
Supreme Court has been operating for generations without a unifying
understanding of the Free Exercise of Religion guarantee. The meaning of

426. E.g., American Friends Service Comm. Corp v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th
Cir. 1992); Ryan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991);
Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985) (involving a religiously motivated nuclear
protestor); Cole v. Spear, 747 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1984) (involving an application by an
enlistee in the armed services for discharge as a conscientious objector).
427. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 337 (1971).
428. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 662.
429. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 6 (1994) (arguing that in
the last 20 years there has been a tendency to exclude religion from the public discourse in
both law and politics).
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the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the Constitution, our most authoritative text, is always in contest by virtue of the fact that meaning lies in the
relation of text to the diverse and divergent narrative traditions within the
nation. 43° Courts have preferred to skip the narratives (although that is
where compelling meaning resides). 431 This diminution contributes to an
impoverished and incoherent recognition of religious faith when it is
exercised.
Within the profession of legal interpreters, the courts' incoherence in
recognizing a religious faith can be explained by recognizing the continuum
which courts have employed when articulating standards applied in free
exercise of religion cases. At one end of the continuum, courts impose a
standard of reasonableness of the claim for constitutional protection. 432 At
the opposite end of the continuum, courts focus· on assessing the subjective
belief of the claimant and the sincerity of the claim that her conduct is
central to her religious belief. 433

430. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (discussing the acknowledgment of the proliferation
of legal meaning and its necessary pluralism).
43 L Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 662.
432. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (upholding the application
of the Social Security tax system on the Old Order Amish, despite claimants' belief that it
was necessary to provide for each other directly, and thus was wrong for them to accept or
provide these government benefits). Conventionally this would be described as an objective
standard, but in this context I dismiss that characterization since its effect tends to be statist
in that it recognizes the most assimilated, secularized notions and practices.
For generations preceding Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988), courts have,
not surprisingly, leaned toward statist/objective evaluation of free exercise claims, and the
result has almost uniformly been denial ~f the claim. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961) (declining to enjoin a state law requiring all businesses to close on Sundays,
reasoning that the burden imposed on orthodox Jewish merchants was merely "indirect");
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Idaho's territorial legislation held valid in refusing
the vote to any person who advocated the practice of polygamy); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding conviction of a Mormon in the Utah territory under a federal
law criminalizing polygamy).
In conducting this type of analysis, courts focus on several factors: (I) the societal
impact of protecting the prohibited activity when religiously motivated, see Lee, 455 U.S. at
258-59; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 608-09; Davis, 133 U.S. at 341; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167-68;
(2) the degree of threat posed by the activity, see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 709-11
(1986) (upholding denial of AFDC benefits to Native American family who refused to obtain
a Social Security number for their two-year-old child against claimants' belief that doing so
would violate their religious beliefs); Lee, 455 U.S. at 258-59; Davis, 133 U.S. at 342-43;
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66; and (3) the extent to which the asserted right could be carried
if recognized; see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699-70; Lee, 455 U.S. at 260; Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at
608-09; Davis, 133 U.S. at 34; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
433. Thomas v. Indiana Employment Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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At the subjective end of the courts' analytic continuum, the threshold
question is whether the actor sincerely believes the conduct is central to her
religious life. 434 While the government may not second guess a person
regarding the truth, or other aspects, of the tenets of one's religion, it may
seek assurance of the sincerity of a believer in her religion if her beliefs are
in conflict with the law on that basis. 435
A religious belief need not be shared by all other adherents of the
claimant's faith to be protected, 436 but it helps. 437 The Supreme Court's
cases evidence a pattern of preferring religion in its sectarian forms, with the
outward trappings of practice such as priests and appointed practices of
worship. 438 The Court further relies on a process of analogy. 439 In
analogizing, the court's inquiry is "whether a conscientious objector who
could not demonstrate membership in a church [can] show a given belief
that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption."440
Likewise, federal courts demonstrate skepticism of exotic beliefs or
practices for those seeking protection under the First Amendment's free
exercise of religion guarantee. 441 To curtail unpredictably broad consequences, the courts have appeared anxious not to extend constitutional
protection to unorthodox and amorphous ideas and practices. 442
434. See, e.g., id. at 707-716; United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,81-82,86 (1944);
see also Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) ("indisputed that
appellant's ... religious belief was sincerely held"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209
(1972) (state stipulated to the sincerity of respondents' beliefs); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 399 n.1 (1963) (sincerity of appellants' beliefs unquestioned).
435. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation). The Court's analysis tends to feature factors such as: (1) a concern for fraud,
or the likelihood that the claimant is obscuring a secular motive in the drape of free exercise
discourse; (2) how large a group of which the claimant is a representative part; (3) how well
established is the practice for which protection is sought; (4) and whether denial of protection
will communicate governmental hostility to sincere religious practices. See, e.g., Yoder, 406
U.S. at 207-18, 235.
436. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
437. Compare Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956 with Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 136 (1987).
438. See FLETCHER, supra note 423. Hence, the courts have struggled with
recognizing conscientious-objector status for persons seeking draft exemptions on religious
grounds who were not conventionally religious. /d.
439. See Seeger v. United States, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
440. See id.; see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that the
exemption was available to those opposing all wars, not just those they viewed as unjust);
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (holding that draftees were not required to
oppose war on religious grounds, to qualify for the exemption).
441. See, e.g., International Soc 'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 113 S. Ct. 37
(1992).
442. See id.
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This skepticism is illustrated in the Sanctuary cases. The Elder court
said it recognized the sincerity and religiosity ofthe claimant's beliefs, albeit
after hearing evidence that Roman Catholics were permitted by their Church
to believe differently about a faith requirement to offer sanctuary to
refugees. 443 The Fifth Circuit was more disparaging in ·Merkt, when it
analogized the Sanctuary defendants' claims of protecting refugees under
human rights laws, to religiously motivated attempts to destroy nuclear
weapons; 444 racketeering; 445 and refusal to testify before a grand jury.446 The judicial treatment of objectors with religious claims is so
preoccupied with preserving social order that it does not comprehend the
vital role that conscientious conduct plays in maintaining a just social order.
Courts necessarily play a central role in the legal culture's recognition
of religious life as part of citizen life. The legislative branch cannot assert
itself because it is a task eluding complete description and, more import~nt
ly, because legislated accommodations may appear to be discriminatorily
preferential. 447
Both the claimed need for uniformity and the periodic concern over
fraudulent religious claims are misleading criteria for analyzing the
prosecution of the Sanctuary workers. First, the government's prosecution
of the Sanctuary workers was not the result of even-handed, methodical
enforcement of the border control laws. The number of refugees assisted by
Sanctuary churches was minuscule compared to either the vast numbers of

443. Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1577.
444. !d. (citing United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1985)).
445. !d. (citing United States v Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772-73 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983)).
446. !d. (citing Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802, 804 (2d Cir.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 409 U.S. 944 (1972) (holding a refusal to testify before a grand
jury based on belief in "divine punishment and ostracism from the Jewish community"
outweighed by state's interest in the testimony)).
447. See, e.g., Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concern to avoid discrimination by the government among religions is mirrored in free exercise cases concerned with
policing against fraudulent claims of religious motive and limiting the scope of a court's
inquiry into a person's religious tenets. Justice Stevens wrote:
In my opinion, the principal reason for adopting a strong presumption against such
claims is not a matter of administrative convenience. It is the overriding interest in
keeping the government-whether it be the legislature or the courts-out of the business
of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that governmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one
religion over another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to
preclude.
Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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people crossing the U.S.-Mexican border illegally or to the numbers of people
entering the United States through other avenues. 448
Second, fraudulent religious claims are not a plausible concern, in light of the
evidence and the federal courts' existin~ methodology for testing the sincerity of
belief without ruling on their truth. 44 Although the churches' Eractices of
notifying the government of their decisions to provide sanctuarl 0 do not in
themselves guarantee against the false adoption of religious guise for criminal
pwposes, no serious question has been raised about the authenticity of Sanctuary
congregations' Presbyterian, Lutheran, Quaker, Reform Judaism, and Baptist ties.
Distinguishing the Movement from alien-smuggling for profit requires no difficult
analysis. 451
B. Judicial Denigration of Dissent
The published opinions of Sanctuary prosecutions and appeals persistently
admonished the defendants for reinterpreting the law, in lieu of using the lawful

448. Numbers are difficult to estimate and subject to much dispute. The number of
refugees provided sanctuary are estimated from 600 to 3000. See William C. Ryan, The
Historical Case for Sanctuary, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 209 (1987). Judicial concern has
generally been on a much larger scale, as reflected in the Supreme Court's descriptions of
the substantiality of governmental interest in stanching illegal immigration. See, e.g.,
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 222 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting the magnitude of illegal aliens in the United States); see also United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 899 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (discussing the effects
of the tide of illegal aliens); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, I 048 (1984) (noting "the staggering dimensions" of the problem created for INS
by the large number of deportable aliens); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
864 (1982) (discussing "the enormous flow of illegal aliens across [America's] southern
border").
Some argue that illegal entries are so common and numerous, as to make our national
borders irrelevant. See J. CREWSDON, THE TARNISHED DOOR: THE NEW IMMIGRANTS AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA I 11 (1983); R. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS
IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 ( 1984) (international concerns historically with
the regulation of immigrant refugee populations).
449. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
450. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 7, at 73-74. The Tucson covenant called for overt,
not covert, aid; it was intentionally a very open, porous operation, which led some
participants to expect to be infiltrated, as they indeed were. See id. at 164. Since the Fifth
Circuit's first Merkt decision, Tucson Sanctuary workers have been mailing letters of
notification to INS for every crossing they assist. The letters explain that the network is
helping the refugee to obtain advice of legal counsel concerning asylum application.
Author's interview with Jim Corbett, supra note 80.
45 I. One of the tasks of the infiltrators appears to have been to tape evidence of
Sanctuary workers' receiving money after crossing Central Americans. Govt Tape (transcript
on file with author). These efforts backfired when a tape recorded an infiltrator being
reprimanded for suggesting the Movement charge a fee for bringing a refugee across the
border. !d.
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process. 452 This admonishment is a judicial trope, argued against a fear that to
claim scope for religious conscience is to claim that one's values should prevail
over the values chosen by the majority. The result of such misguidance is that
each conscience is viewed as a law unto itself. 453 The implicit political theory
of this perception is that so long as one participates in the values competition of
the political marketplace, one cannot claim a constitutional right to avoid
compliance on the basis that his values did not win the competition.454
This assertion is preposterous in the actual historical setting of the Movement.
Sanctuary workers were not able to offer their values in the political marketplace
because there was no public political forum in which they might present their
values. There was no public deliberation of the draconian enforcement measures
of the INS that were just being discovered. The causal links between the policies
of the United States toward Central American governments and the flood of
refugees were not widely known, nor were they in a form for public discussion.
Because those constituting the Movement learned of the causal links by working
with refugees and the INS, their work allowed them to help open American
foreign policy towards Central America to democratic deliberation and change.
Because so few Americans knew, or were concerned, about the impact of federal
policy on Central American immigration, the Sanctuary workers and other
dissenters from American foreign policy towards Central America were a distinct
minority. In a nation based on rnajoritarian rule, a minority voice is a sure loser
in the context of electoral politics or interest group lobbying in the political
marketplace.
The judicial opinions reiterate a familiar thread in the rhetoric of democratic
life: Citizens who possess the right to vote also possess the power to change laws
and remove public officials.455 Non-use of these powers is construed as consent
to the authority of the law and of political officeholders. 456 This invocation in
the opinions illustrates the confusions engendered when courts discuss political
theory in the guise of removed judicial review: it is murk, not analysis. 457 Such
discussions confuse citizen acquiescence with genuine consent; it supposes,

452. See Aguilar, 883 F.2d at 667.
453. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. at 669 (discussing Smith's argument
that the Constitution permitted use of peyote in religious ceremonies despite its being an
illegal narcotic). The Elder court expressed a parallel concern by recasting Elder's religious
belief into his own "do-it-yourself foreign policy." 601 F. Supp. at 1578.
454. See CARTER, supra note 429 (arguing that the federal courts specifically, and the
legal culture more generally, do not take religious values seriously as a special source of
conscientious objection); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses,
102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause fequires the recognition
of religious faith as a ground for exemption from legal obligation).
455. See, e.g., Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1579; A. John Simmons, Consent, Free Choice,
and Democratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 791, 799 ( 1984) [hereinafter Simmons, Consent
and Democratic Government].
456. See Simmons, Consent and Democratic Government, supra note 455, at 797.
457. See Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1579.
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wrongly, that consent can be given to laws, or officials, without prior or
subsequent knowledge of them, and without the intent to consent. 458 Most
fundamental, however, is the misperception that individuals possess these rights,
for only majorities do. 459 Thus, one's failure to exercise these rights can in no
way be construed as consent to particular laws, constitutional provisions, or acts
of government officials. 460
To reason in this way invokes majority rule as an expression of concern to
preserve the body politic. 461 From this perspective, the legal system cannot
permit itself to be overruled by forms of dissenting claims, whether religious or
other forms. The legal system also cannot rationally disregard, or totally discount,
the religious discourse of those who are expected to be its obedient subjects. The
arguments of this nature made by the Sanctuary courts lack the sweeping force
they hoped they might carry because these arguments deny too much. This
argument's position is that the citizen never has the right to choose to disobey the
official laws of his or her pol_ity. This position, however, mistakes the character
of moral life altogether by eliminating the necessity that citizens must choose their
obedience if they are to be free. In essence, if citizens may not choose, then the
state is wholly in charge of their obedience and the practice of obedience can
contain no well-thought reflection. 462 Thoughtful citizens are made obsolete,
resulting in a political majority comprised of "thoughtless slaves."463
A slightly more persuasive argument, hinted at by the courts who decided
Sanctuary cases, is that social chaos may result if legal authority can be readily
contested by appeals to matters outside that juridical system. 464 A companion
idea is that such appeals threaten peaceful and orderly "community life" under
laws. 465 There is little historical support for this expectation, particularly within
the American political order. 466 Granting the premise, where the injustice of the
positive law is atrocious, it must be contested. While some disorder may result,
the health of the body politic is served by the genuine contest over the justice or
~ustice of the positive laws because the resulting contest allows the public to
give serious consideration to the laws.
One further troubling observation is the array of procedural moves employed
by the courts who heard the Sanctuary prosecutions to preclude the articulation,
in court, of knowledge and beliefs that are in "opposition" to government

458. See Simmons, Consent and Democratic Government, supra note 455, at 797.
459. /d. at 799.
460. /d. (arguing that failing to do something can be a means of consent only when
the inaction responds to a clear choice and signifies that such a choice has been made).
46L See COHEN, supra note 322, at 14L
462. !d.
463. See id
464. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 955; Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1578; see also COHEN, supra note
322, at 146.
465. COHEN, supra note 322, at 146.
466. Jd at 148-49.
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policies.467 The motion in limine in the Tucson Sanctuary trial functioned much
like the justiciability and standing barriers commonly erected in contemporary
cases of politically inspired acts of protest468 and the formalistic standing
analysis used in the nineteenth century to avoid cases challenging slavery.469
Whether or not this is the right line to draw, it has tremendous effect. A
great proportion of civil resisters who are permitted to offer an international law
defense are acquitted by a jury.470 This pattern suggests that, when able to
defend their actions, fellow citizens may be convinced that their actions were not
in violation of positive law. If this is the case, courts are not furthering the
interests of democracy when they erect procedural barriers to the presentation of
defenses because of their "oppositional" character.471
How could the legal landscape become more respecting of a defendant's
conscience? One approach would be to resurrect historical links between human
rights and the concept of "obligation to obey law." This link would serve to
reinvigorate democratic political theory. Seeing our constitution of polity as a
moral, as well as a legal, community is profoundly historical. 472 Our nation's
history reflects a conception of fidelity to law that has been transformed from one
of compliance with ordained roles and functions to one centrally premised on
substantive values of respect for human rights-the central exemplar of which is
the inalienable right to conscience.473
For some theorists, some.form or degree of political anarchism is inherent in
democratic values. 474 This anarchistic argument is supported by its criticism of
traditional attempts of democratic theory to separate thought and action. 475

See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases:
Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1987); Lippmann, Nuremberg and
American Justice, supra note 360, at 964-68 (1991 ).
469. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
467.
468.

PROCESS (1975).
470. See Francis A. Boyle, International Law, Citizen Resistance, and Crimes by the
State-the Defense Speaks. II Hous. J. INT'L L. 345 (1989); Lippmann, Nuremberg and
American Justice, supra note 360, at 974.
471. See Frank Lawrence, Note, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political
Protesters, 40 HAST. L.J. 397, 417-27 (1989); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Jury Nullification and
Jury Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 857-65 (1990).
472. David A.J. Richards, Conscience, Human Rights, and the Anarchist Challenge to
the Obligation to Obey the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1984).
473. /d. (discussing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT).
474. E.g., WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE (1976); R.P.
WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970).
475. The United States Supreme Court has apparently felt the compulsion to limit
conscience to belief, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 297 (1940), and at times, has also
felt the power of the critique, as when it extended the protection of the Free Exercise Clause
to conscientiously motivated action in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding
Amish noncompliance with school attendance laws), and in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
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Efforts to limit conscience to belief "has allowed conventional morality to justify
coercion of acts so that uncritical public opinion tyrannizes both thought and
action in ways that compromise the moral sovereignty of persons."476 The legal
enforcement of mere congruence of belief creates a tyrannous public opinion
which disables people from exercising independent conscience within the two
united spheres of humanity: belief and action. 477 Treating the right to conscience as an inalienable right protects one's moral integrity, which is the unity
of belief and action. 478 To limit the right of conscience to belief alone "erects
a wall [against] belief and action which shrivels conscience itself when conscientious belief cannot shape the experiences of our lives."479
But to reject this argument with the anarchists, recognition that conscience
includes action alone need not be taken as a pledge for absolute protection for
conscientious action. 480 A narrower version of the anarchistic claim also suits
the Movement's civil initiative: a state's coercion or criminalization must satisfy
an argument which expresses the greatest respect for the diverse ways in which
independent conscience may be expressed and exercised.481 Such a narrower
version is consistent with a respect for all beliefs. Such a formulation requires the
state to justify coercion by something like a requirement of likely harm to others.
Thus, the state must limit its coercion to protecting what free, rational persons
acknowledge and accept as the general conditions of life, integrity, and security
necessary to pursue the ends defined by their independent consciences.
The prosecution of the Movement fails this test. Was it conscientious action?
Yes. Did the government know that? Yes, because of its undercover tapes. The
government's process of justification, however, was filtered through a statist lens
that would brook no opposition to official versions of events in Central America.
The Movement posed no meaningful threat to American borders, and there is no
serious argument that can be made to construe the Movement's border crossing
as profiteering coyotismo. It was, however, independent interpretation of the law.
For not towing the official line, the Movement was construed as political dissent.
Thus, the government moved to squelch it.

(1963) (reversing the denial of workers compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist
who would not accept employment on her Sabbath).
476. Richards, supra note 471, at 778 (discussing JOHNS. MILL, ON LIBERTY 133-204
(1873)).
477. /d.
478. /d.
479. !d. at 779. Mill delivered a stinging critique that "this stifling lack of freedom
of thought and action in England and America as the corruption of the Anglo-American
democratic tradition." /d. This invites linkage to (1) creation of culture, or more
specifically, manufacture of consent; and (2) tolerance data on antidemocratic beliefs of many
of Americans.
480. /d. at 779.
481. Cf id.
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One final consideration is the "arguments of rights as institutional rights in
constitutional democracy."482 In the American constitutional framework, one
can argue procedurally and substantively about rights, thereby invalidating
offending laws. This feature makes civil initiative admirable because it counters
official disobedience of laws that violate rights. This alternative political ideal
emphasizes, rather than muzzles, conscientious, community-tested dissent. This
difference explains the significance to American politics of the First Amendment
values of conscience in religion, speech, and press. 483
This understanding of the Constitution requires an independent judiciary to
which constitutional rights may be argued. 484 Independence in this sense means
"not managerial control but respect for dialogue about the meaning of personal
rights."485 This perspective treats a person's resistance to violation of rights not
as "anarchic utopian hallucinations of those who must be managed but as
demands of independent citizens for self-respect."486 Constitutional democracy
also requires the fidelity of the government to ideals of the moral sovereignty of
the people as constitutive and the recognition that the obedience of citizens to the
state's assertions of the law derives from the state's success in meeting these
ideals.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the Sanctuary contest over legality, we see two visions of adjudication which
compete within American legal theory. The ascendant view today is that
adjudication is the interpretation of preexisting text guided by reason. 487 This
view has superseded, but not eliminated, the competing vision that adjudication
is the creation of law, backed by the force of the state-an act of power, not of

482. !d. (discussing H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 220-42 (1982)).
483. This significance is always in flux. See Robin L. West, The Authoritarian
Impulse in Constitutional Law, 42 U: MIAMI L. REV. 531,535 (1988). Martin Luther King,
Jr. invoked this distinction by his refusal to obey a valid court order, and by arguing from
his jail cell that he protested unjust practices that violated the Constitution. See Martin L.
King, Jr. Letter from Birmingham Jail (April 16, 1963) in WHY CAN'T WE WAIT 77 (1963);
see also Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 ( 1967). Reverend King was vindicated in this
claim when the statute under which he was imprisoned was held unconstitutional. See
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). The ability of disobedience to
prompt constitutional elaboration of normative values and human rights marks disobedience
as a form of powerful faith in the deeper ideals of constitutional government. King, in
Birmingham, revealed himself to be one of the nation's most profound constitutionalists. See
Richards, supra note 472, at 788.
484. Richards, supra note 472, at 788.
485. !d.
486. !d.
487. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739
(1982); Ronald Dworkin, How Law is Like Literature, in MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146 (1985).
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discove:ry. 488 In the interpretive view, judicial obedience to legal text is an
essential guard against the exercise of power. 489 Where power is destructive
and threatening to the community's life, obedience to text is constructive: It uplifts
the communitarian and rational aspects of society by preserving the meaning of
our collective· life and transforming power into reason. 490 By all appearances,
the judges who decided the Sanctuary cases patterned their analysis on this
dominant view. The moral force of this approach, however, fails in the larger
context of the Sanctuary Movement.
The adjudicative decisions not to confront directly the Sanctuary claims give
the juridical results a decidedly imperative, rather than interpretive, cast. Judges
sought to insist upon obedience to one legal text, which criminalized the
assistance of aliens, while subordinating the Refugee Act of 1980, which describes
persons who should receive protection. It was perfectly reasonable for citizens
to understand the Refugee Act of 1980 to be part of their nation's law, to which
an obligation of citizen obedience may be asserted. The legal system's punitive
response to the Movement cannot fairly be understood as protecting public
meaning other than obedience to the state's choice of texts and assertion of
unrivaled interpretive authority. While, in many circumstances, insistence upon
obedience to the state may indeed serve to protect the body politic, the mere
insistence upon obedience to some legal text cannot be said to infuse the
adjudication with unquestionable morality. Without a justifiable claim to
obedience to selected legal text, the Sanctuary adjudications smack of muzzling
dissent.
The moral fodder in the Sanctuary contest lay not in the legal texts, but in the
politicized process of asylum application and adjudication. Judicial insistence that
citizens obey legal text, uncoupled from a similar expectation that government do
the same, erodes, rather than upholds, the institutional virtue on which the
judiciary stakes its claims to speak authoritatively. 491

488. See Robin L. West, Adjudication is Not Interpretation, 54 TENN. L. REv. 203
(1987).
489. Dworkin, supra note 486, at 146 ("Law ... conceived [as interpretation] is
. deeply and thoroughly political. Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad sense
of political theory.") But see id. at 146 (recognizing Jaw can be conducted so that it is "not
a matter of personal or partisan politics").
490. See West, supra note 488, at 247.
491. See Fiss, supra note 487.
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